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ABSTRACT	  	  	   Since	  November	  2009,	  Greece	  has	  been	  mired	  in	  financial	  crisis	  with	  little	  indication	  that	  it	  will	  be	  solved	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  Research	  and	  media	  accounts	  have	  faulted	  Greece	  for	  sowing	  the	  seeds	  of	  its	  own	  financial	  crisis	  through	  fiscal	  mismanagement	  extending	  back	  to	  the	  1980’s.	  	  Successive	  Greek	  governments	  have	  been	  criticized	  for	  racking	  up	  an	  unsustainable	  amount	  of	  foreign	  debt.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  prevalence	  of	  such	  accounts,	  European	  officials	  and	  Greek	  politicians	  have	  adopted	  a	  nationally	  oriented	  strategy	  to	  resolve	  the	  current	  crisis.	  	  This	  strategy	  means	  that	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  reform	  effort	  falls	  on	  Greece	  to	  neoliberalize	  its	  economy	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  fix	  its	  macroeconomic	  finances.	  	  In	  effect,	  Greece	  is	  viewed	  as	  ‘the	  sick	  man	  of	  Europe’	  that	  must	  be	  ‘cured’	  through	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  and	  through	  liberalization,	  deregulation,	  and	  privatization	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  It	  is	  commonly	  thought	  that	  if	  Greece	  can	  fix	  its	  macroeconomic	  finances,	  then	  the	  crisis	  will	  be	  solved.	  	   With	  expected	  deficit	  reductions	  failing	  to	  be	  achieved	  time	  and	  time	  again	  and	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  continuing	  to	  climb,	  clearly	  this	  reform	  strategy	  is	  failing	  to	  provide	  a	  real	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  not	  strictly	  a	  national	  problem.	  	  Instead,	  the	  situation	  is	  a	  crisis	  of	  the	  eurozone,	  and	  any	  viable	  solution	  must	  take	  this	  into	  consideration.	  	   When	  Greece	  adopted	  the	  euro	  in	  2001,	  Greece	  effectively	  became	  a	  peripheralized	  and	  indebted	  country	  in	  Western	  Europe.	  	  Greek	  exports	  became	  less	  competitive	  when	  Greece	  was	  tied	  to	  a	  hard	  euro	  currency,	  and	  it	  became	  economically	  rational	  for	  Greece	  to	  use	  cheap	  subsidies	  offered	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  fund	  the	  importation	  of	  commodities	  produced	  in	  the	  core	  of	  the	  eurozone	  (Germany,	  France,	  Netherlands,	  Luxembourg).	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  eurozone	  created	  a	  massive	  power	  imbalance	  between	  the	  strong,	  Northern	  European	  countries	  and	  the	  weak,	  Southern	  European	  countries,	  Portugal,	  Spain,	  and	  Italy	  included.	  	  Until	  European	  officials	  take	  this	  dynamic	  into	  consideration	  and	  recommend	  a	  global	  reform	  strategy	  that	  takes	  the	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  into	  account,	  nationally	  oriented	  reforms	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  implemented	  in	  Greece,	  and	  the	  crisis	  will	  continue.	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CHAPTER	  I	  	  
INTRODUCTION	  	  	  	   Since	  November	  of	  2009,	  Greece	  has	  been	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  its	  worst	  financial	  crisis	  in	  its	  modern	  history.	  	  An	  exorbitant	  debt-­‐load,	  accumulated	  over	  decades	  by	  fiscally	  mismanaged	  governments,	  has	  encumbered	  the	  economy.	  	  Orchestrated	  by	  Greek	  politicians,	  February	  2010	  signaled	  the	  first	  round	  of	  austerity.	  	  Protests	  erupted	  as	  angry	  Greeks	  resisted	  the	  erosion	  of	  their	  standard	  of	  living	  that	  is	  an	  invariable	  consequence	  of	  austerity.	  	  By	  early	  May	  2010,	  Greece	  was	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  default.	  	  Days	  earlier,	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  and	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  approved	  of	  a	  110	  billion	  euro	  bailout	  package	  that	  would	  keep	  Greece	  liquid	  on	  its	  debt	  obligations.	  	  To	  receive	  the	  funds	  and	  avoid	  default,	  Greece	  would	  need	  to	  accept	  additional	  austerity	  measures.	  	  In	  this	  three-­‐month	  period,	  from	  February	  to	  May	  2010,	  the	  demonstrations	  became	  more	  violent,	  and	  the	  strikes	  more	  paralyzing	  to	  the	  economy	  (The	  Children	  of	  the	  Gallery	  2011).	  	   May	  5,	  2010	  signaled	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  protest	  movement.	  	  A	  general	  strike	  was	  called	  by	  Greek	  trade	  unions,	  left	  political	  parties,	  and	  anti-­‐authoritarian	  anarchist	  organizations	  to	  protest	  against	  the	  third	  round	  of	  austerity	  that	  politicians	  were	  voting	  on	  in	  Parliament	  that	  day.	  	  The	  strike	  immobilized	  airline	  flights,	  ferries,	  schools,	  and	  hospitals	  (Kaplanis	  2011).	  	  Estimates	  of	  up	  to	  a	  hundred	  thousand	  Greeks	  marched	  towards	  Parliament	  chanting	  slogans	  such	  as	  “Let’s	  burn	  the	  Parliament	  brothel”	  and	  “IMF	  go	  away”	  (The	  Children	  of	  the	  Gallery	  2011).	  	  Crowds	  of	  disgruntled	  Greeks	  tried	  to	  invade	  the	  building	  from	  any	  access	  available;	  there	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were	  none	  as	  hundreds	  of	  riot	  police	  beat	  back	  the	  rioters	  with	  tear	  gas	  and	  stun	  grenades.	  	  	  	   In	  the	  nearby	  streets,	  signs	  of	  anger	  were	  everywhere,	  as	  the	  central	  boulevards	  resembled	  a	  war	  zone.	  	  Buildings,	  cars,	  and	  trash	  bins	  were	  burning;	  windows	  and	  pavements	  were	  shattered	  (Smith	  2010).	  	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  all	  the	  violence	  and	  property	  destruction,	  a	  Marfin	  bank	  branch	  remained	  open.	  	  Their	  boss	  told	  the	  workers	  that	  they	  would	  lose	  their	  job	  if	  they	  did	  not	  work	  that	  day.	  	  Opposed	  to	  businesses	  operating	  during	  the	  strike,	  a	  group	  of	  black-­‐hooded	  anarchists	  threw	  Molotov	  cocktails	  into	  the	  bank.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  twenty	  workers	  coerced	  to	  work	  that	  day	  escaped;	  however,	  three	  did	  not	  (Boukalas	  2011;	  The	  Children	  of	  the	  Gallery	  2011).	  	  	   After	  hours	  of	  intense	  clashes	  with	  riot	  police	  at	  the	  foot	  of	  the	  Parliament	  building,	  it	  was	  announced	  that	  three	  workers	  were	  killed.	  	  Disheartened	  and	  overcome	  with	  sadness,	  the	  protestors	  retreated;	  the	  deaths	  were	  deeply	  regretted.	  Greek	  protestors	  claimed	  that	  fringe,	  hooded	  anarchists	  were	  to	  blame,	  and	  that	  these	  individuals	  were	  not	  characteristic	  of	  the	  larger	  movement	  (Kaplanis	  2011).	  	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Greek	  government,	  such	  distinctions	  did	  not	  matter.	  	  The	  deaths	  gave	  an	  opportunity	  for	  government	  politicians	  to	  condemn	  the	  social	  upheaval	  that	  led	  to	  the	  murders.	  	  Austerity,	  according	  to	  Greek	  politicians,	  was	  the	  path	  to	  life	  and	  economic	  stability	  (The	  Children	  of	  the	  Gallery	  2011).	  	  Austerity	  measures	  passed	  that	  day	  in	  the	  Parliament;	  two	  years	  later,	  austerity	  remains	  the	  central	  tenet	  of	  the	  reform	  package	  meant	  to	  solve	  the	  crisis.	  	  With	  deficit	  targets	  failing	  to	  be	  realized	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and	  the	  economy	  continuing	  to	  contract,	  clearly	  the	  reform	  package	  is	  not	  working.	  	  What	  was	  promoted	  as	  a	  path	  to	  economic	  stability	  has	  only	  lead	  to	  increased	  social	  frustration	  at	  a	  fraying	  government.	  	   With	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  relentlessly	  persisting	  since	  late	  2009,	  much	  debate	  has	  surfaced	  as	  to	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  viable	  solutions.	  	  Most	  mainstreams	  conceptions	  believe	  that	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  current	  crisis	  were	  laid	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  socialist	  party	  PASOK,	  led	  by	  the	  charismatic	  Andreas	  Papandreou1,	  gained	  popular	  support	  by	  creating	  a	  profligate,	  inefficient,	  and	  clientelistic	  government	  bureaucracy	  that	  became	  a	  hub	  for	  Greek	  employment.	  	  The	  welfare	  state	  was	  strengthened	  and	  wages	  and	  pensions	  rose	  for	  decades,	  as	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  economy	  declined	  and	  government	  debt	  piled	  up.	  	  According	  to	  Jason	  Manolopoulos	  (2011),	  “In	  Greece,	  the	  1980’s	  saw	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  ruinously	  wasteful	  and	  corrupt	  public	  sector”	  (p.8).	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  initial	  debt	  build-­‐up,	  the	  mainstream	  conception	  blames	  Greece’s	  adoption	  of	  the	  euro	  for	  exponentially	  increasing	  its	  deficit	  to	  unsustainable	  levels.	  	  According	  to	  Matthew	  Lynn	  (2011),	  “Backed	  by	  an	  unexpectedly	  strong	  currency,	  with	  a	  low	  interest	  rate…Greece	  suddenly	  found	  it	  could	  borrow	  just	  about	  as	  much	  money	  as	  it	  wanted	  without	  having	  to	  worry	  too	  much	  about	  paying	  it	  back”	  (p.	  53).	  	  Since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  euro,	  much	  of	  the	  
                                                
 1	  It	  must	  be	  made	  clear	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  two	  individuals	  from	  the	  Papandreou	  family	  are	  central	  to	  this	  thesis.	  	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  was	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  He	  is	  credited	  with	  building	  the	  inefficient	  and	  sprawling	  public	  sector	  and	  welfare	  state	  that	  necessitated	  massive	  amount	  of	  foreign	  borrowing.	  	  His	  son,	  George	  Papandreou	  became	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  2009.	  	  Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  George	  has	  been	  credited	  with	  scaling	  back	  the	  vast	  public	  sector	  and	  welfare	  state	  that	  his	  father	  created	  through	  austere	  structural	  adjustment	  measures.	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borrowed	  money	  was	  used	  to	  sustain	  the	  overstaffed	  and	  overburdened	  government	  bureaucracy	  created	  by	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  Michael	  Lewis	  (2010),	  writing	  for	  Vanity	  Fair	  compares	  the	  current	  Greek	  government	  bureaucracy	  to	  a	  piñata,	  “As	  it	  turned	  out,	  what	  the	  Greeks	  wanted	  to	  do,	  once	  the	  lights	  went	  out	  and	  they	  were	  alone	  in	  the	  dark	  with	  a	  pile	  of	  borrowed	  money,	  was	  turn	  their	  government	  into	  a	  piñata	  stuffed	  with	  fantastic	  sums	  and	  give	  as	  many	  citizens	  as	  possible	  a	  whack	  at	  it.”	  	  	  	   In	  effect,	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  cites	  fiscal	  mismanagement	  extending	  back	  to	  the	  1980’s	  as	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  According	  to	  Mohamed	  A.	  El-­‐Erian	  (2012),	  CEO	  of	  the	  investment	  company	  PIMCO:	  Many	  will	  be	  quick	  to	  blame	  successive	  Greek	  governments	  led	  by	  what	  used	  to	  be	  the	  two	  dominant	  political	  parties,	  New	  Democracy	  on	  the	  right	  and	  PASOK	  on	  the	  left.	  	  Eager	  to	  borrow	  their	  country	  to	  prosperity,	  they	  racked	  up	  enormous	  debts	  while	  presiding	  over	  a	  dramatic	  loss	  of	  competitiveness	  and,	  thus,	  growth	  potential.	  	  	  	  	   The	  Greek	  people	  are	  also	  faulted	  for	  living	  beyond	  their	  means	  in	  an	  entitlement	  culture	  that	  was	  established	  in	  the	  1980’s	  by	  Andreas	  Papandreou.	  	  The	  mainstream	  conception	  of	  the	  crisis	  thus	  adopts	  a	  nationally	  oriented	  analysis	  as	  to	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  Greece	  is	  blamed	  for	  its	  crisis	  and	  given	  totally	  agency	  in	  accumulating	  its	  vast	  public	  sector	  deficit	  that	  surfaced	  unavoidably	  in	  2009.	  	  In	  effect,	  Greece	  has	  been	  called	  “the	  sick	  man	  of	  Europe”	  that	  created	  the	  larger	  European	  financial	  crisis	  currently	  plaguing	  the	  eurozone	  (Malkoutzis	  2011).	  	  	  	   Structural	  adjustment,	  touted	  as	  the	  “cure”	  for	  “sick”	  economies	  since	  the	  1980’s,	  is	  the	  primary	  strategy	  in	  resolving	  the	  crisis.	  	  Such	  reforms	  are	  being	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implemented	  as	  a	  result	  of	  European	  and	  Greek	  officials	  endorsement	  of	  the	  mainstream	  analysis,	  where	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  reform	  effort	  falls	  squarely	  on	  Greece	  to	  fix	  its	  macroeconomic	  figures	  and	  pay	  back	  its	  debt-­‐load.	  	  Structural	  adjustment	  policies	  are	  currently	  being	  forced	  onto	  Greece	  through	  the	  bailout	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  keep	  the	  indebted	  country	  solvent	  during	  the	  reform	  period.	  	  	   The	  mainstream	  conception’s	  nationally	  oriented	  analysis	  is	  inadequate	  and	  counterproductive.	  	  Structural	  adjustment	  is	  failing	  to	  stabilize	  the	  Greek	  economy	  and	  is	  actually	  having	  the	  opposite	  effect	  by	  intensifying	  Greece’s	  economic	  recession.	  	  The	  failed	  reform	  strategy	  reflects	  the	  mainstream	  conception’s	  faulty	  diagnosis	  into	  the	  causes	  of	  Greece’s	  crisis.	  	  Although	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  is	  correct	  to	  indicate	  that	  Greece	  has	  been	  fiscally	  mismanaged	  by	  successive	  government	  regimes	  for	  decades,	  this	  conception	  neglects	  socio-­‐historical	  conditions	  and	  leads	  to	  a	  narrow	  and	  deficient	  analysis.	  	  Socio-­‐historical	  conditions	  specific	  to	  Greece	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  the	  global	  economy	  in	  the	  1970’s	  and	  1980’s	  are	  ignored,	  such	  as	  the	  political	  climate	  in	  the	  post-­‐military	  dictatorship	  period	  that	  encouraged	  irrational	  economic	  behavior	  and	  the	  de-­‐industrialization	  of	  Western	  countries	  in	  the	  1980’s,	  both	  having	  significant	  impacts	  on	  Greece’s	  economic	  development	  during	  that	  time.	  	  The	  failure	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  validates	  the	  point	  that	  any	  viable	  solution	  strategy	  cannot	  emerge	  from	  a	  faulty	  analysis	  of	  the	  foundations	  that	  created	  the	  crisis.	  	  	  	   What	  the	  mainstream	  account	  dismisses	  is	  that	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  a	  global	  problem	  and	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  flawed	  logic	  inherent	  in	  the	  capitalist	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world-­‐system,	  more	  than	  it	  is	  a	  national	  problem	  specific	  to	  Greece.	  	  Arguably,	  Greece	  has	  been	  the	  worst	  managed	  eurozone	  economy	  in	  recent	  history,	  but	  the	  crisis	  runs	  much	  deeper	  than	  simply	  saying	  that	  Greece	  sowed	  the	  seeds	  of	  its	  own	  destruction	  and	  thus	  must	  endure	  painful	  austerity.	  	  The	  mainstream	  narrative	  fails	  to	  understand	  the	  global	  dimension	  of	  the	  crisis	  to	  any	  degree.	  	  	  	  	  	   A	  viable	  reform	  strategy	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  entire	  eurozone	  that	  enabled	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  to	  develop:	  specifically,	  the	  massive	  power	  imbalance	  within	  this	  European	  monetary	  union.	  	  Since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  eurozone,	  the	  core	  countries,	  Germany,	  France,	  Netherlands,	  and	  Luxembourg,	  have	  developed	  strong,	  export-­‐led	  economies	  that	  have	  greatly	  benefitted	  from	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  monetary	  union.	  	  Conversely,	  Greece,	  characterized	  by	  its	  weak	  and	  uncompetitive	  economy,	  used	  cheap	  subsidies	  provided	  by	  the	  EU	  to	  import	  commodities	  produced	  in	  the	  core	  countries.	  	  Greece	  spiraled	  further	  and	  further	  into	  debt	  while	  its	  economy	  de-­‐industrialized	  and	  become	  less	  and	  less	  competitive.	  The	  PIIGS	  (Portugal,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  and	  Spain)	  are	  similarly	  experiencing	  their	  own	  unique	  financial	  crises	  that	  are	  consequences	  of	  the	  power	  imbalance	  within	  the	  eurozone.	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  PIIGS	  have	  been	  peripheralized	  within	  the	  core	  of	  Western	  Europe.	  	  Thus,	  a	  global	  orientation	  that	  is	  lacking	  in	  the	  mainstream	  analysis	  is	  needed	  to	  produce	  a	  realistic	  reform	  strategy	  that	  could	  solve	  Greece’s	  crisis	  and	  the	  larger	  European	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	  	   The	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  much	  like	  the	  Latin	  American	  financial	  crisis	  of	  the	  1970’s	  and	  1980’s;	  however,	  European	  elites	  in	  charge	  of	  fixing	  the	  Greek	  crisis	  
  7 
have	  not	  learned	  any	  lessons	  from	  the	  failed	  reform	  strategy	  implemented	  to	  solve	  this	  crisis.	  	  Similar	  to	  Greece,	  the	  Latin	  American	  financial	  crisis	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  national	  problem	  rather	  than	  a	  global	  problem.	  	  Individual	  countries	  were	  criticized	  for	  fiscal	  mismanagement	  and	  corruption	  in	  accumulating	  unsustainable	  deficits.	  	  Structural	  adjustment	  measures	  were	  invented	  during	  this	  period	  and	  used	  as	  a	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	  “cure”	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  solve	  their	  debt	  crisis	  nationally.	  	  Currently,	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  in	  Greece	  have	  the	  same	  goal	  as	  those	  used	  in	  Latin	  America	  decades	  earlier-­‐-­‐the	  extraction	  of	  capital	  from	  indebted	  countries.	  	   The	  case	  of	  Greece,	  however,	  is	  unique	  in	  many	  respects	  in	  that	  Greece	  is	  a	  single	  country	  within	  an	  economic	  community	  united	  by	  a	  single	  currency.	  	  This	  situation	  differs	  from	  the	  individual	  Latin	  American	  countries	  that	  dealt	  independently	  with	  the	  IMF	  or	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  	   Also	  unique	  is	  how	  the	  credit	  ratings	  agencies	  during	  the	  current	  Greek	  crisis	  have	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  analyzing	  the	  progression	  of	  the	  Greek	  economy	  through	  credit	  downgrades.	  	  Essentially,	  credit	  ratings	  agencies	  have	  embraced	  the	  role	  of	  “gatekeeper”	  and	  advise	  the	  larger	  financial	  community	  as	  to	  which	  countries	  are	  safe	  havens	  for	  investment	  (Robinson	  2008).	  	  This	  is	  unlike	  the	  IMF	  that	  was	  the	  central	  player	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  crisis	  and	  played	  the	  dual	  role	  of	  credit	  ratings	  agency	  and	  policy	  advisor.	  	  The	  IMF	  currently	  plays	  a	  secondary	  role	  in	  the	  Greek	  crisis	  shadowed	  by	  the	  EU	  that	  has	  been	  central	  in	  dictating	  the	  reform	  strategy	  for	  the	  Greek	  crisis.	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   In	  addition,	  currency	  devaluation	  is	  not	  an	  option	  for	  Greece	  to	  resolve	  its	  crisis.	  	  Greece	  and	  other	  eurozone	  countries	  are	  prohibited	  from	  any	  currency	  fluctuations	  within	  the	  union.	  	  This	  is	  different	  from	  the	  Latin	  American	  financial	  crisis	  where	  a	  key	  component	  to	  the	  structural	  adjustment	  reform	  strategy	  was	  currency	  devaluation.	  
Methods	  	  	  	   My	  thesis	  is	  a	  case	  study	  of	  Greece,	  specifically	  of	  the	  country’s	  present	  experience	  with	  a	  severe	  and	  persistent	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  which	  is	  understood	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  of	  Greece.	  	  Greece	  is	  empirically	  verifiable	  but	  only	  if	  it	  is	  first	  theoretically	  constructed	  and	  clear	  indicators	  can	  be	  established	  for	  what	  is	  being	  analyzed	  empirically.	  	   To	  begin,	  Greece	  is	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  nation-­‐state	  within	  the	  capitalist	  world-­‐system.	  	  Greece	  is	  recognized	  by	  the	  world	  as	  a	  juridically	  independent	  and	  sovereign	  nation,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  Greece	  also	  exists	  within	  the	  eurozone	  and	  is	  currently	  locked	  into	  a	  monetary	  union	  with	  other	  nations	  sharing	  a	  common	  currency	  complicates	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  Greece.	  	  By	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  monetary	  union,	  certain	  actions	  are	  constrained	  for	  Greek	  policymakers,	  such	  as	  currency	  fluctuations,	  while	  other	  actions	  are	  enabled,	  such	  as	  increased	  trading	  among	  eurozone	  members.	  	  Thus,	  conceptualizing	  Greece	  as	  a	  sovereign	  nation-­‐state	  is	  dialectical,	  focusing	  on	  Greece	  as	  an	  autonomous	  agent	  that	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  act	  within	  the	  capitalist	  world-­‐system,	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time	  cannot	  be	  separated	  and	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must	  be	  understood	  within	  the	  context	  of	  its	  monetary	  union	  with	  other	  European	  countries.	  	   In	  addition,	  my	  analysis	  of	  Greece	  is	  bounded	  within	  a	  specific	  timeframe.	  	  Greece’s	  present	  financial	  crisis	  began	  in	  November	  2009	  when	  the	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  George	  Papandreou	  announced	  that	  Greece’s	  budget	  deficit	  statistics	  had	  been	  falsified	  and	  were	  much	  higher	  than	  previously	  expected,	  prompting	  a	  series	  of	  credit	  downgrades	  and	  capital	  flight	  from	  Greece.	  	  This	  is	  the	  surface	  manifestation	  of	  crisis,	  yet	  the	  roots	  of	  this	  crisis	  extend	  back	  decades,	  specifically	  to	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  developmental	  period	  where	  Greece	  rebuilt	  its	  ravaged	  country	  and	  economy.	  	  Certain	  actions	  taken	  by	  successive	  Greek	  governmental	  regimes	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  Western	  capitalism	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  crisis	  currently	  being	  experienced	  in	  Greece.	  	  Thus,	  when	  discussing	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Greece’s	  financial	  crisis,	  my	  analysis	  focuses	  specifically	  on	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  era.	  	  Through	  this	  construction	  of	  Greece	  as	  a	  sovereign	  nation	  existing	  within	  a	  monetary	  union	  in	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  time	  period,	  I	  synthesized	  the	  empirical	  data	  on	  Greece	  and	  used	  it	  to	  create	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis.	  	   The	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  I	  developed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  my	  research.	  	  Greece	  is	  an	  intangible	  construction	  that	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  theoretically.	  	  In	  my	  research,	  I	  actively	  constructed	  Greece	  and	  its	  experience	  with	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis	  through	  the	  body	  of	  literature	  published	  on	  this	  phenomenon.	  	  Thus,	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  was	  derived	  from	  a	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literature	  review	  of	  news	  articles,	  peer-­‐reviewed	  research,	  books,	  and	  government	  documents	  related	  to	  this	  topic.	  	   Journalistic	  articles	  provided	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  description	  and	  chronological	  accounts	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Beginning	  with	  the	  media	  accounts	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  the	  newspaper	  and	  magazine	  articles	  I	  collected	  were	  derived	  from	  various	  English-­‐speaking	  news	  outlets.	  	  I	  mainly	  drew	  from	  articles	  published	  in	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  and	  from	  Ekathemerini,	  which	  is	  a	  Greek	  news	  outlet	  that	  publishes	  in	  English.	  	  In	  addition,	  I	  obtained	  articles	  from	  
Reuters,	  CNN	  reports,	  The	  Financial	  Times,	  The	  Guardian,	  The	  Weekly	  Standard,	  among	  others.	  	  I	  used	  such	  news	  accounts	  to	  construct	  the	  empirical	  chronology	  of	  events	  that	  amalgamate	  into	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	  	   Journalists,	  it	  must	  be	  emphasized,	  are	  inherently	  biased	  by	  certain	  ideological	  perspectives	  and	  tend	  to	  frame	  their	  discussion	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  in	  light	  of	  their	  ideologies.	  	  In	  the	  course	  of	  my	  research,	  I	  discerned	  common	  themes	  in	  much	  of	  the	  journalistic	  accounts	  that	  amount	  to	  a	  shared	  narrative	  of	  the	  crisis,	  which	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  “mainstream	  narrative.”	  	  The	  mainstream	  narrative	  will	  be	  explored	  later	  in	  this	  section.	  	  For	  the	  present	  purposes,	  journalistic	  news	  articles	  provided	  the	  scaffolding	  in	  my	  project	  to	  empirically	  understand	  how	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  developed	  through	  time.	  	   I	  also	  collected	  peer-­‐reviewed	  economic	  journal	  articles	  that	  quantitatively	  explored	  Greece’s	  economic	  performance	  and	  macroeconomic	  finances.	  	  Such	  economic	  accounts	  often	  analyze	  Greece	  through	  a	  neoliberal	  ideological	  framework	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that	  holds	  certain	  assumptions,	  such	  as	  favoring	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  emphasizing	  the	  need	  to	  dismantle	  government	  regulation	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  As	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  paper,	  economic	  journal	  articles	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  biased	  by	  the	  same	  ideological	  perspective	  that	  bias	  journalistic	  accounts-­‐-­‐mainly	  a	  pro-­‐neoliberal	  position.	  	  For	  my	  purposes,	  I	  used	  the	  economic	  journal	  articles	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  quantitative	  and	  economic	  perspective	  into	  Greece’s	  experience	  with	  a	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	   In	  addition,	  I	  also	  reviewed	  government	  documents	  that	  discuss	  the	  present	  state	  of	  Greece’s	  economy	  and	  the	  economic	  restructuring	  to	  be	  implemented.	  	  Such	  reports	  were	  published	  by	  the	  Greek	  government,	  by	  IMF	  reports	  commissioned	  about	  the	  crisis,	  or	  investigations	  directed	  by	  the	  European	  Commission.	  	  I	  refer	  to	  these	  documents	  as	  governmental	  because	  they	  were	  created	  and	  controlled	  by	  government	  bureaucracies,	  whether	  they	  are	  state-­‐commissioned,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Greek	  government,	  or	  commissioned	  by	  international	  financial	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  IMF,	  or	  by	  multilevel	  governance	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  European	  Commission.	  	  These	  documents	  are	  also	  political	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  too,	  just	  like	  the	  journal	  accounts	  and	  economist	  articles,	  tend	  to	  be	  biased	  with	  neoliberal	  ideological	  assumptions,	  	  	  	   I	  also	  read	  various	  books	  on	  this	  subject	  that	  specifically	  focused	  on	  historical	  and	  economic	  accounts	  that	  detailed	  Greece’s	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  period.	  	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  these	  sources	  overlap	  and	  provide	  a	  complementary	  perspective	  on	  Greece’s	  post-­‐WWII	  economic	  development.	  	  Historical	  and	  economic	  accounts	  also	  provided	  a	  thorough	  view	  into	  the	  roots	  of	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the	  present	  financial	  crisis	  and	  thus	  are	  essential	  in	  discerning	  a	  causal	  model	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  For	  example,	  Lyrintzis	  (1993)	  gives	  an	  in-­‐depth	  exploration	  of	  the	  1980’s	  and	  how	  the	  Greek	  government	  bureaucracy	  embarked	  on	  a	  massive	  trajectory	  of	  debt	  accumulation	  during	  this	  time	  period.	  	  I	  also	  examined	  four	  recently	  published	  books,	  written	  in	  English,	  that	  focused	  on	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  perspective	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  I	  utilized	  data	  from	  these	  sources	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  my	  analysis.	  	   Matthew	  Lynn	  published	  Bust	  in	  2010,	  which	  was	  the	  first	  of	  these	  books	  to	  be	  released.	  	  Lynn	  is	  a	  financial	  journalist	  and	  provides	  a	  rich	  description	  into	  the	  empirical	  reality	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  Lynn	  points	  to	  the	  Greek	  government	  mismanagement	  of	  the	  finances	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  eurozone	  for	  creating	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  present	  crisis	  (Lynn	  2011).	  	   Jason	  Manolopoulos	  is	  a	  hedge	  fund	  manager	  who	  wrote	  Greece’s	  Odious	  Debt	  in	  2011	  which	  similarly	  details	  the	  nature	  of	  Greece’s	  current	  crisis.	  	  Manolopoulos	  liberally	  spreads	  the	  blame	  for	  the	  crisis	  by	  exposing	  the	  corruption	  and	  inefficiency	  of	  the	  Greek	  government,	  corruption	  within	  the	  Greek	  people	  themselves,	  and	  the	  overall	  ineffective	  operations	  of	  the	  eurozone	  as	  a	  currency	  union	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	   Michael	  Mitsopoulos	  and	  Theodore	  Pelagidis	  wrote	  Understanding	  the	  Crisis	  
in	  Greece	  in	  2011	  which	  examines	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  from	  a	  purely	  quantitative	  and	  economic	  perspective.	  	  This	  book	  primarily	  discusses	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  mismanaged	  and	  inefficient	  Greek	  government	  that	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squandered	  the	  fruits	  of	  a	  strong	  growth	  period	  in	  the	  2000’s	  (Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  2011).	  	   Finally,	  Antonis	  Vradis	  and	  Dimitris	  Dalakoglou	  edited	  an	  anarchist	  and	  Marxist	  reader	  that	  was	  published	  in	  2011	  and	  markedly	  differs	  from	  the	  themes	  of	  the	  previous	  books	  about	  the	  crisis.	  	  In	  Revolt	  and	  Crisis	  in	  Greece,	  various	  anarchist	  and	  Marxist	  researchers	  discuss	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  inherent	  flawed	  logic	  of	  capitalism	  and	  neoliberal	  orthodoxy	  (Vradis	  and	  Dalakoglou	  2011).	  	   By	  researching	  the	  journalistic	  accounts	  that	  document	  the	  chronology	  of	  the	  crisis	  as	  it	  unfolds,	  economic	  journals	  that	  explore	  the	  macroeconomic	  figures	  of	  Greece’s	  economic	  operations,	  governmental	  documents	  that	  detail	  reform	  strategies,	  historical	  and	  economic	  books	  written	  about	  Greece’s	  economic	  development	  after	  WWII,	  and	  books	  written	  specifically	  about	  the	  present	  financial	  crisis,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  create	  a	  case	  study	  of	  Greece’s	  financial	  crisis.	  	  After	  collecting	  the	  literature	  that	  forms	  the	  basis	  for	  my	  research,	  I	  used	  the	  analytic	  induction	  methodology	  as	  the	  primary	  tool	  to	  examine	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis.	  
Analytic	  Induction	  and	  the	  Greek	  Financial	  Crisis	  	  	   My	  analysis	  is	  primarily	  composed	  of	  secondary	  literature	  published	  on	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis.	  	  With	  the	  objective	  of	  using	  analytic	  induction,	  my	  project	  began	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  research	  question	  that	  I	  intended	  to	  explore:	  	  What	  factors	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  present	  Greek	  financial	  crisis?	  	  I	  searched	  the	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literature	  for	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  with	  an	  understanding	  that	  creating	  a	  complete	  causal	  chain	  of	  events	  is	  problematic,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  	  Thus,	  I	  focused	  on	  what	  I	  believe	  to	  be	  the	  major	  pre-­‐conditions	  and	  historical	  foundations	  leading	  to	  the	  present	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	   Analytic	  induction	  attempts	  to	  answer	  a	  proposed	  research	  question	  with	  an	  examination	  of	  cases	  (Ratcliff	  2002).	  	  I	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  my	  research	  question	  would	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world-­‐system	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  eurozone,	  specifically	  the	  power	  differentials	  within	  the	  monetary	  union.	  	  Essentially,	  I	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  would	  be	  primarily	  global	  in	  nature.	  	  	  	   	  In	  the	  process	  of	  examining	  the	  literature	  on	  Greece	  and	  its	  current	  financial	  crisis,	  I	  found	  that	  most	  accounts	  pointed	  to	  very	  different	  foundations	  for	  crisis	  than	  the	  hypothesis	  I	  developed.	  	  The	  mainstream	  narrative,	  commonly	  espoused	  throughout	  the	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  was	  nationally	  focused	  meaning	  that	  it	  faulted	  Greece	  for	  creating	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  own	  crisis.	  	  There	  were	  some	  accounts,	  however,	  that	  supported	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  was	  globally	  focused	  and	  problematized	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  eurozone	  for	  creating	  the	  conditions	  of	  crisis,	  but	  these	  sources	  were	  much	  less	  common.	  	  Thus,	  two	  distinct	  models	  detailing	  the	  foundations	  for	  crisis	  can	  be	  discerned	  within	  the	  existing	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis:	  the	  “mainstream	  narrative”	  and	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  I	  call	  the	  “structured	  power	  imbalance	  narrative.”	  	  My	  research	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proceeded	  with	  an	  examination	  of	  both	  models	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  out	  of	  the	  two	  narratives	  pointing	  to	  the	  foundations	  of	  crisis.	  	   	  	   In	  the	  discussion	  of	  agency,	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  points	  out	  that	  Greece	  caused	  its	  own	  crisis	  through	  fiscal	  mismanagement,	  corruption,	  and	  profligacy.	  	  Accounts	  falling	  within	  this	  mainstream	  narrative	  vary	  with	  some	  explicitly	  stating	  that	  Greece	  is	  solely	  to	  blame	  for	  its	  crisis	  and	  other	  making	  this	  point	  more	  implicitly.	  	   The	  mainstream	  conceptualization	  into	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  crisis	  reflects	  the	  dominance	  of	  neoliberal	  ideology	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  state	  institutions.	  	  The	  weakness	  with	  such	  a	  conceptualization	  is	  that	  it	  is	  flawed	  and	  incomplete.	  	  True,	  Greece	  has	  been	  a	  financially	  mismanaged	  and	  corrupt	  nation	  for	  decades;	  however,	  this	  explanation	  alone	  is	  not	  adequate	  to	  fully	  explain	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  present	  financial	  crisis.	  	  The	  mainstream	  narrative	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world-­‐system.	  	  Within	  this	  system,	  European	  countries	  embarked	  on	  a	  project	  of	  monetary	  unification,	  which	  created	  the	  eurozone	  where	  member	  countries	  share	  the	  same	  currency.	  	  This	  structure	  and	  the	  power	  dynamics	  operating	  within	  it	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  surplus	  core	  countries	  and	  indebted	  peripheral	  countries.	  	  Thus,	  Greece	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  experiencing	  a	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Portugal,	  Italy,	  and	  Spain	  are	  all	  indebted	  eurozone	  countries	  in	  crisis.	  	  The	  mainstream	  narrative	  fails	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  global	  dimension	  of	  the	  crisis.	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   It	  is	  important	  to	  explore	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  because	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  body	  of	  literature	  published	  on	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  saturated	  with	  pro-­‐neoliberal	  sentiments.	  	  Themes	  promoting	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  free	  market	  and	  private	  sector	  economic	  activities	  and	  criticizing	  the	  inefficient	  operation	  of	  the	  state	  can	  be	  discerned	  within	  these	  sources.	  	  Pro-­‐neoliberal	  themes	  become	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world-­‐system,	  so	  that	  the	  foundations	  and	  causes	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  are	  viewed	  in	  light	  of	  a	  neoliberal	  perspective.	  	  The	  inefficient	  state,	  over-­‐regulated	  markets,	  and	  the	  profligate	  public	  sector	  are	  viewed	  as	  the	  problematic	  institutions	  and	  processes	  that	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  crisis.	  	  The	  inherent	  flawed	  logic	  in	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world-­‐system	  is	  ignored.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  reform	  strategy	  for	  the	  crisis	  also	  reflects	  pro-­‐neoliberal	  sentiments	  so	  that	  structural	  adjustment,	  a	  primary	  neoliberal	  tool,	  becomes	  the	  favored	  solution	  utilized	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  indebted	  states.	  	  	  	   The	  point	  is	  that	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  in	  no	  way	  objectively	  or	  concretely	  exists	  in	  reality.	  	  Instead,	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  constructed	  in	  each	  and	  every	  news	  article,	  economic	  report,	  government	  document,	  and	  book	  source	  by	  its	  respective	  author.	  	  Because	  authors	  are	  necessarily	  influenced	  by	  certain	  ideologies,	  the	  body	  of	  literature	  regarding	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  must	  be	  examined	  in	  light	  of	  the	  ideologies	  influencing	  and	  framing	  how	  authors	  conceive	  of	  this	  phenomenon.	  	  Thus,	  I	  found	  that	  pro-­‐neoliberal	  themes	  were	  the	  most	  common	  ideological	  underpinning	  influencing	  how	  researchers	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  conceptualized	  this	  phenomenon	  within	  their	  work.	  	  However,	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	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just	  because	  most	  sources	  view	  Greece’s	  crisis	  in	  light	  of	  a	  neoliberal	  perspective	  that	  faults	  the	  Greek	  state	  and	  its	  corrupt	  and	  inefficient	  institutions,	  by	  no	  means	  is	  this	  conception	  sufficient	  by	  itself.	  	  Although	  the	  neoliberal	  conception	  into	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  crisis	  is	  extremely	  popular,	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  much	  more	  than	  a	  crisis	  caused	  by	  mismanaged	  state	  institutions.	  	  It	  is	  a	  global	  crisis	  of	  capitalism.	  	  Exposing	  the	  pro-­‐neoliberal	  ideological	  perspective	  framing	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  integral	  to	  abandoning	  the	  failed	  policy	  initiative	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  and	  creating	  a	  more	  viable	  solution	  to	  this	  crisis.	  
Chapter	  by	  Chapter	  Summary	  	  	   Chapter	  2	  provides	  a	  chronological	  account	  of	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  as	  it	  developed	  in	  late	  2009.	  	  Important	  events	  and	  processes	  are	  discussed	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  gain	  a	  macro-­‐historical	  perspective	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  This	  chapter	  also	  explores	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  Greek	  government,	  the	  Greek	  people,	  the	  political	  structure	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  the	  international	  financial	  community.	  	  	   Due	  to	  the	  prevalence	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  guiding	  the	  reform	  strategy	  in	  Greece,	  Chapter	  3	  traces	  the	  lineage	  of	  structural	  adjustment.	  	  This	  chapter	  explores	  structural	  adjustment	  as	  a	  policy	  package	  invented	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  financial	  crisis	  of	  the	  late	  1970’s	  and	  1980’s.	  	  This	  chapter	  also	  reveals	  parallels	  between	  Latin	  America’s	  experience	  with	  structural	  adjustment	  and	  Greece’s	  experience	  with	  this	  policy	  package.	  	  Chapter	  3	  concludes	  with	  a	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discussion	  of	  how	  popular	  resistance	  and	  social	  upheaval	  is	  a	  constant	  feature	  accompanying	  structural	  adjustment.	  	   Chapter	  4	  examines	  the	  mainstream	  narrative’s	  conception	  of	  the	  foundations	  leading	  to	  the	  current	  Greek	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Such	  a	  view	  postulates	  that	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  crisis	  were	  sown	  in	  the	  1980’s	  during	  Andreas	  Papandreou’s	  administration.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  post-­‐euro	  era	  is	  also	  criticized	  for	  accelerating	  Greece’s	  exorbitant	  debt.	  	  National	  manifestations	  of	  the	  corrupt	  political	  system,	  inefficient	  and	  uncompetitive	  economy,	  and	  a	  too	  progressive	  tax	  system	  are	  examined.	  	  	  	   Chapter	  5	  begins	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  “contagion”	  and	  “containment.”	  	  Due	  to	  Greece	  being	  the	  first	  of	  the	  eurozone	  countries	  to	  announce	  its	  crisis,	  along	  with	  its	  poor	  economic	  performance	  and	  the	  mountain	  of	  debt,	  Greece	  has	  been	  viewed	  as	  the	  cause	  and	  focal	  point	  of	  the	  larger	  European	  financial	  crisis.	  	  It	  is	  feared	  that	  if	  Greece	  defaults	  on	  its	  debt	  obligations,	  then	  other	  heavily	  indebted	  eurozone	  countries	  may	  also	  default,	  creating	  an	  exacerbated	  European	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Thus,	  structural	  adjustment	  intends	  to	  contain	  Greece’s	  “disease”	  within	  the	  country	  while	  simultaneously	  attempting	  to	  reduce	  its	  debt-­‐load.	  	  This	  chapter	  examines	  what	  policies	  and	  reforms	  have	  been	  and	  are	  currently	  being	  implemented	  to	  resolve	  the	  crisis.	  	   Chapter	  6	  begins	  by	  evaluating	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  as	  a	  solution	  for	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis.	  	  After	  illustrating	  the	  failures	  of	  this	  strategy,	  I	  discuss	  the	  global	  view	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  that	  examines	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the	  power	  dynamics	  within	  the	  eurozone.	  	  Chapter	  6	  ends	  with	  an	  exploration	  of	  why	  the	  failed	  strategy	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  continues	  to	  be	  implemented	  to	  solve	  the	  crisis.	  	  The	  Greek	  people’s	  response	  to	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  also	  discussed,	  specifically	  how	  the	  Greek	  people	  are	  polarizing	  to	  the	  political	  extremes	  and	  there	  is	  an	  increasing	  presence	  of	  authoritarianism.	  	   Chapter	  7	  is	  the	  concluding	  chapter	  where	  the	  entirety	  of	  this	  project	  is	  summarized.	  	  This	  chapter	  ends	  by	  raising	  important	  questions	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis.	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CHAPTER	  II	  	  
THE	  CRISIS	  	  	   This	  chapter	  consists	  of	  a	  chronological	  and	  empirical	  account	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  as	  it	  unfolded	  from	  November	  2009	  to	  the	  completion	  of	  this	  research	  project	  in	  March	  2012.	  	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  major	  events	  and	  occurrences	  that	  amalgamate	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis.	  	   The	  ostensible	  start	  of	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis	  in	  Greece	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  November	  5,	  2009.	  	  On	  this	  day,	  the	  newly	  elected	  socialist	  Prime	  Minister	  George	  Papandreou	  announced	  that	  the	  previous	  government,	  the	  conservative	  party	  of	  New	  Democracy	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Kostas	  Karamanlis,	  had	  lied	  and	  concealed	  the	  actual	  size	  of	  Greece’s	  deficit	  (Voss	  2011).	  	  Papandreou	  revealed	  that	  the	  true	  size	  of	  the	  Greek	  deficit	  for	  2009	  would	  be	  12.7	  percent	  of	  GDP,	  not	  the	  6	  percent	  of	  GDP	  that	  the	  Karamanlis	  government	  had	  forecasted	  months	  earlier.	  	  As	  the	  IMF	  subsequently	  reworked	  Greece’s	  deficit	  and	  debt	  figures,	  the	  Greek	  deficit	  reached	  a	  peak	  value	  of	  15.5	  percent	  of	  GDP	  (Alumni	  Relations	  2011).	  	  The	  announcement	  that	  the	  Greek	  deficit	  would	  be	  much	  greater	  than	  previously	  expected	  initiated	  fears	  over	  a	  possible	  Greek	  default.	  	   On	  December	  7,	  2009,	  the	  credit	  ratings	  agency	  Standard	  and	  Poor’s	  announced	  it	  would	  place	  Greece’s	  “A-­‐minus”	  long-­‐term	  sovereign	  credit	  rating	  on	  “Credit	  Watch”	  with	  negative	  implications	  (Cadman	  2010;	  "Greece"	  2011b).	  	  According	  to	  Lynn	  (2011),	  “The	  S&P	  downgrade	  was	  the	  moment	  when	  all	  the	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doubts	  and	  worries	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  investors	  about	  the	  solvency	  of	  the	  Greek	  state	  started	  to	  crystallize”	  (p.	  127).	  	  Although	  Greece’s	  credit	  rating	  had	  not	  been	  officially	  downgraded,	  this	  act	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  defining	  moment	  that	  set	  in	  motion	  the	  spiral	  of	  downgrades	  driving	  Greece	  further	  into	  crisis.	  	   The	  next	  day,	  on	  December	  8,	  2009,	  Fitch	  ratings	  agency	  cut	  Greece’s	  credit	  rating	  one	  notch	  to	  “BBB-­‐plus”	  with	  a	  negative	  outlook.	  	  The	  Athens	  stock	  market	  subsequently	  plunged	  as	  it	  was	  getting	  riskier	  to	  carry	  Greek	  debt.	  	  By	  December	  10	  2009,	  stock	  markets	  were	  “starting	  to	  tumble	  around	  the	  world,	  rattled	  by	  nervous	  talk	  about	  the	  stability	  and	  security	  of	  the	  euro”	  (Lynn	  2011:129).	  	  The	  price	  of	  Greek	  debt	  was	  in	  freefall	  while	  the	  costs	  of	  insuring	  it	  were	  rising	  fast.	  	  The	  prospect	  of	  a	  Greek	  default	  was	  growing	  as	  investors	  demanded	  higher	  yields	  on	  Greek	  bonds	  (Lynn	  2011).	  	   Days	  later	  on	  December	  14,	  2009,	  Papandreou	  outlined	  the	  details	  of	  the	  first	  austerity	  package	  to	  be	  implemented	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  cut	  the	  ballooning	  budget	  deficit.	  	  This	  was	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  financial	  chaos	  that	  Papandreou	  explicitly	  stated	  that	  Greece	  would	  need	  to	  implement	  austerity.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  first	  austerity	  package	  was	  self-­‐imposed	  by	  the	  Greek	  government.	  	  Initially,	  the	  European	  Union	  viewed	  the	  crisis	  as	  a	  domestic	  problem,	  not	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  eurozone.	  	  Papandreou	  was	  striving	  to	  regain	  the	  trust	  of	  investors	  and	  the	  EU	  by	  self-­‐imposing	  austere	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  (Lynn	  2011;	  ”Greece”	  2011).	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   At	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  there	  was	  no	  indication	  that	  the	  other	  EU	  member	  countries	  would	  step	  in	  with	  any	  kind	  of	  rescue	  package.	  	  Years	  earlier,	  as	  the	  fledgling	  EU	  was	  forming	  in	  1992,	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  an	  agreement	  signed	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  European	  Community,	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  euro.	  	  The	  treaty	  included	  a	  “No-­‐bailout”	  clause	  by	  other	  euro	  members	  in	  the	  event	  that	  a	  member	  country	  accumulated	  an	  unsustainable	  and	  exorbitant	  amount	  of	  debt.	  	  At	  the	  time,	  it	  was	  deemed	  unfair	  for	  fiscally	  responsible	  states	  to	  subsidize	  profligate	  ones.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  emerging	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  this	  meant	  that	  Greece	  would	  be	  on	  its	  own	  in	  dealing	  with	  its	  exorbitant	  deficit	  as	  other	  euro	  member	  states	  were	  not	  lawfully	  required	  to	  lend	  support	  to	  this	  highly	  indebted	  country.	  	  The	  perception	  that	  Greece	  would	  be	  alone	  in	  dealing	  with	  its	  financial	  crisis	  continued	  to	  incite	  financial	  tumult	  as	  investors	  increasingly	  doubted	  that	  Greece	  could	  fix	  its	  macroeconomic	  finances	  by	  itself.	  	  On	  December	  16,	  2009,	  Standard	  and	  Poor’s	  lowered	  Greece’s	  credit	  rating	  from	  “A-­‐minus”	  to	  “BBB-­‐plus”	  (Lynn	  2011).	  	  A	  week	  later	  on	  December	  22,	  Moody’s	  ratings	  agency	  cut	  Greece’s	  sovereign	  credit	  rating	  to	  “A2”	  from	  “A1”	  (Voss	  2011).	  	  The	  Papandreou	  administration	  needed	  to	  act	  fast	  to	  stop	  the	  continuing	  credit	  downgrades.	  	   On	  January	  14	  2010,	  the	  Greek	  government	  implemented	  the	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Program,	  the	  austerity	  package	  approved	  a	  month	  earlier	  by	  the	  Greek	  Parliament.	  	  This	  program	  was	  designed	  to	  reduce	  the	  country's	  deficit	  from	  12.7	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  2009	  to	  2.8	  percent	  by	  2012,	  a	  rather	  ambitious	  target	  for	  a	  country	  spiraling	  further	  and	  further	  into	  crisis.	  	  The	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Program	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included	  10	  billion	  euros	  of	  spending	  cuts	  and	  revenue	  increases.	  	  The	  package	  was	  implemented	  to	  calm	  the	  financial	  markets	  that	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  reluctant	  to	  invest	  in	  Greece	  (Lynn	  2011;	  Voss	  2011).	  	   On	  February	  2,	  2010,	  the	  Greek	  government	  froze	  the	  wages	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  earning	  less	  than	  2,000	  euros	  a	  month.	  	  On	  February	  9,	  the	  austerity	  package	  was	  effectively	  put	  in	  place	  (Voss	  2011).	  	  	  	   The	  Greek	  people	  were	  not	  used	  to	  austerity	  treatment,	  especially	  coming	  from	  socialist	  leaders,	  and	  a	  general	  strike	  was	  called	  for	  February	  24,	  2010.	  	  On	  this	  day,	  an	  estimated	  two	  million	  workers	  from	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  demonstrated	  against	  the	  austerity	  measures.	  	  Flights,	  trains,	  buses,	  and	  trucking	  services	  were	  canceled;	  banks	  and	  schools	  closed.	  	  Violent	  clashes	  between	  police	  and	  protestors	  occurred	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Athens,	  as	  labor	  leader	  Yannis	  Panagopoulos	  proclaimed,	  “We	  refuse	  to	  pay	  the	  price	  for	  a	  crisis	  that	  we	  didn’t	  create”	  	  (Lynn	  2011:134).	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Greek	  people	  were	  protesting	  against	  austerity	  undermined	  any	  intention	  of	  calming	  the	  markets.	  	  According	  to	  Lynn	  (2011),	  “It	  looked	  as	  if	  the	  government	  could	  announce	  all	  the	  austerity	  packages	  it	  wanted.	  	  If	  it	  couldn’t	  make	  them	  stick,	  they	  didn’t	  account	  for	  very	  much”	  (p.	  135).	  	   By	  the	  spring	  of	  2010,	  a	  clear	  pattern	  emerged.	  	  As	  the	  major	  credit	  ratings	  agencies	  downgraded	  Greece’s	  credit	  rating,	  the	  Greek	  government	  reacted	  by	  implementing	  austerity	  measures.	  	  The	  Greek	  people,	  angered	  at	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  lowered	  standard	  of	  living,	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  to	  protest	  against	  these	  measures.	  	  These	  protests	  undermined	  any	  faith	  the	  financial	  markets	  had	  that	  Greece	  could	  get	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its	  fiscal	  house	  in	  order.	  	  More	  downgrades	  ensued	  as	  the	  vicious	  cycle	  continued,	  and	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  spiraled	  further	  and	  further	  out	  of	  control.	  	  	  	   It	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  clear	  to	  EU	  officials	  that	  support	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  eurozone	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  stop	  the	  financial	  chaos.	  	  In	  early	  March	  2010,	  European	  leaders	  raised	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  European	  rescue	  package	  which	  would	  break	  the	  “No-­‐bailout”	  clause	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty.	  	  Luxembourg’s	  Prime	  Minister	  Jean-­‐Claude	  Juncker	  announced	  on	  March	  5,	  2010,	  “We’re	  telling	  financial	  markets:	  Look	  out,	  we’re	  not	  abandoning	  Greece…The	  eurozone	  stands	  ready	  to	  guarantee	  financial	  stability	  in	  the	  euro	  region”	  (Lynn	  2011:135).	  	  This	  was	  the	  first	  instance	  that	  a	  European	  leader	  publicly	  raised	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  bailout	  for	  Greece;	  however,	  at	  this	  time,	  the	  announcement	  was	  just	  words	  and	  no	  action	  was	  taken.	  	  On	  the	  same	  day,	  Greece	  put	  in	  place	  its	  second	  comprehensive	  austerity	  package	  designed	  to	  save	  4.8	  billion	  euros	  (Voss	  2011).	  	   With	  no	  concrete	  European	  rescue	  package	  in	  place	  and	  no	  sign	  that	  the	  crisis	  was	  abating,	  on	  April	  9,	  2010,	  Fitch	  downgraded	  Greece’s	  credit	  yet	  again	  to	  “BBB-­‐minus”	  with	  a	  negative	  outlook,	  one	  level	  above	  what	  the	  markets	  call	  “non-­‐investment	  grade”	  or	  junk	  status	  (Lynn	  2011).	  	  On	  April	  27,	  2010,	  Standard	  and	  Poor’s	  cut	  Greece’s	  credit	  rating	  to	  “BB-­‐plus”	  from	  “BBB-­‐plus”,	  a	  drop	  of	  three	  grades	  in	  a	  single	  step	  that	  made	  Greece’s	  credit	  rating	  effectively	  junk	  (Lynn	  2011;	  Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	   On	  May	  1,	  2010,	  Greece	  proposed	  its	  third	  austerity	  package	  (Voss	  2011).	  	  The	  Greek	  people,	  becoming	  more	  and	  more	  frustrated	  with	  the	  way	  their	  leaders	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were	  handling	  the	  crisis,	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  to	  protest	  in	  the	  most	  violent	  demonstrations	  to	  date.	  	  On	  May	  5,	  the	  protests	  resulted	  in	  the	  first	  fatalities	  of	  the	  crisis	  with	  three	  people	  killed	  when	  a	  bank	  building	  was	  set	  on	  fire	  by	  protestors	  (Manolopoulos	  2011;	  “Greece”	  2011).	  	   The	  crisis	  was	  growing	  to	  a	  climax	  as	  the	  urgency	  of	  a	  European	  rescue	  could	  not	  be	  delayed	  any	  longer.	  	  The	  conditions	  of	  the	  European	  financial	  markets	  were	  chaotic.	  	  According	  to	  Lynn	  (2011),	  “equity	  markets	  on	  all	  the	  major	  European	  bourses	  had	  started	  to	  skid,	  recording	  some	  of	  the	  worst	  falls	  seen	  since	  the	  collapse	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers”	  (p.	  150).	  	  The	  CAC-­‐40	  in	  Paris	  was	  down	  by	  4.6	  percent	  on	  May	  7,	  2010,	  while	  the	  German	  DAX	  dropped	  by	  more	  than	  3	  percent.	  	  Currency	  and	  bond	  markets	  were	  swinging	  wildly.	  	  U.S.	  Treasuries	  soared	  in	  price	  as	  investors	  started	  to	  switch	  their	  investments	  out	  of	  the	  beleaguered	  euro	  that	  stood	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse	  (Lynn	  2011).	  	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  a	  European	  rescue	  package	  was	  needed	  to	  stop	  the	  volatility	  of	  the	  financial	  markets.	  	   Temporary	  relief	  arrived	  on	  May	  9,	  2010	  when	  the	  EU	  finance	  ministers	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  IMF	  agreed	  to	  a	  rescue	  bailout	  package	  dubbed	  by	  the	  media	  as	  “shock	  and	  awe.”	  	  The	  European	  Financial	  Stability	  Facility	  (EFSF)	  was	  created	  which	  made	  140	  billion	  euros	  available	  to	  Greece	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  Greece	  continue	  implementing	  austerity	  as	  well	  as	  a	  dramatic	  reform	  of	  the	  economy	  through	  liberalization,	  deregulation,	  and	  privatization	  measures,	  also	  known	  as	  structural	  adjustment	  (Lynn	  2011;	  Manolopoulos	  2011).	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   For	  the	  moment	  the	  crisis	  had	  been	  addressed,	  and	  the	  volatility	  of	  the	  financial	  markets	  diminished	  as	  a	  Greek	  default	  was	  averted.	  	  The	  bailout,	  however,	  was	  a	  superficial	  band-­‐aid	  placed	  over	  the	  gaping	  wound	  that	  was	  the	  Greek	  economy.	  	  Greece	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  liquid,	  however,	  the	  underlying	  problems	  causing	  the	  crisis	  continued	  to	  exist.	  	  The	  bailout	  did	  not	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  get	  a	  heavily	  indebted	  country	  to	  grow	  again.	  	   Over	  the	  next	  year,	  from	  May	  2010	  to	  June	  2011,	  Greece	  used	  the	  bailout	  funds,	  borrowed	  from	  the	  EFSF,	  to	  pay	  back	  its	  creditors.	  	  Greece’s	  public	  finances	  during	  this	  time,	  however,	  deteriorated.	  	  The	  Greek	  economy	  shrank	  by	  7	  percent	  in	  2011	  which	  was	  higher	  than	  the	  expected	  contraction	  of	  5.5	  percent	  (Nikas	  2012a;	  Nikas	  2011b).	  	  Greece	  intended	  to	  bring	  down	  its	  deficit	  to	  7.6	  percent	  of	  GDP;	  however,	  this	  target	  was	  also	  missed.	  	  The	  deficit	  for	  2011	  was	  more	  accurately	  estimated	  to	  be	  around	  9	  percent	  of	  GDP	  (Nikas	  2011a).	  	   Throughout	  2011,	  the	  dominant	  discourse	  of	  the	  international	  financial	  community	  centered	  around	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  Greek	  default.	  	  The	  initial	  bailout	  may	  have	  temporarily	  calmed	  fears,	  however,	  the	  financial	  community	  was	  not	  convinced	  that	  the	  Greek	  crisis	  was	  over.	  	  Many	  large	  companies	  holding	  Greek	  debt	  took	  steps	  to	  factor	  a	  Greek	  default	  into	  their	  balance	  sheets	  and	  constantly	  raised	  doubts	  that	  Greece	  would	  stay	  solvent	  long	  enough	  to	  pay	  back	  its	  exorbitant	  debt-­‐load	  (Thomas	  2011b).	  	  However,	  the	  EU	  officials	  and	  Greek	  government	  persistently	  denied	  that	  Greece	  would	  default.	  	  They	  pushed	  for	  more	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  to	  be	  implemented	  and	  faulted	  the	  Greek	  people	  for	  the	  deteriorating	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public	  finances.	  	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  EU	  politicians,	  the	  resistance	  to	  structural	  adjustment	  delayed	  the	  necessary	  restructuring	  of	  the	  economy	  that	  was	  needed	  to	  solve	  the	  crisis.	  	  According	  to	  the	  EU	  officials,	  more	  austerity	  was	  required	  that	  the	  Greek	  people	  needed	  to	  accept.	  	  	  	   Resistance	  to	  structural	  adjustment	  leading	  to	  a	  delay	  in	  implementation	  lies	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  how	  austerity	  measures	  are	  distributed	  in	  Greek	  society.	  	  Cutting	  civil	  servants’	  salaries,	  raising	  taxes,	  scaling	  down	  funds	  for	  public	  services,	  among	  other	  austerity	  measures	  have	  significantly	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  Greek	  people.	  	  The	  various	  sectors	  of	  Greek	  society	  are	  fighting	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  interests	  that	  austerity	  threatens	  to	  undermine.	  	  According	  to	  Dr.	  Jan	  Fidrmuc,	  writing	  for	  the	  
Financial	  Times,	  austerity	  “creates	  powerful	  incentives	  for	  groups	  affected	  by	  these	  changes	  to	  oppose	  the	  reform	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  resistance	  will	  lead	  the	  government	  to	  revise	  the	  package	  to	  wield	  the	  axe	  elsewhere”	  (Fidrmuc	  2012).	  	  Reforms	  to	  the	  Greek	  economy	  are	  delayed	  due	  to	  this	  resistance	  to	  austerity,	  which	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  protests,	  riots,	  worker	  slow-­‐downs,	  and	  incompliance	  with	  austerity	  implementation.	  	  	  	   Discourse	  also	  centered	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  Greek	  debt	  restructuring.	  	  If	  Greece	  was	  going	  to	  avoid	  defaulting	  on	  its	  debt	  obligations,	  the	  international	  financial	  community	  insisted	  that	  Greece	  would	  at	  least	  need	  to	  restructure	  its	  debt.	  	  The	  EU	  officials	  and	  the	  Greek	  government	  constantly	  denied	  that	  a	  restructuring	  was	  needed,	  since	  any	  involuntary	  restructuring	  would	  be	  de-­‐facto	  considered	  a	  default.	  	  Overall,	  the	  rhetoric	  between	  the	  financial	  community	  and	  political	  elites	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for	  the	  years	  2010	  through	  2011	  was	  erratic	  and	  schizophrenic.	  	  One	  thing	  was	  clear,	  the	  outlook	  for	  the	  Greek	  economy	  was	  not	  getting	  any	  better,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  Greek	  default	  persistently	  loomed.	  	  The	  major	  credit	  rating	  agencies	  continued	  to	  downgrade	  Greek	  credit,	  reinforcing	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  financial	  crisis	  was	  far	  from	  solved.	  	   On	  January	  14,	  2011,	  Fitch	  rating	  agency	  downgraded	  Greek	  sovereign	  credit	  to	  “BB-­‐plus”	  or	  junk	  status	  (Voss	  2011).	  	  By	  June	  1,	  2011,	  Moody’s	  also	  downgraded	  Greek	  credit	  by	  three	  notches	  from	  “B1”	  to	  “Caa1”,	  bringing	  it	  seven	  notches	  into	  junk	  territory	  (Reuters	  2011).	  	  The	  downgrades	  by	  the	  credit	  ratings	  agencies	  signaled	  to	  the	  international	  financial	  markets	  that	  Greece	  had	  not	  solved	  its	  financial	  crisis.	  	  With	  a	  restructuring	  of	  Greek	  debt	  officially	  ruled	  out	  by	  the	  Greek	  government	  on	  May	  21,	  2011,	  intensified	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  continued	  to	  be	  advocated	  to	  treat	  the	  crisis.	  	  Austerity,	  however,	  was	  squeezing	  the	  Greek	  economy	  dry,	  as	  GDP	  continued	  to	  decline	  and	  domestic	  consumption	  dropped.	  	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  additional	  action	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  keep	  Greece	  solvent	  on	  its	  debt	  obligation.	  	  Talk	  of	  a	  second	  bailout	  for	  Greece	  began.	  	   On	  July	  21,	  2011,	  the	  EU	  and	  IMF	  confirmed	  that	  Greece	  would	  be	  receiving	  a	  second	  bailout	  worth	  109	  billion	  euros	  (Cadman	  2010;	  "Greece"	  2011b).	  	  The	  bailout	  was	  conditional	  on	  Greece	  intensifying	  its	  implementation	  of	  structural	  adjustment.	  	  One	  specific	  requirement	  was	  that	  Greece	  must	  make	  progress	  with	  its	  privatization	  of	  state-­‐owned	  assets	  that	  had	  so	  far	  been	  sluggish.	  	  Included	  in	  the	  second	  bailout	  deal	  was	  an	  agreement	  of	  a	  restructuring	  of	  Greek	  debt	  where	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private	  investors	  would	  take	  a	  50	  percent	  loss	  on	  their	  holdings.	  	  As	  of	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  in	  March	  2012,	  the	  conditions	  of	  this	  deal,	  termed	  Private	  Sector	  Involvement	  (PSI),	  are	  currently	  being	  worked	  out.	  	  	   To	  reassure	  EU	  officials	  that	  Greece	  would	  comply	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  intensified	  austerity	  to	  be	  eligible	  for	  a	  second	  bailout,	  the	  Greek	  Parliament	  approved	  the	  next	  round	  of	  austerity	  on	  October	  19,	  2011.	  	  The	  package	  included	  spending	  cuts	  and	  tax	  increases	  intended	  to	  raise	  7.1	  billion	  euros	  for	  the	  2012	  budget.	  	  Greek	  people	  immediately	  responded	  to	  the	  austerity	  package	  with	  protests	  and	  rioting.	  	  Violent	  anti-­‐austerity	  demonstrations	  again	  gripped	  the	  Greek	  capital	  as	  an	  estimated	  100,000	  Greeks	  clashed	  with	  police	  (Behrakis	  and	  Maltezou	  2011).	  	   	  The	  recent	  history	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  ostensibly	  amounts	  to	  a	  pattern	  of	  stalemate	  and	  stagnation	  in	  trying	  to	  resolve	  the	  crisis.	  	  The	  Greek	  government	  has	  persistently	  been	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  default	  with	  bailouts	  needed	  to	  keep	  Greece	  solvent	  in	  paying	  back	  its	  debt.	  	  Greece	  can	  only	  receive	  these	  injections	  of	  capital	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  it	  moves	  forward	  with	  structural	  adjustment	  and	  intensifies	  these	  measures.	  	  Although	  the	  Greek	  government	  agrees,	  the	  Greek	  people	  vehemently	  resist,	  and	  implementation	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  delayed.	  	  	  	   Resistance	  to	  austerity	  takes	  many	  forms	  that	  effectively	  delay	  implementation	  of	  these	  measures.	  	  According	  to	  Giorgos	  Floridis,	  a	  former	  member	  of	  Parliament	  from	  the	  PASOK	  party,	  “In	  Greece,	  the	  real	  power	  is	  the	  power	  of	  resistance,	  the	  power	  of	  inertia”	  (Donadio	  2012).	  	  Protests	  and	  demonstrations	  are	  the	  most	  overt	  and	  obvious	  modes	  of	  resistance	  where	  bureaucratic	  functioning	  is	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halted	  as	  employees	  walk-­‐off	  their	  jobs,	  and	  government	  offices	  and	  business	  close.	  	  In	  addition,	  Greek	  officials	  in	  charge	  of	  implementing	  austerity	  measures	  in	  their	  respective	  offices	  delay	  effective	  implementation	  by	  not	  complying	  with	  the	  procedures	  required	  to	  actualize	  structural	  adjustment	  policies.	  Groups	  of	  lawyers,	  trade	  unions	  and	  campaigners	  have	  also	  tried	  to	  derail	  government	  efforts	  to	  collect	  new	  taxes,	  or	  to	  suspend	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  civil	  servants	  on	  partial	  pay.	  	  State	  buildings	  have	  been	  occupied,	  municipalities	  have	  stalled	  in	  delivering	  emergency	  notices	  ordering	  strikers	  back	  to	  work,	  state	  enterprises	  have	  refuses	  to	  hand	  over	  lists	  of	  employees	  eligible	  for	  suspension…state	  power	  company	  workers	  vowed	  to	  prevent	  people	  having	  their	  electricity	  cut	  off	  [for	  those	  who	  did	  not	  pay	  the	  new	  tax	  levied	  on	  electricity	  bills].	  ("Civil	  Disobedience	  in	  Greece	  Grows	  Over	  Government's	  Austerity	  Measures"	  2011a)	  	  	   Implementation	  of	  austerity	  measures	  is	  effectively	  delayed	  by	  these	  actions.	  	  There	  is	  an	  inability	  within	  the	  government	  bureaucracy	  to	  implement	  these	  policies	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  Greeks	  working	  in	  the	  government	  bureaucracy,	  whom	  the	  brunt	  of	  austerity	  is	  aimed	  at,	  do	  not	  want	  such	  policies	  to	  be	  enacted.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  larger	  Greek	  population	  outside	  the	  public	  sector	  is	  opposed	  to	  austerity	  which	  has	  eroded	  their	  high	  standard	  of	  living	  established	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  Yiannis	  Panagopoulos,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  country’s	  main	  labor	  union,	  General	  Confederation	  of	  Greek	  Labor	  (GSEE),	  states	  “They	  keep	  trying	  to	  make	  the	  workers	  pay	  the	  price	  for	  the	  crisis-­‐-­‐that’s	  not	  fair	  and	  we	  won’t	  accept	  it”	  (Kitsantonis	  2010).	  	  	  	   The	  pattern	  of	  stalemate	  and	  stagnation	  has	  repeated	  itself	  for	  the	  past	  two	  years	  as	  Greece	  continues	  to	  be	  mired	  in	  crisis.	  	  Because	  the	  bailouts	  are	  in	  reality	  loans	  that	  must	  be	  paid	  back,	  Greece’s	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  continues	  to	  climb,	  while	  the	  economy	  continues	  to	  contract.	  	  As	  Gabor	  Steingart,	  a	  columnist	  for	  the	  Greek	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newspaper	  Ekathemerini	  states,	  “Although	  the	  country	  initiated	  the	  toughest	  austerity	  package	  a	  Western	  country	  has	  ever	  undertaken	  outside	  wartimes,	  its	  debt	  burden	  grew	  by	  67	  billion	  Euros;	  as	  measured	  against	  GDP,	  it	  increased	  from	  127	  percent	  to	  157	  percent“	  (Steingart	  2011).	  	  This	  pattern	  of	  economic	  decline	  and	  growing	  debt	  has	  persisted	  with	  little	  deviation.	  	  Structural	  adjustment	  reform	  efforts	  have	  stagnated	  as	  intense	  protesting	  undermines	  economic	  restructuring.	  	   The	  Greek	  government	  is	  experiencing	  a	  crisis	  of	  legitimacy	  that	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  state’s	  contradictory	  role	  (Robinson	  2008).	  	  To	  receive	  injections	  of	  capital	  to	  keep	  Greece	  solvent,	  the	  government	  must	  extract	  capital	  from	  the	  labor	  and	  popular	  majorities	  through	  structural	  adjustment	  measures.	  	  Simultaneously,	  the	  Greek	  government	  must	  also	  quell	  the	  social	  upheaval	  that	  results	  from	  structural	  adjustment.	  	  Essentially,	  the	  Greek	  government	  imposes	  measures	  that	  cause	  social	  resistance	  which	  it	  must	  then	  quell.	  	  The	  Greek	  people,	  feeling	  that	  their	  voice	  is	  unheard,	  do	  not	  view	  the	  government	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  their	  interests.	  	  Despite	  continuous	  protests,	  the	  government	  continues	  pushing	  through	  harsh	  austerity	  measures	  but	  has	  lost	  legitimacy	  from	  the	  Greek	  people.	  	  	  	   George	  Papandreou,	  serving	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  when	  the	  crisis	  began,	  was	  the	  first	  political	  figure	  in	  charge	  of	  pushing	  through	  unpopular	  austerity	  measures.	  	  On	  October	  31,	  2011,	  Papandreou	  called	  for	  a	  referendum	  on	  the	  second	  bailout	  proposal.	  	  The	  referendum	  would	  have	  given	  the	  Greek	  people	  a	  say	  in	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  wanted	  to	  accept	  more	  bailout	  capital.	  	  This	  move	  shocked	  EU	  officials.	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  Papandreou	  was	  trying	  to	  give	  voice	  to	  the	  Greek	  people	  when	  they	  had	  none.	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Whether	  this	  was	  a	  political	  move	  to	  gain	  popularity	  from	  the	  Greek	  people	  or	  not,	  Papandreou	  lost	  the	  backing	  of	  his	  socialist	  party	  PASOK	  and	  the	  support	  of	  EU	  officials.	  	  On	  November	  3,	  2011,	  Papandreou	  dropped	  his	  referendum	  proposal,	  but	  as	  a	  result	  he	  was	  forced	  to	  resign.	  	  On	  November	  11,	  2011,	  a	  coalition	  government	  was	  created	  that	  included	  the	  Greek	  political	  parties	  of	  PASOK,	  New	  Democracy,	  and	  far-­‐right	  Popular	  Orthodox	  Rally	  (LAOS).	  	  Lucas	  Papademos,	  former	  vice	  president	  of	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank,	  was	  sworn	  in	  as	  the	  new	  Prime	  Minister.	  	  Papademos	  was	  chosen	  due	  to	  his	  revered	  technocratic	  abilities	  and	  his	  staunch	  support	  for	  structural	  adjustment.	  	  It	  was	  thought	  by	  the	  EU	  officials	  that	  he	  would	  relentlessly	  push	  through	  austerity	  despite	  resistance	  from	  the	  Greek	  people	  (Voss	  2011).	  	   The	  most	  recent	  events	  in	  the	  crisis	  saga	  exemplify	  the	  pattern	  of	  stalemate	  and	  stagnation.	  	  On	  the	  brink	  of	  default	  again,	  Greece	  must	  redeem	  14.5	  billion	  euros	  in	  bonds	  by	  March	  20,	  2012	  (Castle	  and	  Ewing	  2012).	  	  The	  second	  bailout	  is	  needed	  to	  secure	  payment	  to	  foreign	  creditors.	  	  Rejecting	  the	  possibility	  that	  Greece	  would	  default,	  Papademos	  has	  urged	  Greek	  politicians	  to	  support	  the	  new	  round	  of	  austerity	  measures	  to	  secure	  the	  130	  billion	  euros	  of	  new	  loans	  that	  would	  be	  included	  in	  the	  second	  bailout	  package.	  	  Conditions	  of	  the	  second	  bailout	  include	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  minimum	  wage,	  a	  freeze	  on	  all	  salary	  raises,	  pension	  reductions	  for	  state	  employees,	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  15,000	  public	  sector	  jobs	  ("Key	  Points	  in	  the	  Greek	  Reform	  Package"	  2012b).	  	  On	  February	  13,	  2012,	  the	  Greek	  Parliament	  voted	  on	  the	  new	  measures	  and	  an	  overwhelming	  majority	  approved	  to	  intensify	  austerity	  (Kitsantonis	  and	  Donadio	  2012b).	  	  With	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  Greek	  Parliament	  for	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further	  austerity,	  the	  “Troika”	  (the	  EU,	  IMF,	  and	  European	  Central	  Bank)	  is	  currently	  negotiating	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  second	  bailout.	  	   For	  nearly	  three	  days,	  increasingly	  frustrated	  Greeks	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  protest	  while	  the	  new	  austerity	  measures	  were	  being	  voted	  on	  in	  the	  Greek	  Parliament.	  	  More	  than	  80,000	  people	  turned	  out	  to	  protest	  in	  Athens	  and	  in	  other	  cities	  across	  Greece.	  	  The	  demonstrations	  started	  out	  peacefully	  but	  soon	  became	  violent	  and	  destructive.	  	  Protestors	  in	  the	  capital	  threw	  rocks	  at	  police	  who	  fired	  back	  with	  tear	  gas.	  	  After	  nightfall,	  demonstrators	  threw	  Molotov	  cocktails	  setting	  fire	  to	  more	  than	  forty	  buildings.	  	  The	  destruction	  amounted	  to	  the	  worst	  damage	  in	  Athens	  since	  May	  2010	  when	  three	  people	  were	  killed	  after	  protestors	  firebombed	  a	  bank	  (Kitsantonis	  and	  Donadio	  2012a).	  	  	   Thus,	  the	  change	  in	  Prime	  Ministers	  from	  Papandreou	  to	  Papademos	  continued	  the	  contradictory	  role	  of	  the	  Greek	  government,	  i.e.	  pushing	  through	  austerity	  while	  attempting	  to	  quell	  the	  upheaval	  resulting	  from	  the	  Greek	  people’s	  intensified	  resistance.	  	  Forced	  austerity	  has	  frayed	  the	  fabric	  of	  Greek	  society,	  and	  the	  Troika	  has	  grown	  increasingly	  aware	  of	  the	  resulting	  pattern	  of	  stalemate	  and	  stagnation.	  	  New	  rhetoric	  has	  recently	  emerged	  among	  EU	  officials	  that	  Greece	  has	  neither	  the	  ability	  nor	  the	  will	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  broad	  economic	  reforms	  it	  has	  pledged	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  second	  bailout.	  	  “The	  old	  dynamic”	  according	  to	  NY	  
Times	  reporter	  Rachel	  Donadio,	  “with	  Greece	  pretending	  to	  make	  structural	  changes	  and	  its	  lenders	  pretending	  to	  save	  it	  from	  default-­‐-­‐has	  become	  untenable”	  (Donadio	  and	  Kitsantonis	  2012).	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   Among	  EU	  officials	  involved	  in	  resolving	  the	  Greek	  crisis,	  doubts	  have	  grown	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  pledges	  the	  Greek	  government	  has	  made	  to	  increase	  austerity	  will	  actually	  be	  implemented.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  Greece	  can	  announce	  all	  the	  austerity	  it	  wants	  but	  such	  promises	  lack	  conviction.	  	  For	  example,	  Greece	  promised	  in	  2011	  to	  sell	  off	  $65	  billion	  in	  state	  assets,	  however	  to	  date,	  it	  has	  sold	  about	  $2	  billion	  worth.	  	  A	  law	  passed	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2011	  called	  for	  cutting	  30,000	  public	  jobs	  by	  shifting	  workers	  into	  a	  labor	  reserve	  at	  much	  lower	  pay,	  but	  only	  1,000	  workers	  have	  been	  reassigned.	  	  Greece	  has	  also	  failed	  to	  effectively	  open	  professional	  associations	  for	  government	  lawyers	  and	  truck	  drivers	  in	  a	  law	  that	  was	  passed	  in	  2010.	  	  In	  addition,	  Greece	  has	  fallen	  short	  on	  its	  pledges	  to	  lay	  off	  public	  sector	  workers,	  overhaul	  tax	  collection,	  and	  make	  its	  economy	  more	  competitive	  (Donadio	  and	  Kitsantonis	  2012).	  	   Thus,	  such	  doubts	  to	  the	  plausibility	  that	  Greece	  can	  actually	  implement	  further	  austerity	  when	  it	  has	  already	  failed	  in	  implementing	  previous	  rounds	  of	  austerity	  are	  justified.	  	  Interestingly,	  being	  aware	  of	  this	  dynamic	  has	  not	  stopped	  the	  Troika	  from	  continuing	  to	  tout	  austerity	  as	  the	  central	  tenet	  of	  the	  reform	  package.	  	  Despite	  these	  failures,	  Greece	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  its	  structural	  adjustment	  path	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  	   This	  chapter	  provided	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  highlighting	  the	  major	  events	  and	  components.	  	  The	  centrality	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  is	  clear	  throughout	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  examine	  structural	  adjustment	  in	  great	  detail	  to	  understand	  the	  genesis	  of	  this	  policy	  package	  as	  a	  reform	  strategy	  for	  indebted	  Latin	  American	  countries	  in	  crisis.	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CHAPTER	  III	  
STRUCTURAL	  ADJUSTMENT	  	  	   As	  the	  previous	  section	  indicated,	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  are	  the	  primary	  policy	  initiatives	  being	  implemented	  in	  Greece	  to	  increase	  government	  revenues,	  enabling	  Greece	  to	  pay	  back	  its	  debt-­‐load.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  other	  heavily	  indebted	  eurozone	  countries,	  Portugal,	  Italy,	  Ireland,	  and	  Spain,	  have	  all	  recently	  pushed	  through	  their	  own	  structural	  adjustment	  packages	  to	  facilitate	  debt	  repayment.	  	  These	  austerity	  measures	  have	  dominated	  the	  reform	  strategy	  for	  the	  European	  financial	  crisis.	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  structural	  adjustment	  was	  not	  created	  during	  the	  current	  European	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Structural	  adjustment	  measures	  were	  invented	  during	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  of	  the	  1970’s	  for	  much	  the	  same	  reasons	  as	  in	  the	  current	  European	  debt	  crisis-­‐-­‐to	  facilitate	  the	  extraction	  of	  capital	  from	  heavily	  indebted	  states2.	  	  Thus,	  structural	  adjustment	  has	  a	  history	  that	  precedes	  the	  current	  European	  crisis.	  	  Overall,	  structural	  adjustment	  failed	  to	  solve	  the	  debt	  crisis	  of	  Latin	  American	  states,	  and	  these	  measures	  are	  similarly	  failing	  to	  solve	  the	  European	  financial	  crisis.	  	  	   This	  chapter	  aims	  to	  elucidate	  the	  origin	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  as	  a	  policy	  package	  intended	  to	  solve	  the	  financial	  crises	  of	  indebted	  Latin	  American	  states.	  	  Parallels	  between	  the	  Latin	  American	  experience	  and	  the	  Greek	  experience	  with	  
                                                
 2	  Structural	  adjustment	  was	  implemented	  in	  Latin	  America	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  additional	  reasons	  that	  are	  not	  discussed	  in	  this	  research	  project.	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structural	  adjustment	  can	  be	  seen	  through	  this	  comparison	  that	  highlight	  the	  dynamics	  of	  this	  reform	  strategy.	  
Structural	  Adjustment	  as	  a	  Policy	  Package	  	  	   According	  to	  the	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Participatory	  Review	  Initiative	  (SAPRI)	  report,	  which	  investigated	  the	  effects	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  on	  developing	  countries,	  “structural	  adjustment	  measures	  were	  designed	  by	  the	  IMF	  in	  the	  late	  1970’s	  and	  the	  1980’s	  to	  impose	  strict	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  discipline	  on	  indebted	  countries	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  receiving	  short-­‐term	  balance	  of	  payments	  credits”	  (SAPRIN	  2004:2).	  Considering	  the	  extent	  that	  individual	  Latin	  American	  states	  were	  faulted	  for	  creating	  the	  conditions	  of	  their	  own	  respective	  financial	  crises	  and	  needed	  to	  be	  disciplined,	  Shefner	  (2004)	  stated	  that	  “to	  address	  previous	  government	  ‘excesses,’	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy	  in	  support	  of	  working	  people	  and	  domestic	  businesses	  had	  to	  be	  curtailed	  with	  structural	  adjustment	  or	  austerity	  policies.”	  	  By	  opening	  up	  markets	  to	  the	  global	  economy	  and	  reducing	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  economic	  affairs,	  these	  policies	  were	  created	  to	  generate	  savings	  for	  indebted	  governments	  to	  facilitate	  the	  repayment	  of	  their	  foreign	  creditors.	  	   Structural	  adjustment	  measures	  include	  currency	  devaluations,	  reduced	  public	  spending,	  trade	  liberalization,	  investment	  deregulation,	  privatization	  of	  state-­‐owned	  assets,	  and	  liberalization	  of	  labor	  markets	  (SAPRIN	  2004;	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	  Theoretically,	  currency	  devaluations	  are	  intended	  to	  make	  exports	  more	  competitive	  in	  international	  trade.	  	  Increasing	  exports	  is	  also	  facilitated	  by	  trade	  liberalization	  and	  deregulation	  measures	  that	  aim	  to	  eliminate	  protectionism	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and	  other	  restraints	  on	  foreign	  investment.	  	  Reduced	  public	  spending	  curbs	  inflation	  and	  saves	  money	  for	  debt-­‐repayment.	  	  Cuts	  in	  public	  subsidies	  for	  food	  and	  basic	  necessities	  help	  to	  “get	  prices	  right,”	  benefitting	  local	  producers	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	  Wage	  restraints	  and	  higher	  interest	  rates	  reduce	  inflation	  and	  enhance	  economic	  competitiveness.	  	  Privatization	  of	  state-­‐owned	  assets	  generates	  immediate	  government	  revenue,	  generates	  more	  productive	  investment	  from	  the	  private	  sector,	  and	  reduces	  public	  payrolls	  (Robinson	  2008;	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994)	  	   Structural	  adjustment	  programs,	  according	  to	  Robinson	  (2008),	  “were	  justified	  by	  the	  need	  to	  generate	  a	  trade	  surplus	  to	  accommodate	  debt	  service	  payments	  and	  reduce	  trade	  deficits,	  the	  alleged	  inefficiency	  of	  the	  public	  sector,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  control	  inflation	  to	  close	  budget	  deficits	  and	  restore	  fiscal	  solvency	  and	  macroeconomic	  equilibrium”	  (p.	  19).	  	  Overall,	  the	  model	  is	  intended	  to	  generate	  conditions	  for	  the	  efficient	  renewal	  of	  capital	  accumulation	  for	  indebted	  states	  and	  also	  theoretically	  produces	  socially	  beneficial	  results.	  	  Portes	  and	  Hoffman	  (2003:75),	  discussing	  the	  claim	  of	  neoclassical	  economists,	  state	  how	  structural	  adjustment	  “promised	  a	  swift	  return	  to	  growth	  through	  free	  trade	  and	  a	  steady	  alleviation	  of	  poverty	  through	  a	  new	  market-­‐driven	  economic	  dynamism	  that	  would,	  in	  time,	  ‘lift	  all	  boats’.”	  	  	   Robinson	  contends	  that	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  have	  the	  opposite	  effect	  and	  actually	  led	  to	  a	  fall	  in	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  for	  Latin	  American	  people,	  resulting	  in	  a	  “fall	  in	  popular	  consumption,	  a	  deterioration	  of	  social	  conditions,	  a	  rise	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in	  poverty,	  immiseration	  and	  insecurity,	  heightened	  inequalities,	  social	  polarization,	  and	  resultant	  political	  conflict”	  (2008:20).	  	  Shefner	  (2004)	  supports	  this	  claim	  with	  his	  analysis	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  having	  “savage	  effects	  on	  almost	  all	  sectors	  of	  developing	  nations.”	  	  According	  to	  Shefner’s	  analysis	  (2004):	  Currency	  devaluation	  makes	  food	  buying	  more	  expensive.	  	  Wage	  freezes	  amid	  inflation	  further	  reduce	  buying	  power.	  	  Reductions	  in,	  or	  privatization	  of,	  public	  spending	  means	  that	  the	  quality	  and	  quantity	  of	  education,	  health	  care,	  housing	  and	  other	  social	  services	  have	  declined.	  	  Often	  basic	  foodstuffs	  and	  transportation	  were	  subsidized;	  the	  removal	  of	  those	  subsidies	  cuts	  an	  already	  thin	  margin	  of	  survival.	  	  Increased	  interest	  rates	  have	  meant	  both	  increased	  debt	  and	  unemployment	  among	  the	  middle	  and	  working	  classes,	  as	  small	  business	  owners	  find	  it	  harder	  to	  obtain	  capital.	  	  Finally,	  increasing	  access	  of	  foreign	  business	  using	  capital-­‐intensive	  production	  methods,	  coupled	  with	  cutting	  protection	  for	  domestic	  industry,	  has	  meant	  the	  dissolution	  of	  local	  business	  relying	  on	  labor-­‐intensive	  production.	  	  Again,	  employment	  drops,	  local	  production	  falters,	  and	  populations	  fall	  into	  poverty.	  	  	  	   Thus,	  there	  is	  a	  discrepancy	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  reality	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  intended	  to	  do	  and	  what	  it	  actually	  does.	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  structural	  adjustment	  being	  an	  ideological	  tool	  created	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  neoliberalism’s	  ascendency	  to	  dominant	  economic	  paradigm	  guiding	  the	  global	  capitalist	  world-­‐system.	  	  Essentially,	  structural	  adjustment	  was	  the	  brainchild	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory	  in	  that	  such	  policies	  promote	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  free	  trade	  while	  simultaneously	  rolling	  back	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  economy	  which	  are	  foundational	  tenets	  of	  neoliberalism.	  	  The	  immediate	  problem	  is	  that	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  extremely	  taxing	  for	  the	  laboring	  sectors	  and	  people	  resist	  such	  measures	  through	  various	  demonstrations	  and	  protests	  creating	  inertia	  and	  delaying	  the	  implementation	  of	  such	  policies.	  	  The	  resistance	  movements	  of	  effected	  people	  undermine	  the	  implementation	  of	  structural	  adjustment.	  	  Portes	  and	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Hoffman	  (2003)	  contend	  that	  structural	  adjustment	  policies,	  even	  when	  implemented	  effectively,	  fail	  to	  stabilize	  indebted	  countries	  and	  lead	  to	  rising	  unemployment,	  poverty,	  and	  inequality.	  	   Structural	  adjustment	  is	  a	  nationally	  oriented	  reform	  strategy,	  since	  the	  reform	  effort	  falls	  squarely	  on	  the	  government	  to	  fix	  its	  public	  finances	  through	  a	  neoliberal	  restructuring	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  Global,	  macroeconomic	  developments	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world-­‐system	  are	  not	  problematized	  for	  creating	  the	  backdrop	  for	  financial	  crisis,	  and	  instead	  individual	  countries	  are	  faulted.	  	  Both	  Latin	  American	  countries	  and	  Greece	  were	  individually	  faulted	  for	  their	  own	  respective	  crises,	  leading	  to	  structural	  adjustment	  being	  the	  primary	  reform	  strategy.	  	   The	  following	  analysis	  traces	  the	  creation	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  policies.	  	  Although	  such	  policies	  were	  intended	  to	  stabilize	  indebted	  countries	  by	  creating	  budget	  surpluses	  and	  produce	  socially	  beneficial	  results,	  empirical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  opposite	  is	  true.	  	  Structural	  adjustment	  policies	  failed	  to	  effectively	  solve	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  and	  instead	  led	  to	  the	  “Lost	  Decade”	  of	  the	  1980’s	  which	  drastically	  reduced	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  for	  Latin	  American	  citizens.	  
The	  Emergence	  of	  Structural	  Adjustment	  as	  a	  Solution	  to	  the	  Latin	  
American	  Debt	  Crisis	  	  	   The	  roots	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  extend	  back	  to	  the	  late	  1960’s	  and	  into	  the	  1970’s.	  	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  economic	  system	  of	  embedded	  liberalism	  utilizing	  Keynesian	  economics	  was	  failing	  to	  produce	  profits	  in	  the	  Western	  advanced	  capitalist	  states.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  developmentalist	  economic	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policies	  of	  import-­‐substitution	  industrialization	  endorsed	  by	  Latin	  American	  states	  were	  also	  breaking	  down.	  	  Signs	  of	  a	  capital	  accumulation	  crisis	  were	  apparent	  globally	  (Harvey	  2005;	  Robinson	  2008;	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	   In	  theoretical	  terms,	  this	  dynamic	  of	  stagnating	  profits	  refers	  to	  Robinson’s	  “Realization	  Problem”	  (Robinson	  2008).	  	  Due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  capitalism,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  towards	  producing	  a	  surplus	  of	  commodities	  that	  cannot	  be	  consumed	  by	  the	  labor	  classes	  whose	  wages	  are	  constantly	  suppressed.	  	  At	  some	  point,	  capitalists	  are	  left	  with	  a	  surplus	  of	  commodities	  that	  cannot	  be	  unloaded,	  and	  profits	  cannot	  be	  made.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  crisis	  sets	  in	  or	  a	  new	  mechanism	  for	  accumulating	  profits	  is	  created.	  	  The	  late	  1960’s	  represents	  a	  culminating	  point	  where	  the	  “Realization	  Problem”	  was	  evident	  around	  the	  world.	  	  During	  this	  time,	  unemployment	  and	  inflation	  were	  surging	  which	  ushered	  in	  a	  global	  phase	  of	  stagflation	  that	  lasted	  throughout	  the	  1970’s.	  	   The	  stagflation	  of	  the	  1970’s	  was	  compounded	  by	  two	  international	  events	  that	  would	  have	  profoundly	  negative	  impacts	  on	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world-­‐system.	  	  The	  first	  was	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  in	  1971	  which	  allowed	  currency	  rates	  to	  fluctuate	  against	  each	  other,	  engendering	  high	  rates	  of	  inflation	  around	  the	  world.	  	   The	  second	  international	  event	  that	  exacerbated	  the	  global	  recession	  of	  the	  1970’s	  was	  the	  OPEC	  oil	  embargoes	  of	  1973	  and	  1978.	  	  These	  events	  caused	  oil	  prices	  to	  rise	  dramatically	  and	  severely	  deteriorated	  the	  balance	  sheets	  of	  countries	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  imported	  oil,	  such	  as	  Latin	  American	  countries	  and	  Greece	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(Harvey	  2005,	  Robinson	  2008).	  	  Both	  of	  these	  events,	  combined	  with	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  factors	  that	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  discuss,	  created	  the	  stagflationary	  environment	  of	  the	  1970’s.	  	   With	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  international	  economic	  order	  breaking	  down	  globally,	  some	  alternative	  was	  needed	  for	  the	  crisis	  of	  capital	  accumulation	  to	  be	  overcome.	  	  A	  new	  economic	  paradigm	  known	  as	  “neoliberalism”	  that	  gave	  precedence	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  sought	  to	  eliminate	  government	  intervention	  became	  the	  solution.	  	  Beginning	  the	  1970’s	  into	  the	  1980’s,	  virtually	  all	  capitalist	  countries	  adopted	  neoliberal	  policies,	  although	  it	  must	  be	  noted,	  the	  geographical	  endorsement	  of	  neoliberalism	  occurred	  unevenly	  throughout	  the	  world-­‐system	  and	  at	  different	  times	  (Harvey	  2005).	  	  	   In	  Latin	  America,	  the	  implementation	  of	  neoliberal	  policies	  consisted	  of	  seven	  basic	  steps:	  	  (1)	  Unilateral	  opening	  of	  foreign	  trade;	  (2)	  extensive	  privatization	  of	  state	  enterprises;	  (3)	  deregulation	  of	  goods,	  services,	  and	  labor	  markets;	  (4)	  liberalization	  of	  the	  capital	  market,	  with	  extensive	  privatization	  of	  pension	  funds;	  (5)	  fiscal	  adjustment,	  based	  on	  drastic	  reduction	  of	  public	  out-­‐lays;	  (6)	  restructuring	  and	  downscaling	  of	  state-­‐supported	  social	  programs,	  focusing	  on	  compensatory	  schemes	  for	  the	  neediest	  groups;	  and	  (7)	  the	  end	  of	  “industrial	  policy”	  and	  any	  other	  form	  of	  state	  capitalism	  and	  concentration	  on	  macroeconomic	  management.	  (Portes	  1997:238)	  	  	   Adopting	  neoliberalism	  precipitated	  a	  period	  of	  economic	  restructuring	  and	  transformation.	  	  In	  effect,	  capital	  went	  global,	  which	  “allowed	  [capital]	  to	  beak	  free	  of	  the	  constraints	  that	  had	  been	  imposed	  on	  profit	  maximization	  by	  working	  and	  popular	  classes	  and	  by	  national	  governments	  in	  the	  preceding	  epoch	  of	  Keynesian	  capitalism”	  (Robinson	  2004:148).	  	  States	  began	  a	  process	  of	  financialization,	  credit	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liberalization,	  deregulation,	  and	  privatization	  which	  ultimately	  allowed	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  capital	  throughout	  the	  global	  financial	  markets.	  	  Insofar	  as	  neoliberalism	  engendered	  new	  mechanisms	  for	  sustaining	  capital	  accumulation,	  capitalists	  benefitted	  with	  increased	  profits.	  	  	   As	  the	  western	  world	  began	  to	  neoliberalize,	  the	  OPEC	  oil	  embargoes,	  starting	  in	  1973	  and	  occurring	  again	  in	  1978,	  placed	  vast	  amounts	  of	  financial	  power	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  oil-­‐producing	  OPEC	  states.	  	  Through	  military	  pressures,	  OPEC	  countries	  agreed	  to	  recycle	  their	  petrodollars	  through	  the	  New	  York	  investment	  banks.	  	  Taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  stagnant	  state	  of	  the	  United	  States	  economy	  during	  the	  1970’s	  that	  promised	  low	  rates	  of	  return,	  New	  York	  banks	  sought	  investments	  abroad.	  	  Many	  governments	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  until	  now	  starved	  of	  funds,	  were	  eager	  to	  borrow.	  	  As	  rising	  oil	  prices	  engendered	  spiraling	  balance-­‐of-­‐payments	  deficits	  for	  oil-­‐reliant	  states,	  Latin	  American	  governments	  accepted	  loans	  from	  private	  Western	  banks.	  	  Facilitated	  by	  credit	  liberalization	  in	  an	  increasingly	  financialized	  global	  environment,	  Latin	  American	  states	  were	  encouraged	  to	  go	  into	  debt,	  with	  the	  optimistic	  hope	  that	  industrialization	  would	  eventually	  engender	  high	  rates	  of	  revenue	  that	  would	  be	  used	  to	  pay	  back	  the	  foreign	  banks	  (Harvey	  2005;	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	   During	  the	  1970’s,	  Latin	  American	  foreign	  debt	  rapidly	  increased.	  	  In	  1974,	  Latin	  America’s	  foreign	  debt	  climbed	  from	  some	  $50	  billion	  to	  over	  $300	  billion	  by	  1981	  and	  to	  more	  than	  $410	  billion	  by	  1987	  (Robinson	  2008).	  	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  were	  not	  concerned	  
  43 
with	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  emerging	  debt	  crisis.	  	  According	  to	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  (1994),	  “Throughout	  the	  1970’s,	  the	  Bank	  had	  not	  been	  much	  concerned	  about	  adjustment	  and	  did	  not	  oppose	  large-­‐scale	  commercial	  borrowing	  to	  maintain	  high-­‐economic	  growth	  rates”	  (p.	  14).	  	  As	  long	  as	  Latin	  American	  states	  showed	  signs	  of	  growth	  on	  their	  macroeconomic	  finances,	  accumulating	  debt	  was	  not	  a	  problem.	  	  High	  growth	  rates	  were	  the	  guarantee	  of	  the	  continuing	  creditworthiness	  of	  developing	  countries.	  	  Thus,	  while	  Latin	  American	  countries	  steadily	  grew	  by	  an	  average	  of	  3.7	  percent	  from	  1965	  to	  1973	  and	  2.6	  percent	  from	  1973	  to	  1980,	  excessive	  debt	  accumulation	  was	  a	  non-­‐issue	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	   Latin	  American	  foreign	  debt	  remained	  manageable	  until	  1979.	  	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  countries	  were	  experiencing	  their	  own	  recessions.	  	  The	  right-­‐wing	  governments	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  Germany,	  in	  control	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  markets	  during	  the	  1970’s,	  dictated	  terms	  of	  trade	  that	  benefitted	  their	  own	  domestic	  economies	  which	  were	  simultaneously	  detrimental	  to	  developing	  countries.	  	  In	  1979,	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Reserve	  sharply	  increased	  interest	  rates	  as	  a	  measure	  intended	  to	  limit	  the	  money	  supply	  circulating	  throughout	  the	  global	  financial	  markets	  to	  reduce	  inflation.	  	  Interest	  and	  principal	  payments	  for	  developing	  countries	  skyrocketed	  almost	  overnight.	  	  Borrowing	  countries	  were	  also	  facing	  shrinking	  markets	  for	  their	  exports	  and	  deteriorating	  terms	  of	  trade.	  	  The	  deflationary	  effect	  of	  these	  developments	  precipitated	  a	  world	  slump	  from	  1979	  to	  1980.	  	  For	  countries	  who	  had	  borrowed	  heavily	  in	  the	  1970’s,	  the	  combination	  of	  a	  rising	  nominal	  interest	  rate,	  falling	  rate	  of	  inflation,	  and	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declining	  terms	  of	  trade	  created	  an	  alarming	  increase	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  borrowing.	  	  The	  debt-­‐servicing	  abilities	  of	  developing	  countries	  deteriorated	  as	  their	  debt	  increased	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	   Developing	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America	  were	  forced	  to	  run	  massive	  balance-­‐of-­‐payments	  deficits	  if	  they	  were	  to	  expand.	  	  The	  widening	  payments	  deficits	  had	  to	  be	  financed	  by	  more	  borrowing	  or	  through	  debt	  rescheduling.	  	  A	  global	  financial	  crisis	  was	  developing	  that	  was	  culminating	  within	  Latin	  America.	  	  There	  was	  a	  fear	  that	  the	  billions	  of	  dollars	  lent	  to	  Latin	  America	  would	  not	  be	  paid	  back	  in	  full	  to	  the	  private	  banks.	  	  	   The	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis,	  according	  to	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  (1994),	  “surfaced	  visibly	  and	  unavoidably	  in	  1982	  when	  Mexico	  threatened	  to	  default”	  (p.	  15).	  	  The	  debt	  crisis	  was	  underway	  as	  all	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  except	  Colombia,	  followed	  suit.	  	  Borrowing	  continued	  under	  the	  IMF,	  however,	  private	  lending	  dried	  up	  immediately	  for	  all	  developing	  countries	  holding	  large	  amounts	  of	  debt.	  	  	   At	  this	  time,	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  other	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions	  came	  to	  take	  on	  new	  collection	  and	  surveillance	  functions.	  The	  relationship	  between	  western	  banks	  and	  indebted	  developing	  countries	  transformed.	  	  Instead	  of	  pouring	  more	  money	  into	  Latin	  American	  governments,	  western	  banks	  became	  focused	  on	  recovering	  existing	  debts.	  	  The	  IMF	  became	  a	  powerful	  debt-­‐extracting	  institution	  on	  behalf	  of	  western	  banks	  acting	  as	  both	  a	  policy	  advisor	  and	  credit	  rating	  service	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	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   The	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  IMF	  sought	  to	  resolve	  the	  crisis	  of	  indebted	  Latin	  American	  states	  by	  rolling	  over	  the	  debt	  in	  return	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  neoliberal	  reforms.	  	  To	  obtain	  financial	  certification	  that	  was	  a	  requirement	  to	  receive	  additional	  loans,	  Latin	  American	  states	  had	  to	  agree	  to	  implement	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  aimed	  at	  economic	  stabilization.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  was	  to	  “discipline	  Third	  World	  economies	  in	  which	  inflation,	  price	  distortions,	  excessive	  demand,	  industrial	  protection,	  and	  profligate	  government	  spending	  allegedly	  caused	  the	  debt	  problem”	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994:41).	  	  	   Similar	  to	  the	  current	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  Latin	  American	  states	  were	  criticized	  for	  sowing	  the	  seeds	  of	  their	  own	  financial	  crises.	  	  According	  to	  Walton	  and	  Shefner	  (1994),	  “The	  debt	  crisis	  is	  treated	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  Latin	  America’s	  political	  and	  moral	  economy”	  (p.	  99).	  	  Structural	  adjustment	  became	  a	  mechanism	  to	  ensure	  debt	  repayment	  from	  debtor	  countries	  as	  a	  one-­‐size-­‐fit-­‐	  all	  “cure”	  for	  “sick”	  economies,	  regardless	  of	  circumstances.	  	  Thus,	  similar	  to	  the	  current	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  the	  Latin	  American	  financial	  crisis	  was	  also	  treated	  as	  a	  national	  problem	  of	  profligate	  states	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  disciplined	  through	  structural	  adjustment	  measures.	  	  	   Between	  1980	  and	  1986,	  a	  totally	  of	  thirty-­‐seven	  structural	  adjustment	  loans	  were	  negotiated.	  	  In	  return	  for	  these	  loans,	  governments	  had	  to	  reduce	  deficits	  through	  cuts	  in	  welfare	  expenditures	  and	  through	  privatization.	  	  In	  addition,	  governments	  had	  to	  limit	  monetary	  growth,	  devalue	  currencies	  to	  improve	  trade	  prospects,	  and	  make	  labor	  markets	  more	  flexible.	  	  In	  effect,	  demanding	  debt	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repayment	  became	  the	  mechanism	  used	  to	  impose	  neoliberal	  structural	  adjustment	  in	  Latin	  America	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	  	  	   During	  the	  1980’s,	  structural	  adjustment	  gained	  hegemonic	  status	  as	  the	  primary	  reform	  strategy	  to	  resolve	  debt	  problems	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  According	  to	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  (1994),	  “structural	  adjustment	  came	  to	  be	  synonymous	  with	  economic	  reform	  during	  the	  1980’s	  and	  became	  the	  ‘only	  acceptable	  strategy	  for	  development’	  according	  to	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions”	  (p.	  16-­‐17).	  	  	   Structural	  adjustment	  failed	  to	  resolve	  the	  debt	  crisis,	  leading	  Latin	  America	  to	  experience	  the	  “Lost	  Decade”	  of	  1982	  to	  1992.	  	  During	  this	  period,	  Latin	  American	  states	  exhibited	  negative	  growth	  rates,	  a	  decline	  in	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  plummeting	  standards	  of	  living,	  spreading	  poverty,	  and	  debilitating	  external	  debt	  payments.	  	  The	  total	  external	  debt	  per	  capita	  in	  1988	  averaged	  $877	  for	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  a	  figure	  roughly	  ten-­‐time	  greater	  than	  in	  1970	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	  Remmer	  (1991)	  stated	  that	  “average	  inflation	  had	  surged	  to	  the	  unprecedented	  level	  of	  nearly	  1,000	  percent,	  and	  the	  net	  transfer	  of	  resources	  abroad	  was	  continuing	  at	  an	  annual	  rate	  of	  U.S.	  $25	  billion”	  (p.	  778).	  	  According	  to	  Robinson	  (2008),	  “Latin	  American	  stagnated	  in	  absolute	  terms	  and	  experienced	  backward	  movement”	  (p.	  254).	  	  	   Greece’s	  implementation	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  has	  led	  to	  very	  similar	  results,	  including	  economic	  stagnation,	  lower	  standard	  of	  living	  for	  the	  average	  Greek,	  and	  increasing	  external	  debt.	  	  European	  leaders	  involved	  in	  the	  current	  crisis	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have	  failed	  to	  learn	  from	  lessons	  of	  Latin	  America’s	  failed	  experience	  with	  structural	  adjustment.	  
Resistance	  to	  Structural	  Adjustment	  	  	   Just	  as	  structural	  adjustment	  was	  not	  invented	  in	  the	  present	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  protests	  against	  structural	  adjustment	  have	  a	  history	  in	  Latin	  America	  similar	  to	  the	  social	  upheaval	  that	  Greece	  is	  currently	  experiencing.	  	  Resisting	  harsh	  austerity	  measures	  was	  an	  integral	  and	  constant	  presence	  during	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis.	  	  	   Simply	  stated,	  the	  class	  compromise	  that	  ensured	  employment	  and	  high	  wages	  to	  the	  popular	  classes	  in	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  developmentalism	  phase	  was	  subsequently	  dismantled	  by	  the	  implementation	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  during	  the	  debt	  crisis.	  	  People	  reacted	  by	  taking	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  resistance	  demonstrations	  against	  austerity	  policies,	  including	  general	  strikes,	  sit-­‐ins,	  and	  riots.	  	  Some	  were	  peaceful,	  while	  others	  were	  more	  violent,	  resulting	  in	  multiple	  deaths	  (Shefner	  2004).	  	   During	  the	  developmentalism,	  import-­‐substitution	  industrialization	  period	  of	  Latin	  America,	  from	  the	  1950’s	  to	  the	  1970’s,	  states	  were	  undergoing	  rapid	  urbanization.	  	  A	  class	  compromise	  between	  capital	  and	  labor	  was	  created	  where	  Latin	  American	  states	  implemented	  policies	  designed	  to	  meet	  the	  employment	  and	  subsistence	  requirements	  of	  these	  new	  urban	  groups.	  	  State	  policies	  privileged	  the	  poor	  and	  middle	  classes	  engendering	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  capitalist	  and	  popular	  interests.	  	  Public	  assistance	  was	  provided	  in	  exchange	  for	  political	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loyalty.	  	  New	  urban	  groups	  were	  expected	  to	  refrain	  from	  protest	  demonstrations	  and	  were	  expected	  to	  support	  the	  state	  on	  ceremonial	  occasions,	  creating	  a	  “patron-­‐client”	  relationship.	  	  In	  effect,	  a	  moral	  economy	  was	  created	  that	  bought	  social	  peace	  and	  stability,	  although	  sustaining	  the	  class	  compromise	  relied	  heavily	  on	  foreign	  borrowing	  during	  the	  1960’s	  and	  1970’s	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	   The	  developmental	  states	  of	  Latin	  America	  were	  able	  to	  sustain	  the	  moral	  economy	  during	  rapid	  urbanization	  as	  long	  as	  economic	  growth	  and	  foreign	  lending	  ensured	  fiscal	  prosperity.	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1970’s,	  hampered	  by	  the	  international	  recessions	  and	  oil	  embargoes,	  borrowing	  became	  more	  costly,	  and	  the	  price	  of	  peace	  was	  becoming	  unsustainable.	  	  As	  Latin	  American	  countries	  implemented	  structural	  adjustment,	  conditional	  on	  further	  borrowing,	  the	  social	  pact	  established	  during	  the	  previous	  decade	  abruptly	  eroded.	  	  	  	   Structural	  adjustment	  policies	  had	  clear	  redistributional	  implications	  for	  Latin	  American	  citizens.	  	  The	  urban	  poor	  and	  working	  classes	  were	  affected	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  subsidy	  cuts,	  real-­‐wage	  reductions,	  price	  increases	  stemming	  from	  exchange-­‐rate	  devaluations,	  and	  elevated	  public	  service	  costs.	  	  Structural	  adjustment	  resulted	  in	  the	  abrogation	  of	  many	  previously	  customary	  guarantees,	  such	  as	  housing,	  public	  employment,	  education,	  and	  health	  care.	  	  Overall,	  the	  policies	  resulted	  in	  a	  reduced	  share	  of	  national	  income	  for	  the	  laboring	  classes	  and	  greater	  income	  inequality.	  	  According	  to	  Carlos	  Filgueira:	  	  For	  19	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  the	  percentage	  of	  persons	  under	  the	  poverty	  line	  reached	  46	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  in	  1990.	  	  This	  figure	  is	  superior	  to	  that	  registered	  in	  1970,	  1980,	  and	  1986.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  1980s	  were	  the	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decade	  where	  problems	  of	  poverty	  and	  inequality	  increased	  with	  notable	  regularity.	  (Portes	  1997:247)	  	  The	  middle	  class	  was	  also	  hurt,	  especially	  public	  employees	  facing	  the	  elimination	  of	  their	  jobs.	  	  In	  addition,	  consumer	  prices	  rose	  and	  shopkeeper’s	  sales	  volume	  suffered	  from	  diminished	  demand	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	  	  	   Protests	  against	  austerity	  began	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970’s	  in	  Peru	  and	  then	  spread	  worldwide.	  	  According	  to	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  (1994),	  a	  wave	  of	  austerity	  protests	  arose	  in	  thirty-­‐nine	  of	  the	  eighty	  debtor	  countries.	  	  Between	  1976	  and	  1992,	  some	  146	  demonstrations	  occurred,	  peaking	  from	  1983	  to	  1985.	  	  Analyzing	  a	  myriad	  of	  national	  and	  international	  newspapers,	  Shefner	  (2004)	  found	  evidence	  for	  over	  800	  protests	  against	  the	  IMF	  and	  notes	  that	  this	  is	  a	  conservative	  estimate.	  	   Latin	  American	  citizens	  protested	  against	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  moral	  economy.	  	  Governments	  were	  blamed	  for	  sacrificing	  their	  own	  citizens	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  foreign	  banks.	  	  Protestors	  demanded	  that	  the	  state	  meets	  its	  responsibilities	  to	  the	  people	  who	  during	  the	  decades	  of	  patron-­‐client	  politics	  had	  upheld	  their	  end	  of	  the	  bargain.	  	  Demonstrations	  and	  riots	  targeted	  specific	  institutions	  perceived	  as	  responsible	  for	  the	  depredations.	  	  Popular	  resistance	  converged	  on	  major	  thoroughfares	  and	  government	  buildings,	  such	  as	  the	  national	  bank	  and	  legislature.	  Slogans	  such	  as	  “Out	  with	  the	  IMF”	  were	  chanted	  by	  workers	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994).	  	   A	  clear	  parallel	  can	  be	  drawn	  that	  points	  to	  the	  similarities	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Latin	  American	  and	  Greek	  people	  responded	  to	  structural	  adjustment.	  	  In	  the	  1980’s,	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  created	  an	  “entitlement	  culture”	  in	  Greece	  that	  is	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reminiscent	  of	  Latin	  America’s	  moral	  economy	  of	  the	  1950’s	  and	  1960’s.	  	  This	  process	  will	  be	  further	  explained	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  however,	  for	  the	  present	  purposes	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Greece’s	  entitlement	  culture	  operated	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  as	  Latin	  America’s	  moral	  economy	  in	  that	  Greek	  people	  enjoyed	  high	  levels	  of	  employment	  and	  wages	  in	  return	  for	  supporting	  the	  political	  party	  in	  power.	  	   With	  the	  sudden	  implementation	  of	  austerity	  measures	  beginning	  in	  Greece	  in	  2010	  and	  persisting	  until	  the	  present	  time,	  the	  entitlement	  culture	  has	  been	  continuously	  stripped	  away.	  	  Angry	  at	  this	  reality	  and	  a	  lowered	  standard	  of	  living,	  Greeks	  have	  relentlessly	  demonstrated	  against	  such	  measures	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  means	  ranging	  from	  peaceful	  to	  violent.	  	   Thus,	  the	  parallel	  experiences	  with	  structural	  adjustment	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  Greece	  lie	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  how	  such	  measures	  weigh	  heavily	  on	  the	  citizens	  of	  that	  respective	  country.	  	  With	  the	  backdrop	  of	  a	  moral	  economy	  and	  entitlement	  culture,	  in	  both	  cases	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  eroded	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  of	  the	  people.	  	  Social	  upheaval	  resulted	  as	  the	  people	  bore	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  reform	  effort.	  	   	  Structural	  adjustment	  was	  the	  primary	  reform	  strategy	  for	  indebted	  countries	  during	  the	  Latin	  American	  financial	  crisis,	  and	  is	  the	  primary	  strategy	  for	  the	  current	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  due	  to	  the	  perception	  that	  these	  indebted	  countries	  were	  at	  fault	  for	  creating	  their	  own	  respective	  crises	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  moral	  economy	  or	  entitlement	  culture.	  	  Structural	  adjustment	  became	  the	  tool	  
  51 
to	  discipline	  what	  was	  considered	  profligate,	  corrupt,	  and	  wasteful	  governments	  by	  scaling	  back	  social	  welfare	  programs	  and	  reducing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  economic	  affairs.	  	  Within	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  the	  harsh	  austerity	  treatment	  is	  justified,	  since	  fiscally	  mismanaged	  governments	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  crisis	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Greece,	  Norris	  (2011)	  comments	  how,	  “those	  who	  partied	  deserve	  the	  pain	  of	  hangovers.”	  	  The	  following	  chapter	  addresses	  this	  issue	  and	  discusses	  the	  processes	  and	  institutions	  specific	  to	  Greece	  that	  have	  been	  faulted,	  according	  to	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  logic,	  for	  creating	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis.	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CHAPTER	  IV	  	  
MAINSTREAM	  EXPLANATIONS	  	  	   Political	  leaders	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  IMF	  treated	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  as	  a	  national	  problem.	  	  Within	  this	  logic,	  profligate	  and	  wasteful	  Latin	  American	  states	  were	  disciplined	  with	  austere	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  to	  facilitate	  debt	  repayment.	  	  Although	  western	  banks	  were	  repaid,	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries’	  economies	  stagnated	  leading	  to	  the	  “Lost	  Decade”	  of	  the	  1980’s.	  	  	  A	  more	  accurate	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  crisis	  would	  have	  indicated	  that	  the	  crisis	  was	  a	  result	  of	  global,	  macroeconomic	  developments	  with	  national	  manifestations.	  	  Treating	  the	  crisis	  as	  strictly	  a	  national	  problem	  led	  to	  national	  reforms,	  however,	  they	  ultimately	  failed	  to	  stabilize	  Latin	  American	  states.	  	   The	  current	  academic	  and	  journalistic	  wisdom	  that	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  Greece	  similarly	  suggests	  that	  Greece’s	  problems	  are	  strictly	  national.	  	  Applying	  the	  same	  logic	  used	  to	  solve	  the	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis,	  political	  leaders	  in	  Europe	  have	  forced	  Greece	  to	  adopt	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  bailout	  funds.	  	  Under	  this	  plan,	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  reform	  effort	  falls	  onto	  Greece	  to	  fix	  its	  own	  macroeconomic	  finances	  which	  would	  then	  facilitate	  debt	  repayment	  and	  ultimately	  solve	  the	  crisis.	  	  Thus,	  for	  the	  past	  two	  years	  Greece	  has	  been	  undergoing	  a	  fundamental	  restructuring	  of	  its	  economy	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  image.	  	  Structural	  adjustment,	  including	  drastic	  cuts	  to	  public	  expenditure	  combined	  with	  higher	  taxes,	  has	  been	  an	  integral	  component	  of	  the	  reform	  strategy.	  	  Additionally,	  Greece	  is	  undergoing	  a	  liberalization	  and	  deregulation	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  and	  labor	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markets.	  	  Finally,	  a	  major	  privatization	  plan	  has	  been	  created	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  reducing	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  economy	  by	  privatizing	  state-­‐owned	  assets.	  	  	   With	  expected	  deficit	  reduction	  targets	  failing	  to	  be	  achieved	  time	  and	  time	  again,	  persistent	  economic	  stagnation,	  and	  the	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  continuing	  to	  climb,	  clearly	  these	  reform	  efforts	  are	  failing	  to	  provide	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis.	  	  Simply	  stated,	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  not	  solely	  a	  national	  problem	  that	  can	  be	  fixed	  with	  national	  reforms.	  	  Instead,	  the	  situation	  is	  a	  crisis	  of	  the	  eurozone,	  and	  any	  viable	  solution	  must	  take	  this	  into	  consideration.	  	  	  	   To	  understand	  why	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  being	  treated	  as	  strictly	  a	  national	  problem,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  illustrate	  how	  Greece	  has	  been	  blamed	  for	  creating	  its	  own	  crisis.	  	  Ultimately,	  conventional	  wisdom	  has	  given	  Greece	  complete	  agency	  for	  laying	  the	  foundation	  for	  its	  financial	  crisis.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  as	  a	  national	  problem	  is	  reinforced	  by	  real	  experiences	  of	  political	  corruption,	  an	  uncompetitive	  and	  inefficient	  economy,	  and	  an	  unsatisfactory	  tax	  system.	  	  In	  effect,	  these	  national	  manifestations	  of	  crisis	  reinforce	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  that	  faults	  Greece	  for	  sowing	  the	  seeds	  of	  its	  own	  destruction.	  	  	   In	  truth,	  it	  is	  well	  known	  that	  Greece	  has	  been	  a	  fiscally	  mismanaged	  country	  for	  decades;	  however,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  understand	  that	  these	  national	  issues	  are	  not	  the	  primary	  reason	  Greece	  is	  in	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Instead,	  the	  Greek	  crisis	  is	  much	  more	  a	  product	  of	  global	  power	  imbalances	  manifested	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  eurozone	  that	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  	  For	  the	  present	  purposes,	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this	  chapter	  intends	  to	  illustrate	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  current	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  as	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  has	  conceptualized	  it.	  	  In	  addition,	  this	  chapter	  will	  identify	  the	  problematic	  national	  institutions	  that	  reinforce	  the	  conception	  that	  Greece	  is	  to	  blame	  for	  its	  own	  crisis.	  	  	  
National	  Explanations	  of	  the	  Greek	  Financial	  Crisis	  
Expansion	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  in	  the	  1980’s	  	  	   The	  mainstream	  narrative	  posits	  that	  the	  deep	  roots	  of	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  1980’s.	  	  Andreas	  Papandreou,	  the	  Greek	  Prime	  Minister	  from	  1981	  to	  1989,	  is	  credited	  for	  creating	  the	  sprawling	  and	  over-­‐staffed	  public	  sector	  that	  has	  persisted	  into	  the	  present	  day	  (Thomas	  2011a).	  	  Ultimately,	  Papandreou	  is	  given	  complete	  agency	  in	  establishing	  an	  over-­‐sized	  and	  clientelistic	  government	  bureaucracy	  and	  a	  sprawling	  welfare	  state	  that	  initiated	  Greece’s	  rapid	  accumulation	  of	  public	  debt,	  laying	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  current	  crisis.	  	   Andreas	  Papandreou’s	  tenure	  as	  Greek	  Prime	  Minister	  commenced	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  Greece	  joined	  the	  European	  Community	  (EC)	  in	  1981.	  	  Papandreou	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  many	  grants	  and	  agricultural	  subsidies	  to	  which	  a	  poorer	  country	  in	  the	  EC	  became	  eligible	  (Lyrintzis	  1993).	  	  This	  dynamic	  enabled	  Papandreou	  to	  reward	  many	  of	  the	  disenfranchised	  social	  groups	  who	  had	  suffered	  under	  the	  Axis	  Occupation	  during	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  subsequent	  civil	  war	  from	  1946	  through	  1949,	  and	  the	  junta	  military	  dictatorship	  that	  lasted	  from	  1967	  to	  1974	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	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   Papandreou,	  and	  his	  newly	  formed	  socialist	  party	  PASOK,	  started	  out	  as	  a	  protest	  movement	  among	  the	  middle	  and	  lower	  strata	  of	  Greek	  society	  against	  the	  conservative,	  right	  wing	  regime	  of	  New	  Democracy	  which	  was	  in	  power	  at	  the	  time.	  	  PASOK	  framed	  Greece’s	  socio-­‐political	  environment	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  “non-­‐privileged”	  majority	  that	  PASOK	  claimed	  to	  stand	  for,	  and	  a	  tiny	  “privileged”	  oligarchy	  that	  had	  power	  and	  was	  identified	  as	  the	  enemy.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  PASOK’s	  discourse	  was	  oversimplified	  at	  best,	  but	  framing	  this	  scenario	  in	  terms	  of	  Marxist	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  few	  oppressors	  and	  the	  mass	  of	  oppressed	  allowed	  the	  heterogeneous	  middle	  and	  lower	  strata	  to	  overcome	  their	  differences	  and	  create	  a	  unified	  social	  base	  supporting	  PASOK.	  	  Thus,	  PASOK’s	  rise	  to	  power	  was	  based	  on	  populist	  rhetoric	  that	  sought	  to	  benefit	  the	  “proletariat”	  of	  Greece,	  even	  if	  it	  did	  include	  large	  sections	  of	  the	  middle	  class.	  	  Papandreou	  was	  able	  to	  mobilize	  the	  masses	  in	  a	  vague	  project	  for	  change	  and	  successfully	  won	  the	  1981	  elections	  (Lyrintzis	  1993).	  	   Papandreou	  pursued	  a	  path	  of	  populism	  where	  he	  favored	  those	  Greeks	  that	  supported	  his	  rise	  to	  power	  with	  favorable	  employment	  opportunities	  through	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  Using	  Shefner’s	  (2012)	  core	  definition	  of	  clientelism	  that	  “centers	  on	  unequal	  access	  to	  scarce	  resources,	  and	  the	  exchange	  relationship	  in	  which	  a	  powerful	  actor	  trades	  such	  resources	  for	  political	  support	  from	  less	  powerful	  actors,”	  Papandreou’s	  socio-­‐political	  activity	  in	  the	  1980’s	  can	  be	  accurately	  characterized	  as	  clientelistic.	  	  Papandreou	  gave	  thousands	  of	  stable,	  well-­‐paying	  jobs	  to	  the	  middle	  and	  lower	  strata	  Greeks	  who	  in	  return	  supported	  Papandreou’s	  premiership.	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   Close	  discusses	  how	  “the	  PASOK	  government	  took	  to	  new	  lengths	  the	  use	  of	  public	  appointments	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  policy,	  providing	  secure	  jobs	  to	  masses	  of	  people	  from	  lower	  income	  groups”	  (2002:161).	  	  Papandreou	  gave	  supporters	  cushy	  jobs	  in	  the	  large,	  sprawling	  government	  bureaucracy.	  	  Government	  employees	  numbered	  320,000	  in	  1971	  and	  increased	  to	  500,000	  in	  1981	  and	  700,000	  in	  1991	  (Close	  2002).	  	  Manolopoulos	  (2011)	  has	  referred	  to	  this	  dynamic	  as	  “Hellenic	  Peronism”	  to	  parallel	  Juan	  Domingo	  Peron	  of	  Argentina	  who	  was	  notorious	  for	  giving	  subsides	  and	  favors	  to	  special	  interest	  groups	  that	  supported	  him.	  	   According	  to	  Lyrintzis	  (1993),	  “PASOK	  embarked	  on	  a	  systematic	  expansion	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  by	  appointing	  people	  loyal	  to	  the	  party	  en	  masse	  to	  specially-­‐created	  posts	  and	  by	  multiplying	  state-­‐controlled	  agencies”	  (p.	  27).	  	  The	  public	  sector	  grew	  in	  inefficiency,	  corruption,	  and	  overstaffing,	  as	  simultaneously	  wages	  and	  pensions	  increased	  sharply.	  	  Between	  1979	  and	  1985,	  public	  pension	  expenditure	  in	  Greece	  increased	  from	  5.8	  to	  10.7	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  	  Trade	  unions	  were	  strengthened,	  and	  the	  state-­‐controlled	  banking	  sector	  was	  used	  to	  subsidize	  unprofitable	  businesses	  (Close	  2002;	  Lynn	  2011).	  	  According	  to	  an	  OECD	  research	  report,	  “the	  Government	  immediately	  embarked	  on	  a	  massive	  program	  of	  redistribution.	  	  Real	  average	  and	  minimum	  wages	  and	  pensions	  were	  increased,	  and	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  social	  security	  system	  was	  extended”	  (Eardley et al. 1996:178).	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  enlargement	  of	  the	  government	  bureaucracy,	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  and	  his	  PASOK	  party	  are	  criticized	  for	  creating	  a	  sprawling	  welfare	  state.	  	  Total	  expenditure	  on	  social	  welfare	  (including	  health	  but	  excluding	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education)	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GNP	  was	  9.7	  percent	  in	  1965	  and	  10.9	  percent	  in	  1975,	  but	  then	  leapt	  to	  14	  percent	  in	  1980	  and	  20.9	  percent	  in	  1985	  (Close	  2002).	  	  According	  to	  Fouskas	  (1997),	  PASOK’s	  “policies	  contributed	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  such	  a	  ‘welfare	  society’	  which	  even	  the	  most	  prosperous	  advanced	  economies	  of	  the	  West	  would	  admire”	  (p.	  71).	  	  The	  number	  of	  Greeks	  in	  relative	  poverty	  fell	  from	  2.1	  million	  in	  1980	  to	  1.8	  million	  in	  1986	  (Close	  2002).	  	   Considering	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  Greeks	  were	  employed	  in	  secure,	  well-­‐paying	  government	  jobs	  combined	  with	  an	  expanding	  welfare	  state,	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  posits	  that	  an	  “entitlement	  culture”	  was	  created	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  According	  to	  New	  York	  Times	  reporter	  Landon	  Thomas	  Jr.	  (2011a),	  “Andreas	  Papandreou	  corrupted	  the	  Greek	  psyche	  and	  gave	  the	  Greeks	  an	  entitlement	  culture	  based	  on	  their	  existence	  and	  not	  their	  ability	  to	  work.”	  	  In	  effect,	  as	  Greeks	  enjoyed	  secure,	  well-­‐paying	  jobs	  and	  ample	  social	  welfare	  programs,	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  Greek	  economy	  continually	  declined	  throughout	  the	  1980’s.	  	   To	  sustain	  such	  a	  large	  government	  bureaucracy	  and	  welfare	  state,	  PASOK	  turned	  to	  foreign	  loans	  to	  finance	  its	  populist	  social	  policy.	  	  Public	  spending	  increased	  by	  40	  percent	  during	  the	  1982	  through	  1988	  period	  (compared	  to	  28	  percent	  during	  the	  1975	  through	  1981	  period	  of	  the	  previous	  New	  Democracy	  government).	  	  Public	  debt	  increased	  during	  the	  same	  period	  by	  433	  percent,	  compared	  to	  106	  percent	  during	  the	  1975	  through	  1981	  period	  (Lyrintzis	  193).	  	  The	  budget	  deficit	  for	  the	  PASOK	  administration	  increased	  from	  2.6	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  1980	  to	  9.1	  percent	  in	  1981	  and	  11.7	  percent	  in	  1985	  (Psalidopoulos	  2010).	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   It	  is	  essential	  to	  note	  that	  the	  strategy	  pursued	  by	  Papandreou	  and	  his	  PASOK	  administration	  did	  nothing	  to	  make	  the	  economy	  more	  globally	  competitive.	  	  Instead,	  Greece’s	  economic	  performance	  deteriorated	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Eardley	  et	  al.	  (1996),	  “economic	  growth	  slumped	  from	  3.1	  percent	  per	  year	  in	  the	  1975	  to	  1980	  period	  to	  0.7	  percent	  per	  year	  between	  1980	  and	  1985,	  rising	  to	  1.4	  percent	  per	  year	  between	  1985	  and	  1990”	  (p.	  179).	  	  Part	  of	  the	  poor	  economic	  performance	  is	  attributed	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  foreign	  investment	  which	  particularly	  hurt	  the	  manufacturing	  industry.	  	  Greece	  de-­‐industrialized	  during	  the	  1980’s	  while	  inflation	  increased	  and	  was	  the	  highest	  out	  of	  any	  European	  country	  during	  this	  decade.	  	  Using	  manufacturing	  employment	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  de-­‐industrialization,	  Greek	  manufacturers	  lost	  23	  percent	  of	  its	  workforce	  from	  the	  time	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  was	  elected	  into	  office	  in	  1981	  to	  1994	  (Pirounakis	  1997).	  	  In	  addition,	  manufacturing	  output,	  as	  a	  share	  of	  industrial	  output	  GDP,	  fell	  from	  62.4	  percent	  in	  1982	  to	  59.2	  percent	  in	  1987	  (Jouganatos	  1992).	  	  	  	   The	  populist	  strategy	  paid	  off	  in	  electoral	  terms,	  but	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  an	  unprecedented	  increase	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  debt,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  “bolstering	  the	  chaotic,	  irrational,	  and	  clientelistic	  nature	  of	  the	  Greek	  state”	  (Lyrintzis	  1993).	  	  According	  to	  Close	  (2002),	  “PASOK	  governments-­‐-­‐and	  to	  some	  extent	  their	  predecessors	  and	  successors-­‐-­‐spent	  money	  on	  buying	  votes	  (particularly	  with	  pensions,	  wage	  increases	  for	  public	  workers,	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  public-­‐sector	  employment),	  rather	  than	  on	  investment	  in	  areas	  which	  could	  stimulate	  long-­‐term	  growth”	  (p.	  175).	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   The	  mainstream	  narrative	  thus	  criticizes	  Papandreou	  and	  his	  PASOK	  regime	  for	  creating	  such	  a	  wasteful	  and	  profligate	  public	  sector	  in	  the	  1980’s	  that	  continued	  to	  rack	  up	  exorbitant	  amounts	  of	  debt	  into	  the	  present	  day	  without	  restructuring	  the	  economy	  to	  be	  globally	  competitive.	  	  “There	  is	  little	  dispute	  that	  the	  borrowing	  spree	  began	  under	  Andreas,”	  writes	  Thomas	  (2011a).	  	  According	  to	  the	  mainstream	  narrative,	  all	  political	  parties	  have	  followed	  the	  populist	  path	  since	  1981.	  	  As	  Monolopoulos	  (2011)	  asserts,	  “The	  precedent	  established	  by	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  in	  the	  1980’s	  of	  largesse	  directed	  at	  interest	  groups…has	  been	  followed	  by	  PASOK	  and	  New	  Democracy	  administrations	  alike”	  (p.	  89).	  	  	   On	  a	  superficial	  level,	  the	  mainstream	  narrative’s	  analysis	  into	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  crisis	  extending	  back	  to	  Papandreou’s	  premiership	  in	  the	  1980’s	  is	  valid.	  	  This	  period	  in	  Greek	  economic	  history	  initiated	  the	  explosion	  of	  foreign	  debt	  and	  de-­‐industrialization,	  creating	  problems	  for	  the	  future	  Greek	  economy.	  	  However,	  by	  placing	  Greece	  within	  the	  socio-­‐historical	  context	  of	  the	  time	  period,	  a	  different	  analysis	  of	  Greece’s	  economic	  development	  is	  revealed	  which	  mitigates	  some	  of	  the	  charges	  giving	  Papandreou	  complete	  agency	  for	  creating	  the	  sprawling	  public	  sector.	  	  More	  importantly,	  it	  gives	  credence	  to	  the	  central	  argument	  of	  this	  project	  that	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  more	  a	  global	  problem	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world-­‐system	  than	  a	  national	  financial	  crisis	  that	  was	  self-­‐created	  by	  the	  Greek	  government.	  	   On	  a	  domestic	  level,	  the	  political	  context	  of	  the	  1970’s	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  successive	  Greek	  governments	  to	  pursue	  strategies	  of	  populism	  and	  clientelism.	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At	  this	  time,	  Greece	  had	  just	  emerged	  from	  a	  repressive	  military	  dictatorship	  that	  held	  power	  from	  1967	  to	  1974.	  	  After	  democratization,	  any	  political	  party	  attempting	  to	  gain	  power	  needed	  to	  consolidate	  a	  strong	  sociopolitical	  base.	  	  Both	  the	  left	  and	  the	  right	  were	  completely	  against	  any	  political	  party	  having	  power	  without	  social	  legitimacy	  as	  the	  military	  dictatorship	  did	  for	  the	  previous	  seven	  years.	  	  This	  dynamic	  of	  requiring	  popular	  support	  to	  hold	  political	  power	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  clientelistic	  practices	  to	  dominate	  Greece’s	  next	  phase	  of	  development;	  attempting	  to	  achieve	  economic	  competitiveness	  in	  an	  increasingly	  globalized	  world	  became	  secondary	  to	  this	  goal	  (Close	  2002;	  Pagoulatos	  2003).	  	   Konstantinos	  Karamanlis	  was	  the	  first	  democratically	  elected	  Prime	  Minister	  	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  dictatorship	  in	  1974.	  	  Karamanlis	  sought	  to	  consolidate	  his	  fledgling	  conservative	  party,	  New	  Democracy,	  as	  a	  base	  to	  draw	  social	  legitimacy.	  	  Through	  clientelistic	  practices	  of	  giving	  financial	  handouts	  and	  cheap	  credit	  to	  friendly	  business	  constituents,	  Karamanlis	  successfully	  held	  power	  until	  1981	  (Pagoulatos	  2003).	  	  According	  to	  Fouskas	  (1997),	  Karamanlis	  expanded	  “state	  interventionism	  and	  boosting	  aggregate	  demand.	  	  A	  number	  of	  nationalizations	  took	  place	  in	  the	  banking	  sector,	  transport	  and	  shipyards.	  	  Welfare	  measures	  were	  introduced,	  thus	  preparing	  the	  ground	  for	  PASOK’s	  generous	  welfare	  policies	  throughout	  the	  1980’s”	  (p.	  68).	  	  Ultimately,	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  in	  the	  1980’s	  expanded	  the	  clientelistic	  trend	  that	  Karamanlis	  had	  already	  initiated	  a	  decade	  earlier.	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   Interestingly,	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  fails	  to	  extend	  its	  analysis	  of	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis	  back	  to	  the	  post-­‐military	  dictatorship	  era	  beginning	  in	  1974	  with	  Karamanlis’	  rise	  to	  power.	  	  Instead,	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  begins	  its	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	  crisis	  with	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  and	  his	  socialist	  party	  being	  elected	  to	  power	  in	  1981.	  	  While	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  is	  correct	  in	  citing	  Papandreou’s	  establishment	  of	  a	  bloated	  public	  sector	  and	  sprawling	  welfare	  state	  as	  a	  main	  root	  of	  the	  current	  crisis,	  this	  analysis	  is	  incomplete	  and	  fraught	  with	  shortcomings.	  	  More	  accurately,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  the	  political	  conditions	  during	  the	  return	  to	  democracy	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  clientelism	  to	  become	  entrenched.	  	  Kostas	  Karamanlis	  starting	  in	  1974,	  not	  Andreas	  Papandreou,	  was	  the	  first	  politician	  to	  initiate	  clientelistic	  practices	  that	  Papandreou	  subsequently	  intensified	  and	  continued.	  	   The	  inability	  of	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  to	  adopt	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  the	  roots	  of	  this	  crisis	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  ideological	  foundation	  of	  this	  perspective.	  	  The	  mainstream	  narrative	  is	  a	  based	  in	  pro-­‐neoliberal	  sentiments	  that	  exist	  globally,	  and	  one	  constant	  feature	  of	  this	  perspective	  is	  its	  lambasting	  of	  welfare	  states	  and	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  Thus,	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  does	  not	  credit	  Karamanlis	  with	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  crisis	  although	  he	  initiated	  the	  welfare	  policies	  and	  clientelistic	  trends	  in	  Greece.	  	  Instead,	  Papandreou	  was	  the	  subsequent	  Prime	  Minister	  who	  expanded	  the	  welfare	  state	  and	  the	  government	  bureaucracy	  that	  necessitated	  huge	  amounts	  of	  foreign	  borrowing.	  	  The	  mainstream	  narrative	  uses	  Papandreou’s	  enlargement	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  strengthening	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  in	  the	  1980’s	  as	  an	  exemplar	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of	  the	  failure	  of	  welfare	  states.	  	  According	  to	  this	  logic,	  Greeks	  erected	  an	  inefficient	  public	  sector	  and	  a	  costly	  welfare	  state	  that	  initiated	  Greece’s	  explosion	  of	  foreign	  borrowing,	  laying	  the	  foundation	  for	  crisis.	  	  This	  rhetoric	  allows	  neoliberal	  states	  to	  justify	  the	  erosion	  of	  their	  own	  respective	  welfare	  states,	  as	  it	  is	  posited	  that	  the	  welfare	  state	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  crisis.	  	   A	  symbiotic	  relationship	  emerged	  in	  Greece	  between	  the	  political	  party	  in	  power	  and	  its	  constituents.	  	  The	  conservative	  New	  Democracy	  party	  and	  the	  socialist	  PASOK	  party	  both	  entrenched	  clientelistic	  practices	  of	  giving	  cheap	  credit	  to	  specific	  business	  constituents.	  	  In	  return,	  the	  clientele	  would	  support	  that	  political	  party.	  	  All	  of	  this	  happens,	  however,	  as	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  economy	  deteriorates.	  	  The	  drive	  for	  firms	  to	  restructure	  their	  business	  operations	  and	  increase	  productivity	  to	  compete	  in	  global	  economic	  markets	  becomes	  superfluous.	  For	  example,	  the	  net	  profit	  rate	  in	  manufacturing	  fell	  from	  15	  percent	  between	  1970	  and	  1973	  to	  about	  8	  percent	  in	  1979,	  and	  turned	  negative	  in	  1982	  (Pagoulatos	  2003).	  	  According	  to	  Pagoulatos	  (2003),	  “Though	  some	  40	  percent	  of	  all	  firms	  between	  1979	  and	  1986	  were	  steadily	  making	  losses,	  only	  7	  percent	  declared	  bankruptcy,	  and	  these	  were	  predominately	  small-­‐size”	  (p.	  102).	  	  In	  effect,	  industry	  became	  increasingly	  reliant	  on	  state	  funds	  to	  operate	  as	  production	  costs	  increased	  during	  the	  1970’s	  and	  1980’s.	  	  Thus,	  government	  spending	  sharply	  increased	  during	  this	  time;	  from	  1975	  to	  1990,	  government	  spending	  rose	  from	  29	  percent	  to	  52	  percent	  (Pagoulatos	  2003).	  	  Therefore,	  the	  foreign	  borrowing	  during	  the	  1980’s	  was	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spent	  not	  only	  on	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  the	  welfare	  state,	  but	  also	  to	  prop	  up	  failing	  businesses	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  political	  component,	  the	  domestic	  economic	  conditions	  of	  the	  1970’s	  created	  the	  context	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  populist	  path.	  The	  breakdown	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  in	  1973	  had	  a	  profoundly	  negative	  effect	  on	  Greece’s	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  development.	  	  Now	  that	  currencies	  exchange	  rates	  were	  volatile,	  the	  monetary	  stability	  that	  Greece	  experienced	  in	  the	  early	  postwar	  decades	  was	  replaced	  by	  stagflation	  that	  lasted	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  1970’s	  and	  1980’s.	  	  Greek	  inflation	  rose	  from	  4.3	  percent	  in	  1972	  to	  15.5	  percent	  in	  1973	  and	  averaged	  annual	  growth	  of	  less	  than	  1	  percent	  of	  GDP	  during	  the	  1980’s.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  OPEC	  oil	  embargoes	  had	  a	  severely	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  economy.	  	  Greece	  is	  a	  country	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  imported	  oil	  to	  fuel	  their	  industrial	  and	  shipping	  sectors	  and	  therefore	  is	  sensitive	  to	  foreign	  price	  increases	  which	  were	  exceptionally	  high	  because	  of	  the	  soaring	  international	  inflation	  at	  this	  time	  (Close	  2002;	  Pagoulatos	  2003).	  	   Combined	  with	  this	  bleak,	  domestic	  economic	  picture,	  the	  international	  economic	  context	  of	  the	  1970’s,	  characterized	  by	  high	  inflation	  and	  stagnation	  worldwide,	  must	  also	  be	  stressed	  as	  a	  central	  factor	  that	  engendered	  Greece’s	  debt	  buildup	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries	  were	  experiencing	  their	  own	  respective	  financial	  crises	  in	  the	  1970’s,	  Greek	  industrial	  profitability	  declined	  as	  there	  was	  a	  diminution	  of	  markets	  for	  Greece	  to	  export	  its	  commodities.	  	  In	  effect,	  Greece	  began	  a	  process	  of	  de-­‐
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industrialization	  which	  was	  also	  accompanied	  by	  many	  other	  western	  countries.	  	  According	  to	  Close	  (2002),	  “During	  the	  1980’s,	  Greece	  shared	  in	  the	  de-­‐industrialization	  widespread	  in	  western	  developed	  countries	  as	  manufacturing	  moved	  increasingly	  to	  countries	  outside	  Europe,	  where	  labor	  costs	  were	  even	  lower	  than	  those	  of	  Greece.”	  	  Combining	  the	  inefficient	  and	  over-­‐staffed	  government	  bureaucracy,	  sprawling	  welfare	  state,	  high	  inflation,	  the	  price	  increase	  for	  imported	  oil,	  de-­‐industrialization,	  and	  an	  overall	  erratic	  international	  economic	  context,	  Greece	  borrowed	  significantly	  more	  funds	  through	  the	  global	  markets	  to	  support	  its	  economy	  (Close	  2002;	  Jouganatos	  1992;	  Pagoulatos	  2003;	  Pirounakis	  1997).	  	  	  	   Thus,	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  political	  economic	  context	  of	  the	  1970’s	  and	  1980s,	  an	  alternative	  perspective	  of	  Greece’s	  development	  is	  revealed.	  	  This	  perspective	  dismisses	  the	  claim	  of	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  that	  gives	  complete	  agency	  to	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  for	  creating	  the	  clientelistic	  government	  bureaucracy	  and	  initiating	  Greece’s	  foreign	  debt	  buildup.	  	  Karamanlis	  was	  the	  first	  prime	  minister	  to	  begin	  clientelistic	  policies	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  return	  to	  democracy.	  	  Papandreou	  merely	  continued	  a	  trend	  that	  ensured	  him	  a	  political	  career.	  	  	   In	  addition,	  Greece,	  along	  with	  much	  of	  the	  developed	  western	  world,	  was	  de-­‐industrializing	  in	  the	  1980’s	  due	  to	  a	  stagflationary	  global	  economy	  as	  labor	  costs	  became	  cheaper	  in	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  western	  economic	  system	  was	  fundamentally	  changing	  at	  that	  time,	  and	  Greece	  had	  little	  choice	  in	  de-­‐industrializing.	  	  It	  was	  financially	  rational,	  at	  the	  time,	  for	  Greece	  to	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build	  up	  a	  strong	  public	  sector,	  rather	  than	  try	  to	  invest	  in	  its	  private	  sector	  that	  was	  losing	  competitiveness	  to	  the	  BRIC	  countries.	  	  	  	   Instead	  of	  pursuing	  a	  “race	  to	  the	  bottom”	  where	  many	  countries	  industrialized	  and	  improved	  competitiveness	  by	  reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  labor,	  Greece	  took	  a	  bold	  stance	  in	  this	  economic	  environment.	  	  Greece	  pursued	  a	  path	  of	  populism	  that	  fit	  well	  with	  the	  return	  to	  democracy,	  and	  this	  allowed	  the	  country	  to	  offset	  the	  negative	  and	  destabilizing	  effects	  of	  de-­‐industrialization.	  	  This	  may	  have	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  massive	  accumulation	  of	  foreign	  debt,	  but	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  paper,	  other	  factors	  contributed	  to	  the	  current	  crisis,	  most	  importantly	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  within	  the	  eurozone.	  	  	  
Post-­Euro	  Excessive	  Borrowing	  	  	  	   Although	  Hellenic	  Peronism	  is	  often	  criticized	  for	  the	  initial	  debt	  buildup	  that	  began	  in	  the	  1980’s,	  Greece’s	  debt-­‐load	  significantly	  exploded	  in	  the	  early	  2000’s	  when	  the	  country	  adopted	  the	  euro.	  	  During	  the	  1990’s,	  Greece	  was	  borrowing	  an	  average	  of	  4.1	  percent	  of	  GDP	  per	  year.	  	  After	  adopting	  the	  euro	  in	  the	  2000’s,	  borrowing	  increased	  by	  an	  average	  of	  10.2	  percent	  of	  GDP	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  	  	   The	  media	  often	  criticizes	  the	  Greek	  government	  for	  borrowing	  and	  spending	  too	  much	  since	  euro	  integration	  in	  2001.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  expenditure	  has	  been	  needed	  to	  sustain	  the	  overstaffed	  and	  inefficient	  public	  sector	  that	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  created	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  causality,	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  establishes	  a	  linear	  connection	  between	  the	  1980’s	  bureaucratic	  state	  and	  the	  current	  debt-­‐load	  that	  led	  to	  crisis.	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  public	  sector	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  bureaucratic,	  debt-­‐
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consuming	  monster	  born	  in	  the	  1980’s	  that	  can	  only	  continue	  its	  existence	  by	  eating	  up	  a	  larger	  and	  larger	  share	  of	  the	  nation’s	  budget.	  	  Thus,	  current	  reforms	  are	  intended	  to	  reduce	  the	  size	  of	  the	  bureaucracy.	  	   An	  overview	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  published	  in	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  states,	  “the	  roots	  of	  the	  crisis	  go	  back	  to	  the	  strong	  euro	  and	  the	  rock-­‐bottom	  interest	  rates	  that	  prevailed	  for	  much	  of	  the	  past	  decade.	  	  Greece	  took	  advantage	  of	  this	  easy	  money	  to	  drive	  up	  borrowing	  by	  the	  country’s	  consumers	  and	  its	  government	  which	  built	  up	  $400	  billion	  in	  debt”	  ("Greece"	  2011a).	  	  Irwin	  Stelzer,	  a	  journalist	  for	  the	  Weekly	  Standard	  agrees,	  “Greece	  was	  eager	  to	  trade	  its	  drachma	  for	  the	  euro	  so	  that	  it	  could	  borrow	  at	  the	  lower	  interest	  rates	  that	  membership	  made	  available,	  and	  then	  went	  on	  a	  borrowing	  spree”	  (Stelzer	  2010).	  	   Economists	  publishing	  in	  peer-­‐reviewed	  journals	  have	  similarly	  citied	  Greece’s	  excessive	  borrowing	  in	  the	  post-­‐euro	  period	  as	  a	  primary	  cause	  of	  the	  crisis	  (Athanassiou	  2009;	  Christodoulakis	  2010;	  Gibson,	  Hall,	  and	  Tavlas	  2011;	  Mylonas	  2011).	  	  According	  to	  Gibson	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  Greece’s	  adoption	  of	  the	  euro	  in	  2001	  provided	  sharply-­‐reduced	  interest	  rates	  leading	  to	  a	  credit	  boom.	  	  Nominal	  interest	  rates	  declined	  from	  about	  20	  percent	  in	  1994,	  at	  the	  time	  when	  Greece	  announced	  its	  intention	  to	  join	  the	  eurozone,	  to	  less	  than	  3.5	  percent	  in	  early	  2005.	  	  Low	  interest	  rates	  allowed	  Greece	  to	  continue	  to	  borrow	  cheaply	  to	  fund	  its	  inefficient	  public	  sector	  rather	  than	  face	  the	  reality	  that	  it	  needed	  to	  be	  restructured.	  	  Essentially,	  the	  euro	  allowed	  Greece	  to	  continue	  its	  inefficient	  economic	  trajectory	  that	  existed	  since	  the	  return	  to	  democracy	  in	  the	  1970’s.	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   Not	  only	  did	  Greece	  accumulate	  massive	  amounts	  of	  public	  debt	  in	  the	  post-­‐euro	  period,	  private	  debt	  also	  exploded.	  	  According	  to	  Manolopoulos	  (2011),	  “Private	  households	  went	  on	  a	  borrowing	  spree	  following	  entry	  into	  the	  single	  currency,	  encouraged	  by	  much	  looser	  lending	  conditions”	  (p.	  24).	  	  Greeks	  went	  into	  debt	  buying	  all	  sorts	  of	  luxury	  items,	  such	  as	  homes,	  second	  homes,	  vacation	  homes,	  and	  cars.	  	  The	  private	  household	  accumulation	  of	  debt	  has	  reinforced	  the	  mainstream	  argument	  for	  furthering	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  to	  solve	  the	  current	  crisis.	  	  According	  to	  this	  logic,	  the	  Greek	  people	  lived	  way	  beyond	  their	  means	  during	  the	  boom	  period	  of	  easy-­‐access,	  low-­‐interest	  credit.	  	  Ultimately	  for	  this	  reason,	  it	  is	  seen	  as	  fair	  to	  lower	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  of	  Greeks	  through	  austerity	  practices	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  punishment	  for	  their	  previous	  profligacy.	  	  	  	   Interestingly,	  the	  criticism	  that	  Greece	  lived	  beyond	  its	  means	  in	  the	  post-­‐euro	  period	  and	  went	  on	  a	  “spending	  spree”	  with	  borrowed	  money	  developed	  retrospectively.	  	  During	  the	  2000’s,	  political	  leaders	  and	  economists	  conceived	  of	  the	  credit	  boom	  as	  leading	  to	  strong	  economic	  growth.	  	  According	  to	  Kaplanis	  (2011),	  “The	  general	  perception	  as	  promoted	  by	  the	  official	  reports	  is	  that	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s	  and	  until	  hit	  by	  the	  crisis,	  the	  Greek	  economy	  experienced	  a	  sustained	  path	  of	  growth	  and	  exhibited	  great	  economic	  successes”	  (p.	  217).	  	  Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  (2011),	  writing	  in	  their	  book	  Understanding	  the	  Crisis	  in	  Greece,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  economic	  perspectives	  espousing	  the	  mainstream	  narrative,	  discuss	  Greece’s	  strong	  growth	  during	  the	  2000’s	  in	  terms	  GDP	  rates.	  	  Since	  Greece	  adopted	  the	  euro	  in	  2001	  up	  until	  the	  onset	  of	  crisis	  in	  2009,	  the	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country	  averaged	  annual	  growth	  rates	  of	  4.2	  percent	  which	  was	  the	  second	  highest	  growth	  rate	  in	  the	  eurozone	  (Lynn	  2011).	  	  Due	  to	  the	  overall	  positive	  and	  uncritical	  analysis	  of	  Greek	  growth	  in	  the	  2000’s,	  economic	  rhetoric	  of	  “The	  Powerhouse	  of	  Southeast	  Europe”	  developed	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	   When	  strictly	  analyzing	  GDP	  rates,	  on	  the	  surface	  it	  did	  indeed	  appear	  that	  Greece	  was	  growing.	  	  However,	  by	  taking	  a	  more	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  Greece’s	  macroeconomic	  finances	  during	  the	  2000’s,	  strong	  GDP	  performance	  did	  not	  equate	  to	  real	  growth,	  but	  in	  fact	  was	  unsustainable	  debt-­‐fueled	  growth.	  	  	  	   When	  Greece	  joined	  the	  euro	  in	  2001,	  almost	  magically,	  a	  backwards	  country	  that	  no	  one	  previously	  wanted	  to	  invest	  in	  became	  an	  “A”	  rated	  nation	  on	  par	  with	  Germany.	  	  According	  to	  Lynn	  (2011),	  the	  spread	  between	  Greek	  bonds	  and	  German	  bonds	  narrowed	  to	  55	  basis	  points,	  meaning	  that	  Greece	  could	  borrow	  money	  at	  a	  rate	  slightly	  over	  0.5	  percent	  more	  than	  the	  German	  government	  paid	  for	  its	  money.	  Lynn	  (2011)	  states,	  “The	  difference	  in	  risk	  between	  lending	  to	  Europe’s	  most	  feckless	  government	  and	  its	  most	  responsible	  was	  vanishing	  overnight”	  (p.	  53).	  	  In	  effect,	  Greece	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  “wacky	  fringe	  country,	  of	  interest	  only	  to	  brave	  speculators	  and	  emerging	  market	  funds”	  (Lynn	  2011:53).	  	  Greece	  was	  now	  a	  rock-­‐sold,	  A-­‐rated	  nation,	  as	  creditworthy	  as	  Germany.	  	  Accordingly,	  cheap	  loans	  flooded	  the	  country	  leading	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  economic	  growth.	  	  The	  euro	  brought	  the	  illusion	  of	  prosperity	  to	  Greece	  in	  the	  2000’s.	  	  Underlying	  the	  strong	  GDP	  performance,	  however,	  was	  an	  economy	  about	  to	  crumble	  under	  the	  weight	  of	  its	  debt-­‐load.	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   Greece	  was	  growing	  unsustainably	  during	  the	  2000’s	  as	  the	  trade	  balance	  was	  worsening	  in	  an	  unstable	  fashion.	  	  The	  trade	  balance	  in	  Greece,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  all	  peripheral	  eurozone	  countries,	  deteriorated	  in	  the	  2000’s.	  	  In	  2001,	  Greece’s	  current	  account	  balance	  stood	  at	  -­‐7.3	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  	  That	  figure	  increased	  and	  almost	  doubled	  to	  -­‐14.1	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  2007.	  	  Greece	  could	  only	  continue	  importing	  more	  than	  it	  was	  exporting	  because	  it	  was	  borrowing	  heavily	  from	  foreign	  sources.	  	  Greece’s	  external	  debt	  increased	  from	  42.7	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  2000	  to	  82.5	  percent	  in	  2009	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	   Manolopoulos	  (2011)	  refers	  to	  the	  dynamic	  of	  Greece	  as	  a	  Ponzi	  scheme	  where	  growth	  can	  only	  continue	  with	  more	  borrowing.	  	  The	  trade	  deficit	  in	  Greece	  and	  other	  peripheral	  eurozone	  economies	  indicated	  that	  the	  problem	  was	  global.	  	  A	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  mechanism,	  at	  play	  since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  euro,	  led	  to	  a	  trade	  deficit	  in	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  eurozone	  and	  a	  trade	  surplus	  for	  the	  core.	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  euro	  acted	  as	  a	  redistributive	  mechanism	  funneling	  wealth	  from	  the	  periphery	  to	  the	  core	  countries.	  	  The	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  in	  a	  later	  chapter.	  	   The	  mainstream	  narrative	  is	  correct	  in	  its	  analysis	  that	  the	  borrowing	  and	  spending	  spree	  of	  the	  2000’s	  was	  a	  direct	  cause	  of	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis.	  	  In	  my	  conception,	  there	  is	  no	  disputing	  this	  argument.	  	  The	  intent,	  however,	  is	  to	  illustrate	  that	  during	  the	  2000’s,	  Greece’s	  GDP	  growth	  was	  seen	  positively.	  	  When	  core	  eurozone	  countries	  were	  profiting,	  investors	  were	  making	  money,	  and	  Greece	  was	  going	  further	  and	  further	  into	  debt	  to	  sustain	  a	  lavish	  consumer	  lifestyle,	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conventional	  wisdom	  approved	  and	  extolled	  the	  eurozone	  project.	  	  Only	  after	  Greece’s	  superficial	  success	  story	  came	  crumbling	  down	  and	  the	  country	  became	  mired	  in	  crisis	  did	  researchers	  revise	  their	  once	  positive	  analysis	  of	  Greece	  in	  the	  2000’s.	  	  Currently,	  proponents	  of	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  criticize	  Greece’s	  unsustainable	  growth	  in	  the	  post-­‐euro	  period	  saying	  that	  the	  country	  was	  irresponsible,	  feckless,	  and	  mismanaged	  which	  then	  led	  to	  crisis.	  	  In	  effect,	  strictly	  looking	  at	  GDP	  rates	  alone	  will	  not	  engender	  an	  accurate	  portrayal	  of	  real	  economic	  growth.	  
National	  Manifestations	  	  	   The	  dominance	  of	  the	  mainstream,	  nationally	  oriented	  explanation	  that	  faults	  Greece	  for	  creating	  the	  conditions	  for	  its	  own	  crisis	  is	  reinforced	  by	  real	  experiences	  of	  Greek	  political	  corruption,	  economic	  inefficiency	  and	  low	  competitiveness,	  and	  an	  unsatisfactory	  tax	  system.	  	  These	  aspects-­‐-­‐political,	  economic,	  and	  tax-­‐-­‐are	  three	  aspects	  of	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  that	  reinforce	  the	  characterization	  that	  Greece’s	  current	  crisis	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  national	  problems.	  	  This	  section	  will	  explicate	  these	  national	  problematic	  institutions.	  	   Before	  Greece’s	  defunct	  political	  economic	  situation	  is	  explored,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  illustrate	  Greece’s	  sectoral	  economic	  structure.	  	  Table	  1	  and	  Figure	  1	  depict	  the	  sectoral	  composition	  of	  the	  Greek	  economy	  from	  1950	  to	  2010	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  agricultural,	  manufacturing,	  and	  services	  sectors.	  	  Once	  a	  primarily	  agricultural	  economy,	  Greece’s	  agricultural	  sector	  has	  drastically	  declined	  in	  recent	  history,	  falling	  from	  31.3	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  1950	  to	  just	  3.3	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  2010.	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Conversely,	  using	  structural	  funds	  given	  by	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  as	  well	  as	  funds	  from	  the	  Marshall	  Plan,	  Greece’s	  manufacturing	  sector	  developed	  in	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  decades	  and	  increased	  from	  23.2	  percent	  in	  1950	  to	  33.2	  percent	  in	  1982.	  	  However,	  as	  previously	  discussed,	  Greece	  began	  a	  process	  of	  de-­‐industrialization	  in	  the	  1980’s	  that	  has	  lasted	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  	  The	  manufacturing	  sector’s	  contribution	  to	  GDP	  has	  thus	  declined	  since	  1982	  to	  its	  2010	  value	  of	  17.9	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  service	  sector	  has	  historically	  dominated	  Greece’s	  economic	  performance,	  contributing	  45.4	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  1950	  and	  increasing	  to	  52.2	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  1982.	  	  With	  Andreas	  Papandreou’s	  strengthening	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  public	  sector,	  Greece’s	  service	  sector	  significantly	  increased	  since	  the	  1980’s.	  	  In	  2010,	  the	  service	  sector	  overwhelmingly	  controls	  Greece’s	  economic	  performance	  contributing	  78.8	  percent	  to	  GDP	  (Jouganatos	  1992;	  U.S	  Department	  of	  State	  2010).	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Table	  1.	  Sectoral	  Composition	  of	  Greek	  Economy	  (%	  of	  GDP)	  
           Source: U.S. department of State and Jouganatos 1992 
 	   	   1950	   1982	   2010	  
Primary	  Sector	   Agriculture	   31.3	   14.6	   3.3	  
Secondary	  Sector	   Manufacturing	   23.2	   33.2	   17.9	  
Tertiary	  Sector	   Service	   45.4	   52.2	   78.8	  
	  
 






1950	   1982	   2010	  
Agriculture	  Manufacturing	  Service	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   By	  exploring	  Greece’s	  sectoral	  composition	  of	  its	  economy,	  an	  interesting	  dynamic	  emerges	  within	  Greece’s	  manufacturing	  and	  service	  sectors.	  	  Both	  the	  manufacturing	  and	  service	  sectors	  increased	  their	  share	  of	  economic	  productivity	  from	  the	  1950’s	  to	  the	  1980’s	  due	  to	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  Greek	  economy	  in	  the	  early	  postwar	  decades.	  	  Since	  1982,	  however,	  Greece’s	  manufacturing	  sector	  and	  service	  sector	  have	  diverged.	  	  When	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  was	  elected	  to	  power	  in	  the	  1980’s	  and	  pursued	  a	  path	  of	  populism	  by	  strengthening	  the	  welfare	  state	  and	  expanding	  the	  public	  sector,	  Greece	  began	  a	  period	  of	  de-­‐industrialization	  as	  its	  economy	  became	  less	  globally	  competitive.	  	  Thus,	  the	  sectoral	  share	  of	  GDP	  for	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  has	  declined	  since	  the	  1980’s.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  welfare	  state	  bolstered	  the	  service	  sector’s	  share	  of	  economic	  performance	  significantly	  since	  the	  1980’s	  to	  its	  current	  state.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  present	  reform	  strategy	  to	  resolve	  Greece’s	  crisis	  is	  intended	  to	  balance	  out	  these	  two	  sectors	  by	  increasing	  the	  role	  of	  manufacturing	  sector	  and	  reducing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  service	  sector.	  
Corrupt	  Political	  System	  	  	   Perhaps	  the	  most	  common	  and	  widely	  noted	  characterization	  of	  the	  Greek	  political	  system	  is	  its	  corruption	  (Tsimitakis	  2011).	  	  Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  (2011)	  compare	  Greece’s	  political	  corruption	  to	  that	  of	  developing	  nations.	  	  “The	  widespread	  corruption	  in	  Greece	  is…more	  comparable	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  a	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developing	  country	  than	  that	  observed	  in	  other	  members	  of	  the	  OECD	  and	  eurozone”	  (Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  2011:19).	  	  The	  Brookings	  Institute	  in	  2010	  found	  that	  bribery,	  patronage,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  public	  corruption	  are	  major	  contributors	  to	  Greece’s	  public	  debt.	  	  It	  has	  been	  estimated	  that	  the	  Greek	  government	  has	  lost	  the	  equivalent	  of	  at	  least	  8	  percent	  of	  GDP	  each	  year	  due	  to	  these	  practices	  (Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  2011).	  	   Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  (2011)	  undertook	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  Greek	  political	  corruption	  and	  described	  how	  the	  Greek	  government,	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  inefficient	  regulation	  that	  hampers	  free	  market	  competition,	  creates	  pockets	  of	  rent	  that	  allow	  for	  the	  proliferation	  of	  pork	  barreling.	  	  Accordingly,	  “these	  pools	  of	  rent	  are	  claimed	  by	  the	  many	  small,	  but	  well	  placed	  and	  organized	  groups	  that	  succeed	  to	  earn	  significant	  rents,	  and	  therefore	  have	  a	  strong	  motive	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  oppose	  any	  reforms	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  these	  pools	  of	  rent”	  (Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  2011:8).	  	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  government	  transparency,	  Greek	  politicians	  corruptly	  consume	  pockets	  of	  rent	  that	  they	  create	  through	  regulation.	  	  The	  Brookings	  Institute	  concluded	  that	  if	  Greece	  had	  better	  control	  of	  government	  corruption,	  it	  would	  have	  had	  a	  smaller	  budget	  deficit	  by	  4	  percent	  of	  GDP	  (Tsimitakis	  2011).	  	  	   Greek	  elites	  entrench	  and	  fuel	  inefficiencies	  in	  the	  economy	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  a	  competitive	  economy	  and	  to	  their	  own	  personal	  benefit.	  	  Greece	  does	  not	  have	  much	  of	  a	  capitalist	  class	  whose	  wealth	  is	  derived	  from	  profitable	  investment	  and	  production.	  	  Instead,	  wealthy	  elites	  profit	  from	  the	  clientelistic	  and	  corrupt	  nature	  of	  
  75 
the	  Greek	  state	  by	  creating	  pools	  of	  rent	  that	  they	  then	  collect.	  	  This	  situation	  is	  not	  surprising	  since	  there	  is	  low	  industrial	  activity	  in	  Greece	  and	  many	  industries	  are	  state-­‐owned.	  	  Greek	  elites	  thus	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  sustaining	  a	  backwards,	  inefficient,	  and	  uncompetitive	  economy.	  	  According	  to	  Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  (2011):	  The	  numerous	  rent-­‐seeking	  groups	  curtail	  competition	  in	  the	  product	  and	  services	  markets,	  increase	  red	  tape	  and	  administrative	  burdens	  and	  actively	  seek	  to	  establish	  opacity	  in	  all	  administrative	  and	  legal	  processes...in	  order	  to	  form	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  increase	  the	  rents	  they	  extract.	  (P.	  4)	  	  	   Essentially,	  Greek	  politicians	  create	  inefficiencies	  and	  hamper	  competition	  to	  create	  pockets	  of	  rent	  that	  they	  and	  other	  powerful	  special	  interest	  groups	  consume.	  	  Restructuring	  the	  economy	  to	  achieve	  greater	  competitiveness	  is	  sidelined,	  since	  profit	  is	  not	  made	  by	  increasing	  productivity	  and	  competitiveness,	  but	  by	  fueling	  inefficiencies.	  	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  profiting	  off	  of	  an	  intentionally	  inefficient	  economic	  system,	  Greek	  corruption	  is	  structural	  and	  institutionalized.	  	  In	  recent	  Greek	  history,	  there	  have	  been	  recurring,	  systemic	  scandals	  that	  have	  rocked	  the	  political	  system.	  	  According	  to	  Manolopoulos	  (2011),	  “It	  is	  not	  just	  a	  case	  of	  the	  occasional	  bad	  apple-­‐-­‐this	  is	  ingrained	  behavior	  throughout	  the	  state	  and	  society”	  (p.	  95).	  	  The	  Koskotas	  Affair	  is	  a	  classic	  example	  of	  corruption	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  administration	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  Giorgios	  Koskotas	  was	  the	  former	  owner	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  Crete	  and	  was	  jailed	  and	  charged	  with	  embezzling	  more	  than	  $200	  million	  in	  1988.	  	  Andreas	  Papandreou,	  suspected	  of	  colluding	  with	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Koskotas,	  was	  indicted	  by	  Parliament	  in	  1991	  but	  was	  eventually	  acquitted.	  Two	  junior	  ministers	  were	  found	  guilty	  but	  received	  suspended	  jail	  sentences	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  	  	   The	  Siemens	  scandal,	  persisting	  from	  the	  late	  1990’s	  to	  2009,	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  long-­‐term,	  institutionalized	  nature	  of	  Greek	  corruption.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  Siemens	  executives	  paid	  millions	  of	  euros	  in	  bribes	  to	  various	  Greek	  politicians	  to	  secure	  government	  contracts	  in	  sectors	  ranging	  from	  telecommunications	  to	  transport.	  Greek	  politicians	  laundered	  the	  money	  into	  offshore	  accounts	  where	  they	  remained	  until	  Swiss	  prosecutors	  opened	  up	  an	  investigation,	  suspecting	  unusual	  money	  transfers.	  	  Both	  major	  Greek	  political	  parties	  colluded	  with	  one	  another	  in	  accepting	  bribes,	  which	  they	  used	  to	  fund	  election	  campaigns.	  	  A	  parliamentary	  investigation	  by	  the	  current	  Greek	  government	  is	  currently	  taking	  place;	  however,	  to	  date,	  no	  Greek	  politicians	  have	  been	  prosecuted	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  	  	   These	  are	  two	  of	  the	  larger	  scandals	  that	  have	  been	  revealed	  in	  recent	  Greek	  political	  history.	  	  By	  no	  means	  is	  this	  an	  exhaustive	  or	  complete	  list	  of	  government	  corruption.	  	  According	  to	  Manolopoulos	  (2011)	  there	  are	  hundreds	  and	  perhaps	  thousands	  of	  other	  just	  as	  corrupt	  cases.	  	  These	  examples	  were	  chosen	  to	  illustrate	  the	  extent	  of	  systemic	  corruption	  and	  the	  subsequent	  failure	  of	  the	  Greek	  political	  system	  to	  properly	  prosecute	  corrupt	  politicians.	  	   Ultimately,	  it	  is	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Greek	  political	  system	  that	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  prosecute	  corrupt	  politicians.	  	  Article	  62	  of	  the	  Greek	  Constitution	  grants	  immunity	  for	  members	  of	  the	  government.	  	  According	  to	  this	  Article,	  politicians	  may	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not	  be	  prosecuted,	  arrested,	  or	  imprisoned	  without	  the	  approval	  of	  Parliament	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  Thus,	  many	  politicians	  are	  not	  prosecuted	  because	  the	  Parliament	  is	  comprised	  of	  like-­‐minded	  party	  members	  who	  have	  no	  interest	  in	  prosecuting	  one	  of	  their	  own.	  	  According	  to	  Matthaios	  Tsimitakis	  (2011)	  writing	  for	  May	  Day	  International:	  Since	  the	  1990s,	  there	  hasn’t	  been	  a	  single	  government	  that	  hasn’t	  been	  justifiably	  accused	  of	  corruption	  and	  of	  favoring	  the	  interests	  of	  big	  domestic	  or	  foreign	  capital.	  But	  it’s	  even	  worse.	  	  Although	  in	  most	  cases	  sufficient	  evidence	  has	  been	  presented,	  not	  a	  single	  politician	  of	  the	  two	  ruling	  parties	  which	  have	  dominated	  politics	  for	  35	  years	  has	  ever	  been	  held	  accountable	  for	  his/her	  actions.	  	  	  Manolopoulos	  (2011)	  confirms	  that	  no	  minister	  has	  gone	  to	  jail	  in	  the	  last	  30	  years	  making	  Greece	  unique	  in	  this	  respect	  out	  of	  all	  the	  member	  of	  the	  EU.	  	   Politicians	  are	  not	  the	  only	  agents	  in	  Greek	  society	  that	  participate	  in	  corruption.	  	  Greek	  citizens	  also	  commit	  corrupt	  acts	  themselves.	  	  According	  to	  Manolopoulos	  (2011),	  to	  speed	  up	  service	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  Greeks	  implicitly	  understand	  that	  bribes	  must	  be	  given.	  	  Greek	  culture	  even	  has	  two	  terms	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  institutionalized	  nature	  of	  the	  corruption.	  	  “Fakelaki”	  (literally	  a	  small	  envelop)	  is	  known	  as	  a	  bribe	  and	  a	  socially	  acceptable	  way	  to	  speed	  up	  service	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  According	  to	  Lynn,	  more	  than	  a	  million	  citizens	  paid	  a	  fakelaki	  in	  2010	  for	  better	  service	  in	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  Lynn	  (2011)	  notes,	  “The	  bribes	  were	  mostly	  paid	  to	  doctors	  for	  preferential	  treatment	  via	  the	  public	  health	  system,	  for	  building	  permits,	  and	  somewhat	  ironically,	  to	  tax	  inspectors	  who	  would	  then	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  fiddled	  returns”	  (p.	  121).	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   The	  Greek	  term	  “miza”	  refers	  to	  kickbacks	  or	  introduction	  fees,	  usually	  for	  procurement	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  A	  person	  seeking	  to	  procure	  a	  government	  contract	  to	  build	  an	  apartment	  complex,	  for	  example,	  would	  give	  a	  “miza”	  to	  the	  Greek	  politician	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  contract	  would	  be	  given.	  	  Michael	  Lewis	  (2010)	  states,	  “It	  is	  assumed	  that	  anyone	  working	  for	  the	  government	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  bribed.	  	  People	  going	  to	  health	  clinics	  assume	  they	  need	  to	  bribe	  doctors	  to	  actually	  take	  care	  of	  them”	  (p.	  121).	  	  Corruption	  is	  thus	  a	  pervasive	  and	  institutionalized	  feature	  of	  Greek	  society	  that	  resists	  attempts	  to	  be	  reformed.	  	  Tax	  collectors	  who	  attempted	  to	  blow	  the	  whistle	  on	  colleagues	  who	  had	  accepted	  bribes	  to	  sign	  off	  on	  fraudulent	  tax	  returns	  were	  demoted	  and	  shut-­‐out	  (Tsimitakis	  2011).	  	  	   Related	  to	  the	  pervasive	  corruption	  in	  Greece	  is	  the	  aforementioned	  clientelist	  nature	  of	  the	  government.	  	  Greek	  politicians	  have	  been	  accused	  by	  many	  sources	  as	  pandering	  to	  special	  interest	  groups	  (Lewis	  2010).	  	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  has	  largely	  been	  credited	  with	  creating	  the	  clientelist	  government	  by	  “creating	  parasitic	  jobs	  for	  the	  political	  clientele	  of	  the	  ruling	  elite	  in	  return	  for	  political	  favors”	  (Manolopoulos	  2011:83).	  	  When	  politicians	  win	  an	  election,	  they	  pander	  to	  their	  own	  special	  interest	  groups	  who	  supported	  their	  election	  campaign.	  	  According	  to	  Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  (2011),	  politicians	  who	  cooperate	  with	  interest	  groups	  are	  rewarded	  with	  long-­‐standing	  political	  careers	  and	  immunity	  from	  prosecution.	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Inefficient	  Public	  Sector	  	  	  	   Most	  analyses	  that	  research	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  current	  financial	  crisis	  deal	  with	  the	  Greek	  public	  sector	  in	  some	  way.	  	  In	  general,	  the	  public	  sector	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  creating	  the	  conditions	  where	  Greek	  workers	  clearly	  prefer	  public	  sector	  jobs	  to	  private	  or	  entrepreneurial	  employment	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  According	  to	  the	  mainstream	  narrative,	  allowing	  the	  state	  bureaucracy	  to	  be	  the	  largest	  employer	  in	  Greece	  contributes	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  overstaffed	  and	  inefficient	  public	  sector,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  constrains	  growth	  by	  discouraging	  entrepreneurship	  and	  private	  sector	  production.	  	  Wage	  increases,	  generous	  public	  sector	  pension,	  early	  retirement,	  and	  job	  security	  have	  all	  added	  to	  the	  preference	  for	  public	  sector	  jobs	  and	  scarcity	  of	  private	  sector	  jobs.	  	  A	  discussion	  in	  more	  detail	  as	  to	  why	  public	  sector	  employment	  is	  more	  desirable	  and	  the	  overall	  implications	  this	  has	  for	  Greece’s	  economy	  follows.	  	   Public	  sector	  workers	  are	  paid	  on	  average	  more	  than	  the	  private	  sector	  (Lynn	  2011;	  Manolopoulos	  2011;	  Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  2011).	  	  Since	  1981,	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  pay	  raises	  without	  links	  to	  productivity	  have	  occurred	  consistently	  in	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  Wage	  increases	  were	  being	  implemented	  even	  until	  the	  eve	  of	  full-­‐scale	  crisis.	  	  In	  2008,	  there	  were	  increases	  in	  public	  sector	  salaries	  and	  pensions	  resulting	  in	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  wage	  bill	  by	  8.9	  percent.	  	  These	  sorts	  of	  wage	  increases	  were	  being	  made	  even	  as	  the	  public	  sector	  deficit	  climbed	  far	  ahead	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  budget	  deficit	  limit	  of	  3	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  	  In	  addition,	  public	  sector	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employees	  pay	  less	  into	  social	  security	  than	  private	  sector	  workers	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	   Greece’s	  public	  sector	  has	  an	  early	  retirement	  age.	  	  Employees	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  can	  retire	  at	  58	  years	  old	  with	  full	  pensions.	  	  Retiring	  at	  58	  is	  significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  OECD	  and	  EU	  average	  and	  much	  lower	  than	  Germany’s	  retirement	  age	  that	  has	  recently	  been	  pushed	  up	  from	  65	  to	  67.	  	  Similarly,	  there	  are	  637	  occupations	  that	  the	  Greek	  state	  deems	  to	  be	  “arduous	  in	  nature.”	  	  These	  jobs	  are	  labeled	  so	  tough	  that	  the	  person	  can	  retire	  earlier	  than	  the	  official	  retirement	  age.	  	  For	  example,	  hairdressers,	  car	  washers,	  and	  radio	  technicians	  are	  all	  classified	  as	  arduous	  in	  nature	  and	  eligible	  for	  early	  retirement	  (Lynn	  2011,	  Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  	   Greece’s	  pension	  system	  is	  criticized	  for	  being	  overly	  generous.	  	  Both	  Lynn	  (2011)	  and	  Manolopoulos	  (2011)	  discuss	  how	  Greek	  pensions	  are	  more	  generous	  that	  the	  EU	  and	  OECD	  average.	  	  On	  average,	  a	  Greek	  pension	  totaled	  95.7	  percent	  of	  an	  employee’s	  average	  lifetime	  earnings	  compared	  to	  the	  OECD	  average	  of	  60.8	  percent.	  	  In	  effect,	  Greek	  pensioners	  on	  average	  live	  on	  96	  percent	  of	  the	  salary	  they	  made	  working	  which	  is	  more	  than	  twice	  the	  proportion	  of	  earnings	  as	  German	  pensioners	  (Lynn	  2011).	  	   The	  public	  sector	  is	  also	  regarded	  as	  having	  a	  high	  level	  of	  job	  security.	  	  According	  to	  Manolopoulos	  (2011),	  it	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  fire	  people	  in	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  (2011)	  document	  how	  Greece	  has	  the	  highest	  employment	  protection	  legislation	  (EPL)	  among	  OECD	  countries	  which	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demonstrates	  the	  extreme	  restrictions	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  public	  sector	  employers	  to	  fire	  employees.	  	  For	  example,	  Greek	  law	  strictly	  prohibits	  the	  dismissal	  of	  trade	  unionists,	  female	  workers	  during	  pregnancy	  and	  for	  one	  year	  after	  childbirth,	  and	  workers	  during	  their	  annual	  leave	  (Karantinos	  2006).	  	  The	  mainstream	  narrative	  posits	  that	  if	  employees	  cannot	  be	  fired,	  it	  promotes	  a	  lazy	  work	  attitude	  and	  productivity	  decreases.	  	  As	  Manolopoulos	  (2011:86)	  states,	  “And	  if	  you	  cannot	  fire	  people,	  productivity	  inevitably	  goes	  down.”	  	   “Most	  public	  enterprises,”	  according	  to	  Close	  (2002),	  “because	  they	  were	  protected	  from	  commercial	  competition	  and	  from	  any	  sort	  of	  economic	  discipline,	  were	  not	  just	  grossly	  overstaffed	  but	  also	  overpaid	  and	  inefficient”	  (p.	  179).	  	  A	  2003	  study	  ranked	  Greece	  at	  the	  bottom	  out	  of	  23	  developed	  countries	  on	  public	  sector	  efficiency	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  Additionally,	  Manolopoulos	  (2011)	  describes	  how	  there	  are	  so	  many	  public	  sector	  jobs	  that	  no	  individual	  worker	  ever	  has	  too	  much	  to	  do.	  	  Essentially	  the	  overstaffed	  public	  sector	  is	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  Greece’s	  clientelist	  political	  system.	  	  Phony	  jobs	  and	  committees	  are	  formed	  to	  give	  party-­‐supporters	  favorable	  employment	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  without	  any	  regard	  to	  efficiency	  or	  actually	  holding	  a	  valid	  position	  at	  all.	  	  Not	  until	  summer	  2010	  was	  there	  any	  attempt	  to	  determine	  the	  total	  number	  of	  people	  working	  the	  public	  sector.	  	  When	  a	  count	  was	  finally	  administered,	  768,000	  government	  workers	  were	  announced	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  The	  Greek	  government	  is	  the	  largest	  employer	  in	  Greece	  today.	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   Ultimately,	  the	  structure	  that	  gives	  preference	  to	  public	  sector	  work	  also	  constrains	  and	  discourages	  entrepreneurship.	  	  The	  Greek	  public	  sector	  has	  been	  implicated	  for	  creating	  fiscal	  headaches	  that	  prevent	  entrepreneurs	  from	  starting	  businesses.	  	  Simply	  stated,	  the	  overall	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  Greek	  government	  over-­‐regulates.	  	  According	  to	  Manolopoulos	  (2011),	  “Hundreds	  of	  bureaucratic	  procedures	  tie	  business	  people	  in	  knots	  causing	  frustrating	  and	  pointless	  delays	  and	  additional	  costs”	  (p.	  94).	  	  The	  Greek	  economy	  has	  one	  of	  the	  most	  complex	  administrative	  procedures	  and	  ownership	  barriers	  among	  OECD	  countries.	  	  There	  are	  start-­‐up	  costs	  and	  sector-­‐specific	  administrative	  burdens	  (Mistolopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  2011).	  	  Close	  (2002)	  states:	  A	  major	  obstacle	  to	  businesses…was	  the	  demand	  for	  licenses	  by	  bureaucrats,	  who	  had	  the	  worst	  reputation	  in	  the	  EEC	  [European	  Economic	  Community]	  for	  obstructionism,	  inefficiency	  and	  corruption.	  	  An	  American	  research	  institute	  reported	  around	  the	  start	  of	  1989	  that	  ‘favourtism,	  red	  tape	  and	  dilatoriness	  remain	  serious	  problems.	  	  Bureaucratic	  procedures	  add	  20	  percent	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  business	  enterprises’.	  (P.	  180)	  	  	   To	  establish	  a	  company	  in	  Greece,	  there	  are	  15	  procedures	  and	  38	  days	  required	  compared	  with	  an	  average	  of	  6	  procedures	  and	  25	  days	  in	  other	  countries.	  	  For	  many	  procedures,	  the	  entrepreneur	  has	  to	  appear	  at	  the	  administrative	  office	  in	  person	  and	  cannot	  simply	  send	  a	  completed	  form	  by	  email.	  	  This	  adds	  to	  the	  costs	  and	  frustration	  levels	  of	  many	  entrepreneurs,	  impeding	  economic	  development	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	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Uncompetitive	  Economy	  	  	   The	  overall	  Greek	  economy	  has	  widely	  been	  criticized	  for	  its	  low	  competitiveness.	  	  Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  (2011)	  collected	  numerous	  surveys	  that	  document	  the	  low	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  Greek	  economy.	  	  These	  surveys	  found	  that	  the	  administrative	  burden	  in	  Greece	  is	  exceptionally	  high,	  regulation	  excessive,	  and	  limited	  competition	  due	  to	  government	  intervention.	  	  In	  addition,	  Greece	  attracts	  relatively	  little	  foreign	  investment	  compared	  to	  other	  eurozone	  countries.	  	  The	  Greek	  business	  climate	  is	  plain	  and	  simple,	  unattractive.	  	  	   There	  has	  been	  significant	  capital	  flight	  from	  Greece	  to	  countries	  with	  more	  attractive	  business	  climates.	  	  Since	  2009,	  more	  than	  1,500	  companies	  have	  relocated	  to	  other	  countries	  with	  a	  more	  stable	  economy	  taking	  with	  them	  jobs	  and	  capital	  that	  are	  unlikely	  to	  return	  (Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  2011).	  	  Businesses	  are	  also	  fleeing	  Greece	  to	  find	  easier	  access	  to	  bank	  loans	  and	  lending	  institutions	  that	  operate	  under	  less	  bureaucracy.	  	  Greece	  dropped	  twelve	  places	  to	  109th	  position	  in	  “Doing	  Business	  2011.”	  	  Economic	  troubles	  have	  led	  to	  two	  in	  ten	  businesses	  failing.	  	  Seven	  out	  of	  ten	  suffer	  serious	  liquidity	  problems.	  	  Recently,	  many	  Greek	  textile	  businesses	  have	  moved	  to	  Bulgaria	  and	  Turkey	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  	   In	  Greece,	  there	  is	  no	  globally	  competitive	  industry	  to	  speak	  of.	  	  According	  to	  Lynn	  (2011),	  Greek	  industry	  remains	  stuck	  in	  the	  past	  and	  largely	  unable	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  modern	  world.	  	  Greece’s	  state-­‐owned	  railway	  industry	  loses	  more	  money	  than	  any	  other	  transportation	  system	  in	  Europe.	  	  In	  total,	  the	  railway	  industry	  was	  estimated	  in	  2010	  to	  be	  costing	  Greeks	  between	  2	  million	  and	  2.5	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million	  euros	  per	  day.	  	  Lynn	  (2011)	  speculates	  that	  the	  railway	  industry	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  profitable.	  	  Instead	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  preserve	  the	  jobs	  for	  its	  6,500	  workers,	  half	  of	  whom	  are	  over	  50	  and	  will	  collecting	  generous	  pensions	  soon.	  	  This	  analysis	  fits	  well	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  Greek	  public	  sector	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  hub	  for	  employment,	  not	  for	  engendering	  competitive,	  profitable	  industries.	  	   The	  uncompetitive	  nature	  of	  Greece’s	  economy	  is	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  clientelistic	  practices	  occurring	  in	  the	  1970’s	  with	  the	  return	  to	  democracy.	  	  Instead	  of	  firms	  restructuring	  their	  business	  operations	  to	  compete	  in	  an	  increasingly	  globalized	  economy,	  Greek	  companies	  remaining	  were	  propped	  up	  by	  state	  funds.	  	  In	  addition,	  Greece’s	  accession	  to	  the	  eurozone	  in	  2001	  actually	  accelerated	  the	  demise	  of	  its	  manufacturing	  industry.	  	  In	  effect,	  adopting	  the	  euro	  has	  made	  Greek	  exports	  uncompetitive,	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  its	  uncompetitive	  economy	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  Understanding	  this	  dynamic	  is	  crucial	  to	  recognizing	  the	  underlying	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  
Progressive	  Tax	  System	  	  	   The	  Greek	  tax	  system	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  being	  too	  progressive	  where	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  the	  wealthy	  population	  pays	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  income	  taxes,	  and	  the	  average-­‐income	  family	  pays	  no	  taxes	  at	  all.	  	  According	  to	  Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  (2011),	  higher	  income	  earners	  bear	  the	  highest	  tax	  burden,	  yet	  there	  are	  not	  many	  of	  them.	  	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  Greek	  population	  declares	  a	  low	  enough	  income	  to	  effectively	  make	  them	  exempt	  from	  taxation.	  	  This	  is	  because	  Greece	  has	  a	  very	  low	  tax-­‐free	  threshold	  in	  which	  workers	  earning	  less	  than	  12,000	  euros	  per	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year	  do	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  any	  income	  tax.	  	  Out	  of	  5.5	  million	  personal	  income	  tax	  declarations	  issued	  by	  the	  heads	  of	  households	  for	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  2007,	  3	  million	  declared	  an	  annual	  income	  below	  12,000	  euros,	  thereby	  evading	  income	  tax	  payments.	  	  This	  tax	  bracket	  represents	  54	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  tax	  returns	  yet	  amounts	  to	  only	  0.4	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  personal	  income	  tax	  paid	  (Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  2011).	  	  In	  effect,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  incentive	  for	  Greek	  to	  cheat	  on	  their	  taxes	  and	  declare	  a	  much	  lower	  income	  than	  they	  actually	  make.	  	  The	  Greek	  income	  tax	  system	  effectively	  encourages	  tax	  evasion.	  	  	   Not	  paying	  taxes	  is	  a	  traditional	  way	  of	  life	  for	  middle	  and	  lower-­‐income	  Greeks.	  	  According	  to	  Manolopoulos	  (2011),	  “Tax	  avoidance…is	  a	  national	  pastime	  in	  Greece”	  (p.	  103).	  	  Or	  as	  Michael	  Lewis	  (2011)	  explains,	  “It	  has	  become	  a	  cultural	  trait…The	  Greek	  people	  never	  learned	  to	  pay	  their	  taxes.	  	  And	  they	  never	  did	  because	  no	  one	  is	  punished.	  	  No	  one	  has	  ever	  been	  punished.	  	  It’s	  a	  cavalier	  offense-­‐-­‐like	  not	  opening	  a	  door	  for	  a	  lady.”	  	   Mistopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  (2011)	  explain	  how	  Greek	  politicians	  enabled	  this	  sort	  of	  tax	  evasion.	  	  Politicians	  do	  not	  try	  to	  force	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  citizens	  to	  pay	  income	  tax	  because	  that	  would	  be	  the	  end	  of	  their	  political	  career.	  	  It	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  votes.	  	  The	  politicians	  do	  not	  make	  the	  middle	  and	  lower	  income	  earners	  pay	  taxes	  because	  they	  represent	  the	  largest	  voter	  base.	  	  Instead	  the	  politicians	  make	  the	  much	  smaller	  voter	  base	  of	  the	  wealthy	  and	  high-­‐income	  Greeks	  pay	  the	  majority	  of	  taxes.	  	  It	  is	  thus	  more	  rational	  for	  Greek	  politicians	  to	  allow	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  to	  evade	  taxes	  and	  force	  a	  small	  minority	  to	  pay	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  the	  taxes.	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Manolopoulos	  (2011)	  supports	  this	  claim	  when	  stating,	  “The	  authorities	  hound	  the	  honest	  few	  and	  let	  the	  thousands	  of	  high	  income	  individuals	  escape	  with	  impunity”	  (p.	  106).	  	   The	  higher	  tax	  bracket	  consisting	  of	  declared	  incomes	  between	  30,000	  and	  75,000	  euros	  amount	  to	  11.43	  percent	  of	  all	  income	  tax	  returns	  filed,	  yet	  pay	  50.52	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  personal	  income	  tax	  collected	  by	  the	  state.	  	  The	  highest	  tax	  bracket,	  those	  declaring	  incomes	  above	  75,000	  euros,	  amount	  to	  1.07	  percent	  of	  all	  income	  tax	  returns	  filed	  and	  pay	  23.99	  percent	  of	  all	  income	  tax	  collected	  by	  the	  state	  in	  2011	  (Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  2011).	  	  Thus,	  higher-­‐income	  earners	  in	  Greece	  bear	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  tax	  burden	  while	  millions	  of	  lower	  income	  Greeks	  successfully	  evade	  taxes.	  	  Put	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  in	  Greece	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  with	  the	  highest	  income	  paid	  92	  percent	  of	  the	  personal	  income	  tax.	  	  The	  next	  25	  percent	  paid	  7.9	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  personal	  income	  tax	  collected	  by	  the	  government,	  and	  the	  remaining	  50	  percent	  declaring	  the	  lowest	  income	  pay	  only	  .028	  percent	  of	  all	  personal	  income	  tax	  (Mitsopoulos	  and	  Pelagidis	  2011).	  The	  rampant	  tax	  evasion	  in	  Greece	  is	  a	  cultural	  tradition	  that	  dates	  back	  to	  Greece’s	  subjugation	  by	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  for	  over	  300	  years.	  	  A	  whole	  way	  of	  life	  emerged	  among	  the	  Greeks	  that	  grew	  up	  around	  survival	  and	  resistance	  from	  the	  Turks.	  	  At	  this	  time,	  Greeks	  were	  expected	  to	  pay	  a	  “haratzi”	  or	  an	  Islamic	  poll	  tax	  levied	  on	  Christians.	  	  Greeks	  also	  had	  to	  carry	  a	  receipt	  certifying	  their	  payment	  of	  taxes	  at	  all	  times	  or	  face	  imprisonment.	  	  Thus,	  Greeks	  made	  it	  a	  point	  to	  not	  pay	  taxes	  to	  signify	  a	  resistance	  movement.	  	  After	  Greece	  won	  its	  independence,	  tax	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evasion	  continued	  because	  many	  of	  the	  politicians	  that	  took	  control	  after	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  were	  former	  tax	  collectors.	  	  Greek	  citizens	  continued	  to	  avoid	  paying	  taxes	  to	  these	  politicians	  due	  to	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  traditions.	  	  The	  culture	  of	  evading	  taxes	  has	  persisted	  for	  generations	  of	  Greeks	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	   Tax	  evasion	  exists	  on	  such	  a	  large	  scale	  that	  there	  are	  in	  effect	  two	  parallel	  economies:	  the	  formal	  and	  informal,	  i.e.,	  black	  economy	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  The	  formal	  economy	  obviously	  refers	  to	  the	  legitimate	  tax	  system	  where	  taxes	  are	  paid	  to	  the	  state,	  such	  as	  sales	  tax.	  	  The	  informal	  economy	  exists	  to	  avoid	  paying	  the	  sales	  tax	  and	  instead,	  bribery	  and	  kickbacks	  are	  expected	  when	  obtaining	  services	  within	  the	  Greek	  economy.	  	  According	  to	  Transparency	  International,	  the	  black	  economy	  accounts	  for	  around	  40	  percent	  of	  GDP	  annually.	  	  Bribes	  are	  paid	  in	  every	  sector	  of	  the	  economy,	  for	  example,	  to	  doctors	  for	  preferential	  treatment,	  to	  obtain	  building	  permits,	  and	  to	  tax	  inspectors	  who	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  fudged	  returns	  (Lynn	  2011).	  	  According	  to	  Lynn	  (2011),	  to	  jump	  to	  the	  top	  of	  a	  waiting	  list	  for	  an	  operation	  in	  the	  state	  hospital	  costs	  about	  2,500	  euros.	  	  To	  get	  your	  car	  through	  a	  vehicle-­‐emissions	  inspection	  would	  cost	  around	  300	  euros.	  	  It	  has	  been	  estimated	  that	  the	  average	  Greek	  family	  pays	  about	  1,500	  euros	  in	  bribes	  every	  year.	  	  The	  clear	  problem	  with	  the	  black	  economy	  is	  that	  none	  of	  these	  funds	  can	  be	  collected	  by	  the	  government	  and	  utilized	  to	  pay	  back	  its	  debt.	  	   The	  institutionalized	  corruption,	  economic	  inefficiency	  and	  low	  competitiveness,	  and	  an	  unsatisfactory	  tax	  system	  create	  a	  compelling	  case	  that	  Greece’s	  crisis	  is	  strictly	  national.	  	  On	  the	  surface,	  these	  problematic	  institutions	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clearly	  create	  conditions	  for	  financial	  crisis.	  	  European	  and	  Greek	  officials,	  espousing	  the	  mainstream	  narrative,	  utilize	  this	  view	  to	  justify	  structural	  adjustment	  treatment.	  	  Under	  this	  logic,	  structural	  adjustment	  becomes	  a	  nationally	  oriented	  reform	  strategy	  to	  fix	  and	  restructure	  these	  problematic	  institutions.	  	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  detail	  what	  this	  reform	  strategy	  specifically	  entails.	  	   What	  needs	  to	  be	  understood	  is	  that	  these	  persistent,	  problematic	  institutions	  are	  insufficient	  to	  explain	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  Greece’s	  crisis.	  	  This	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Greece’s	  entire	  reform	  strategy,	  since	  the	  onset	  of	  crisis,	  has	  aimed	  to	  fix	  these	  problematic	  institutions,	  yet	  the	  crisis	  shows	  no	  signs	  of	  abating.	  	  What	  is	  needed	  is	  a	  global	  view	  of	  the	  crisis	  that	  examines	  the	  entire	  structure	  of	  the	  eurozone	  which	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  ignores.	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CHAPTER	  V	  	  
CONTAGION	  AND	  CONTAINMENT	  
	  	   The	  foregoing	  analysis	  suggests	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  a	  national	  problem	  specific	  to	  Greece.	  	  Along	  with	  the	  macro	  historical	  causes,	  policymakers	  in	  Europe	  have	  indicated	  that	  defunct	  political	  and	  economic	  institutions	  have	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  crisis.	  	  In	  addition,	  because	  Greece	  was	  the	  first	  of	  the	  euro	  countries	  to	  be	  submersed	  in	  financial	  crisis	  and	  is	  the	  worst	  off	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  stability,	  Greece	  is	  ultimately	  viewed	  as	  the	  cause	  and	  focal	  point	  of	  the	  larger	  European	  crisis.	  	  Greece	  has	  been	  called	  	  “the	  sick	  man	  of	  Europe”	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  cured	  (Lewis	  2010;	  Stelzer	  2010).	  	  Indeed,	  much	  of	  the	  mainstream	  media’s	  discussion	  surrounding	  Greece’s	  current	  financial	  crisis	  has	  centered	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  “containment”	  so	  that	  Greece’s	  financial	  crisis,	  or	  “disease,”	  does	  not	  spread	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  highly	  indebted	  and	  fiscally	  unstable	  peripheral	  eurozone	  countries	  of	  Portugal,	  Italy,	  Ireland,	  and	  Spain	  (PIIGS).	  	  Under	  this	  logic,	  if	  Greece	  cannot	  be	  cured	  of	  its	  disease,	  then	  at	  least	  Greece’s	  disease	  needs	  to	  be	  contained	  so	  that	  it	  does	  not	  spread	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  eurozone	  countries.	  	  	   EU	  officials	  fear	  that	  if	  Greece	  defaults	  on	  its	  debt-­‐payment	  obligations,	  then	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  PIIGS	  with	  high	  debts	  will	  also	  default	  causing	  a	  domino	  contagion	  scenario.	  	  As	  Nouriel	  Roubini	  stated,	  “Greece	  is	  just	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg”	  ("Greece	  is	  Just	  the	  ‘Tip	  of	  the	  Iceberg,’	  Nouriel	  Roubini	  Warns.”	  2010b).	  	  Since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  single	  currency,	  euro-­‐countries’	  financial	  markets	  have	  become	  far	  more	  integrated	  than	  ever	  before.	  	  They	  share	  the	  same	  currency,	  hold	  each	  other’s	  debts,	  and	  have	  increased	  trade	  with	  one	  another.	  	  It	  is	  feared	  that	  a	  default	  by	  any	  one	  of	  the	  highly	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indebted	  eurozone	  countries	  will	  put	  the	  whole	  European	  banking	  system	  at	  risk,	  and	  possibly	  lead	  into	  an	  intensified	  recession	  ("Greece	  is	  Just	  the	  ‘Tip	  of	  the	  Iceberg,’	  Nouriel	  Roubini	  Warns.”	  2010b).	  	  	   As	  previously	  discussed,	  the	  mainstream	  analysis	  gives	  Greece	  complete	  agency	  for	  creating	  its	  own	  crisis.	  	  The	  structural	  adjustment	  measures,	  privatization	  plan,	  and	  reforms	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  Greece’s	  political	  economic	  system	  are	  meant	  to	  alleviate	  Greece’s	  debt-­‐burden	  so	  that	  its	  “disease”	  does	  not	  spread	  to	  the	  other	  PIIGS.	  	  The	  bailout	  injections	  are	  implemented	  to	  keep	  Greece	  solvent	  during	  this	  containment	  process.	  	  It	  is	  ultimately	  hoped	  that	  Greece	  will	  stay	  liquid	  long	  enough	  to	  pay	  down	  much	  of	  its	  debts	  while	  Portugal,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  and	  Spain	  recapitalize	  their	  banks	  and	  trim	  their	  own	  government	  deficits	  (Castle	  and	  Saltmarsh	  2010;	  Dixon	  and	  Unmack	  2011;	  Kitsantonis	  2011b;	  Simeunovic	  2010).	  	  Greece	  may	  still	  default	  on	  some	  of	  its	  debts,	  however,	  by	  that	  time	  the	  contagion	  effects	  will	  be	  contained	  within	  Greece,	  and	  an	  intensified	  European	  financial	  crisis	  can	  be	  averted.	  	  The	  global	  impact	  "will	  be	  a	  mere	  hiccup	  instead	  of	  a	  new	  financial	  crisis"	  (Cowen	  2011).	  	  This	  is	  the	  optimistic	  view	  of	  how	  the	  European	  financial	  crisis	  will	  play	  out.	  	  It	  is	  adopted	  by	  most	  European	  officials,	  Greek	  politicians,	  IMF	  officials,	  and	  most	  of	  the	  economic	  world	  and	  justifies	  the	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  forced	  upon	  the	  PIIGS.	  	   The	  rhetoric	  of	  “containment”	  has	  led	  to	  a	  nationally	  oriented	  reform	  strategy.	  	  The	  European	  Community	  created	  the	  Economic	  Adjustment	  Program	  (EAP)	  that	  details	  a	  five-­‐year	  economic	  strategy	  for	  Greece	  called	  the	  “Medium-­‐
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Term	  Fiscal	  Strategy”	  (MTFS)	  in	  spring	  2011.	  	  This	  program	  was	  ratified	  by	  the	  Greek	  parliament	  in	  June	  2011	  and	  is	  to	  be	  implemented	  over	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  	  Overall,	  the	  EAP	  represents	  the	  best	  the	  mainstream	  narrative	  has	  to	  offer	  in	  terms	  of	  trying	  to	  resolve	  the	  Greek	  crisis.	  	  The	  EAP	  is	  meant	  to	  “cure”	  the	  “sick	  man	  of	  Europe”	  and	  contain	  Greece’s	  “disease.”	  	  The	  plan,	  however,	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  band-­‐aid	  fix	  that	  does	  not	  address	  the	  true	  power	  imbalance	  that	  is	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011).	  	   The	  objectives	  of	  this	  program	  are	  to	  improve	  efficiency	  and	  quality	  of	  public	  spending,	  reduce	  waste	  and	  inefficiency	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  broaden	  the	  tax	  base,	  and	  reduce	  tax	  evasion.	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  plan	  is	  meant	  to	  reform	  many	  of	  the	  institutions	  that	  were	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section:	  the	  sprawling	  public	  sector,	  the	  low	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  the	  overly	  progressive	  tax	  structure.	  	  The	  MTFS	  aims	  to	  reduce	  the	  government	  deficit	  to	  2.5	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  2014	  and	  place	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  on	  a	  downward	  slope	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011).	  	  	  	   Note	  that	  the	  following	  analysis	  of	  the	  MTFS	  does	  not	  include	  the	  most	  recent	  austerity	  measures	  that	  were	  approved	  in	  early	  2012.	  	  Considering	  the	  difficulty	  in	  establishing	  which	  specific	  austerity	  policies	  have	  been	  effectively	  implemented	  and	  which	  have	  been	  delayed,	  I	  will	  limit	  my	  analysis	  to	  the	  MTFS	  in	  its	  projection	  of	  how	  economic	  reforms	  should	  ideally	  be	  effectuated.	  	  It	  can	  be	  accurately	  stated	  that	  the	  reforms	  declared	  in	  the	  MTSF	  are	  representative	  of	  the	  entire	  reform	  package	  that	  is	  currently	  being	  implemented	  in	  Greece	  as	  of	  March	  2012.	  	  The	  main	  objective	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of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  outline	  the	  nationally	  oriented	  reform	  strategy	  Greece	  is	  currently	  implementing	  to	  resolve	  its	  crisis.	  	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  reform	  strategy	  will	  be	  evaluated.	  
Political	  Structure	  Reforms	  	  	   Overall,	  the	  MTFS	  does	  little	  to	  address	  Greece’s	  political	  structure	  and	  how	  it	  operates.	  	  It	  is	  mainly	  a	  strategy	  for	  improving	  the	  economy.	  	  This	  is	  not	  very	  surprising	  because	  reforming	  the	  corrupt	  political	  structure	  necessarily	  entails	  that	  top	  Greek	  officials	  would	  lose	  their	  privileged	  position.	  	  Instead,	  Greek	  politicians	  are	  starting	  with	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  make	  it	  more	  globally	  competitive.	  	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  economy	  as	  the	  major	  cause	  of	  financial	  crisis,	  there	  is	  no	  demand	  for	  Greek	  politicians	  to	  change	  the	  political	  system	  that	  so	  favorably	  supports	  their	  social	  status	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  Affairs	  2011).	  
Economic	  Reforms	  	  	   The	  MTFS	  has	  much	  to	  say	  about	  the	  Greece’s	  public	  sector	  and	  economic	  competitiveness.	  	  The	  new	  austerity	  measures	  are	  primarily	  composed	  of	  spending	  cuts	  and	  tax	  increases.	  	  The	  austerity	  plan	  intends	  to	  cut	  14.32	  billion	  euros	  of	  spending	  and	  raise	  14.09	  billion	  euros	  through	  tax	  increases.	  	  There	  is	  also	  an	  aggressive	  privatization	  plan	  that	  aims	  to	  raise	  50	  billion	  euros	  by	  2015	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011).	  	  	   Concerning	  spending	  cuts,	  the	  strategy	  first	  aims	  to	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  by	  20	  percent	  during	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  	  Public	  sector	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wages	  will	  also	  be	  substantially	  reduced.	  	  In	  total,	  770	  million	  euros	  are	  to	  be	  cut	  in	  the	  2011	  wage	  bill.	  	  Pensions	  will	  also	  be	  reduced	  for	  workers,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  “arduous”	  jobs	  that	  qualify	  for	  early	  retirement	  will	  be	  considerably	  reduced.	  	  The	  total	  social	  benefits	  bill	  will	  be	  cut	  by	  1.09	  billion	  euros	  in	  2011.	  	  There	  will	  also	  be	  a	  7	  percent	  cut	  in	  the	  operational	  budgets	  of	  state-­‐owned	  companies	  to	  reduce	  overhead	  and	  administrative	  expenditures	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011).	  	  	   The	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  Greek	  economy	  is	  also	  being	  addressed	  by	  liberalizing	  the	  labor	  market.	  	  Essentially,	  the	  government	  is	  opening	  up	  previously	  closed	  and	  regulated	  professions	  that	  have	  hampered	  the	  mobility	  of	  labor.	  	  The	  new	  framework	  repeals	  restrictions	  on	  more	  than	  100	  professional	  activities.	  	  Also,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  liberalization	  of	  some	  Greek	  industries.	  	  The	  first	  industry	  to	  be	  liberalized	  is	  the	  transport	  market.	  	  With	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  market,	  transportation	  licenses	  will	  be	  cheaper	  and	  easier	  to	  obtain	  improving	  competitiveness	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011).	  	   The	  MTFS	  intends	  to	  boost	  entrepreneurship	  by	  reducing	  excessive	  regulation.	  	  Greece	  has	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  entrepreneurs	  to	  start	  companies	  by	  creating	  one-­‐stop-­‐shop	  services.	  	  Companies	  can	  now	  be	  created	  much	  faster	  under	  the	  new	  system	  by	  reducing	  the	  time	  required	  to	  submit	  plans,	  obtain	  permits,	  etc.,	  from	  38	  days	  to	  one	  day.	  	  A	  total	  of	  200	  new	  firms	  have	  so	  far	  been	  created	  under	  the	  new	  measures.	  	  Overall,	  Greece	  is	  attempting	  to	  deregulate	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the	  market	  to	  make	  a	  more	  “business-­‐friendly	  Greece”	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011).	  
Tax	  system	  reforms	  	  	   As	  for	  revenue	  increases,	  the	  MTFS	  seeks	  increase	  taxes	  on	  income,	  tolls,	  fees,	  rights,	  and	  other	  taxable	  revenue	  streams.	  	  The	  tax-­‐free	  threshold	  will	  be	  reduced	  from	  12,000	  euros	  to	  8,000	  euros	  to	  broaden	  the	  income	  tax	  base.	  	  A	  new	  luxury	  tax	  will	  also	  be	  levied	  on	  yachts,	  pools,	  cars,	  and	  owners	  of	  large	  properties.	  	  There	  will	  also	  be	  higher	  property	  taxes.	  	  Under	  the	  current	  system,	  homeowners	  with	  properties	  valued	  at	  less	  than	  400,000	  euros	  are	  property	  tax	  exempt.	  	  Under	  the	  new	  measures,	  the	  threshold	  will	  plummet	  by	  half	  to	  200,000	  euros	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011).	  	   There	  will	  also	  be	  a	  stronger	  enforcement	  of	  the	  new	  tax	  laws,	  including	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  audits	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  prosecution	  of	  tax	  evasion	  offenders.	  	  Prosecuting	  tax	  evaders	  is	  expected	  to	  raise	  at	  least	  878	  million	  euros	  by	  2013	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011;	  Talos	  2011).	  
Privatization	  	  	   A	  central	  component	  to	  neoliberal	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  privatization	  of	  state-­‐owned	  assets.	  	  Privatization	  has	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  structural	  adjustment	  plans	  of	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  1980’s	  and	  1990’s,	  and	  it	  is	  now	  being	  implemented	  in	  the	  structural	  adjustment	  plans	  for	  Greece	  (Robinson	  2008).	  	  The	  Greek	  government	  hopes	  that	  the	  revenue	  from	  selling	  state	  assets	  would	  allow	  it	  to	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buy	  back	  its	  own	  bonds	  at	  a	  discount,	  thereby	  helping	  pay	  off	  a	  sizeable	  amount	  of	  what	  it	  owes.	  	   The	  MTFS	  relies	  heavily	  on	  privatization.	  	  Ultimately,	  Greece	  has	  committed	  to	  raise	  50	  billion	  euros	  by	  2015	  through	  the	  sale	  of	  state	  assets.	  	  These	  sales	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  cut	  the	  debt	  ratio	  by	  more	  than	  20	  percentage	  points	  of	  GDP	  over	  the	  next	  five	  years	  and	  boost	  economic	  efficiency	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011).	  	  Greece	  intends	  to	  sell	  a	  diverse	  portfolio	  of	  assets	  ranging	  from	  state-­‐owned	  utilities	  to	  the	  main	  ports	  of	  Piraeus	  and	  Thessaloniki	  (Castle	  2011).	  	  On	  May	  23,	  2011,	  Greece	  approved	  its	  first	  wave	  of	  privatization	  by	  selling	  a	  20	  percent	  stake	  in	  OTE	  telecom	  to	  Germany’s	  Deutsche	  Telekom	  for	  about	  400	  million	  euros	  (Kitsantonis	  and	  Ewing	  2011;	  Kitsantonis	  2011a).	  	  	   There	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  debate	  about	  what	  the	  benefits	  and	  costs	  of	  privatization	  will	  be.	  	  Proponents	  of	  privatization	  argue	  that	  the	  Greek	  government	  has	  one	  of	  the	  richest	  portfolio	  of	  assets	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  assets	  have	  not	  provided	  any	  relevant	  revenue	  for	  the	  Greek	  state.	  	  Loss-­‐making	  enterprises	  have	  even	  been	  a	  source	  of	  costs.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  privatizing	  those	  assets	  will	  contribute	  to	  reducing	  the	  deficit	  without	  any	  cost	  to	  future	  revenue.	  	  In	  addition,	  proponents	  of	  privatization	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  a	  crucial	  instrument	  to	  support	  growth	  and	  fiscal	  sustainability.	  	  It	  is	  claimed	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  can	  operate	  these	  companies	  more	  efficiently	  than	  the	  Greek	  state,	  so	  that	  privatization	  will	  increase	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  (Bouras	  2011;	  "Privatization	  Plan	  Finally	  Passed”	  2011b).	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   The	  opponents	  of	  privatization	  mainly	  come	  from	  the	  Greek	  workers	  and	  labor	  unions.	  	  They	  fear	  that	  privatization	  will	  lead	  to	  job	  cuts.	  	  Also,	  Greek	  workers	  are	  skeptical	  that	  privatization	  will	  be	  a	  long-­‐term	  solution.	  	  They	  fear	  that	  because	  of	  the	  crisis,	  state-­‐owned	  assets	  are	  being	  sold	  at	  bargain-­‐bottom	  prices	  at	  a	  reduced	  value.	  	  Employees	  at	  state-­‐run	  companies	  that	  are	  in	  line	  to	  be	  privatized	  have	  protested.	  	  In	  May	  2011,	  workers	  of	  Hellenic	  Postbank	  organized	  sit-­‐in	  demonstrations	  at	  the	  bank’s	  main	  offices	  to	  voice	  opposition	  to	  the	  privatization	  plan	  ("Unions	  Protest	  Against	  Privatization"	  2011e).	  	  In	  February	  of	  2012,	  union	  workers	  in	  the	  Greek	  Public	  Power	  Corporation	  DEI	  protested	  against	  the	  privatization	  of	  the	  company.	  	  Greeks	  anticipate	  that	  if	  the	  company	  is	  privatized,	  electricity	  rates	  will	  dramatically	  increase	  (Balezdrova	  2012).	  	  	   The	  Greek	  state	  continues	  with	  privatization	  against	  intense	  opposition	  from	  workers.	  	  Greek	  officials	  have	  established	  an	  external	  agency	  to	  oversee	  privatization	  and	  manage	  sales	  of	  state-­‐assets.	  	  This	  agency	  is	  said	  to	  accelerate	  the	  privatization	  process	  and	  ensure	  the	  irreversibility	  of	  the	  whole	  process.	  	  Ultimately,	  privatization	  is	  said	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  when	  a	  single	  entity	  controls	  the	  privatization	  operation	  (Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011).	  	   A	  report	  sent	  out	  by	  the	  Troika	  to	  eurozone	  governments	  in	  late	  October	  2011,	  however,	  contradicts	  the	  optimistic	  picture	  painted	  by	  privatization	  advocates.	  	  The	  report	  indicates	  that	  the	  privatization	  plan	  has	  gone	  off-­‐course	  and	  further	  privatizations	  have	  been	  delayed	  ("Thomsen	  Warns	  Rescue	  Plan	  Could	  Fail”	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2011c).	  	  Greece	  has	  so	  far	  only	  sold	  $2	  billion	  of	  state	  assets	  which	  is	  considerably	  below	  expectations	  (Donadio	  and	  Kitsantonis	  2012).	  	  This	  dynamic	  represents	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  stalemate	  in	  Greece.	  	  The	  Greek	  state	  attempts	  to	  further	  neoliberalization	  through	  privatization,	  however,	  as	  angry	  Greeks	  protest	  and	  resist,	  implementation	  halts.	  	   Ultimately,	  privatization	  is	  a	  tool	  for	  neoliberal	  states	  to	  extend	  capitalist	  production	  relations.	  	  According	  to	  Robinson	  (2008),	  privatization	  strengthens	  transnational	  ties	  in	  the	  national	  economy	  by	  reducing	  the	  state’s	  ability	  to	  engage	  in	  economic	  planning	  and	  implementation,	  thereby	  privileging	  the	  private	  sector.	  	  Privatization	  was	  implemented	  in	  Latin	  America	  beginning	  in	  the	  1980’s	  that	  reduced	  government	  spending	  and	  balanced	  state	  budgets.	  	  Also,	  privatization	  freed	  up	  resources	  for	  debt	  repayment	  and	  made	  the	  overall	  economy	  more	  efficient.	  	  Greece	  is	  embarking	  on	  a	  privatization	  program	  for	  largely	  the	  same	  reason.	  	  	  	   Robinson	  also	  contends	  that	  privatization	  exacerbates	  economic	  crisis.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Latin	  America,	  the	  enormous	  influx	  of	  capital	  through	  the	  sale	  of	  state-­‐assets	  contributed	  to	  state	  solvency	  and	  the	  region’s	  apparent	  economic	  recovery	  in	  the	  1990’s.	  	  But	  by	  the	  2000’s,	  privatization	  revenue	  dwindled	  as	  the	  stock	  of	  enterprises	  for	  sale	  declined	  contributing	  to	  the	  renewal	  of	  crisis.	  	  Much	  the	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  Greece.	  	  Assuming	  that	  the	  Greek	  state	  can	  effectively	  continue	  privatization,	  revenue	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  can	  be	  accumulated	  to	  keep	  Greece	  solvent,	  however,	  Greece	  is	  selling	  its	  assets	  at	  fire	  sale,	  bargain	  prices	  due	  to	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  Thus,	  the	  revenue	  collected	  is	  less	  than	  the	  real	  value	  of	  these	  assets.	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Furthermore,	  Greece	  will	  eventually	  run	  out	  of	  state-­‐assets	  to	  sell,	  and	  revenues	  that	  would	  have	  been	  collected	  if	  they	  were	  state-­‐owned	  would	  be	  lost.	  	  Crisis	  will	  inevitably	  continue.	  	  	  	   Privatization	  is	  ultimately	  a	  short-­‐term	  solution	  to	  a	  long-­‐term	  problem;	  it	  will	  likely	  exacerbate	  the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  Greece.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  privatization	  will	  strengthen	  the	  power	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  transnational	  corporations	  in	  Greece.	  	  As	  Robinson	  (2008)	  contends,	  “Privatization	  not	  just	  fomented	  the	  process	  of	  capitalist	  class	  formation	  but	  also	  resulted	  in	  the	  transnationalization	  of	  economic	  groups”	  (p.	  172).	  	  In	  the	  first	  round	  of	  Greek	  privatization,	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  state-­‐owned	  OTE	  Telecom	  Corporation	  were	  sold	  to	  Germany’s	  Deutsche	  Telecom.	  	  This	  transnational	  corporation	  will	  now	  have	  more	  power	  in	  Greece’s	  affairs	  because	  it	  owns	  a	  major	  corporation	  providing	  communication	  services	  to	  Greek	  people.	  	   This	  chapter	  has	  outlined	  Greece’s	  reform	  strategy	  that	  consists	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  intended	  to	  raise	  revenues	  for	  the	  Greek	  government	  and	  make	  the	  economy	  more	  globally	  competitive.	  	  Although	  theoretically,	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  designed	  to	  solve	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  a	  thorough	  examination	  of	  the	  reform	  strategy	  as	  it	  has	  been	  implemented	  indicates	  otherwise.	  	  Instead,	  Greece’s	  financial	  crisis	  has	  been	  exacerbated	  by	  such	  measures.	  	  The	  following	  chapter	  evaluates	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  as	  a	  reform	  strategy	  and	  discusses	  why	  it	  has	  failed	  to	  solve	  Greece’s	  crisis.	  	  Ultimately,	  Greece’s	  crisis	  cannot	  be	  solved	  by	  structural	  adjustment	  because	  the	  crisis	  is	  a	  global	  problem	  that	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must	  be	  addressed	  with	  a	  global	  solution.	  	  Structural	  adjustment,	  a	  nationally	  oriented	  reform	  strategy	  by	  design,	  will	  not	  solve	  what	  is	  a	  global	  problem.	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CHAPTER	  VI	  
THE	  STRUCTURED	  POWER	  IMBALANCE	  
The	  Effects	  of	  Structural	  Adjustment	  	  	   The	  previous	  chapter	  has	  illustrated	  that	  the	  reform	  strategy	  in	  Greece	  consists	  of	  nationally	  oriented	  policies	  of	  structural	  adjustment.	  	  Overall,	  structural	  adjustment	  has	  failed	  to	  achieve	  its	  intended	  goal	  of	  reducing	  Greece’s	  debt-­‐load	  and	  has	  failed	  to	  stabilize	  Greece’s	  economy.	  	  Instead,	  Greece’s	  debt-­‐load	  has	  actually	  grown	  larger	  since	  the	  start	  of	  crisis,	  and	  the	  country	  continues	  to	  be	  mired	  in	  crisis.	  	   The	  imposed	  austerity	  measures	  have	  led	  to	  three	  separate	  but	  related	  trends	  all	  of	  which	  are	  intensifying	  Greece’s	  financial	  crisis:	  a	  reduction	  in	  domestic	  demand,	  a	  contraction	  of	  the	  GDP,	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio.	  	  Ian	  Campbell	  and	  Rob	  Cox	  (2011),	  journalists	  from	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  suggest,	  “As	  huge	  cuts	  eat	  into	  employment	  and	  domestic	  demand,	  the	  economy	  will	  get	  smaller	  and	  weaker	  and	  the	  debt	  burden	  relatively	  heavier.”	  	  Essentially,	  austerity	  measures	  have	  led	  to	  Greek	  citizens	  having	  less	  disposable	  incomes	  and	  invariably	  less	  consumer	  demand	  which	  depresses	  GDP	  performance	  and	  leads	  to	  a	  heavier	  debt-­‐load.	  	  This	  dynamic	  does	  not	  necessarily	  represent	  a	  linear	  causal	  chain,	  and	  there	  are	  other	  dynamics	  involved,	  however,	  these	  macroeconomic	  processes	  are	  mutually	  reinforcing.	  	  	   The	  contraction	  of	  domestic	  demand	  has	  been	  deeper	  than	  previously	  expected	  by	  European	  officials.	  	  Private	  consumption	  fell	  by	  more	  than	  4	  percent	  in	  2010,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  sharp	  deterioration	  in	  retail	  sales	  continuing	  in	  2011	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(Directorate	  General	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	  2011).	  	  The	  outlook	  for	  private	  consumption	  remains	  negative	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  as	  unemployment,	  wage	  reductions,	  cuts	  in	  social	  benefits	  and	  pensions,	  and	  inflation	  are	  curtailing	  households'	  disposable	  income	  (Campbell	  and	  Cox	  2011).	  	  Overall,	  Greeks	  have	  less	  money	  to	  spend	  consuming,	  resulting	  in	  less	  money	  circulating	  throughout	  the	  Greek	  economy.	  	  	   In	  addition,	  Greece’s	  GDP	  has	  been	  steadily	  contracting	  since	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  Fitch	  credit	  ratings	  agency	  warned,	  “The	  key	  risk	  for	  Greece’s	  public	  debt	  dynamics	  is	  that	  the	  economy	  suffers	  a	  greater-­‐then-­‐expected	  decline	  in	  nominal	  GDP	  and	  the	  economy	  veers	  towards	  a	  debt-­‐deflation	  spiral,	  notwithstanding	  the	  authorities’	  best	  efforts	  to	  fulfill	  their	  fiscal	  targets”	  (Lynn	  2011:14).	  	  In	  fact,	  Greece’s	  GDP	  has	  been	  contracting	  more	  than	  expected,	  declining	  by	  an	  average	  of	  4.5	  percent	  in	  2010	  and	  reaching	  7.5	  percent	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  2010	  (Lachman	  2010).	  	  For	  the	  year	  2011,	  Greece’s	  GDP	  contracted	  by	  7	  percent,	  and	  the	  GDP	  is	  expected	  to	  continue	  to	  shrink	  by	  an	  estimated	  6	  to	  7	  percent	  in	  2012	  (Nikas	  2012b).	  	  Falling	  consumer	  demand	  is	  only	  one	  of	  many	  factors	  that	  have	  lead	  to	  Greece’s	  decline	  in	  GDP.	  	  Other	  factors	  include	  the	  low	  competitiveness	  of	  Greek	  industry,	  the	  unattractive	  business	  climate,	  and	  the	  high-­‐debt	  servicing	  costs.	  	   As	  a	  consequence	  of	  austerity,	  Greece’s	  debt-­‐load	  is	  growing	  heavier.	  	  Austerity,	  according	  to	  Desmond	  Lachman	  a	  former	  senior	  staff	  member	  at	  the	  IMF,	  “will	  have	  the	  unwanted	  effect	  of	  substantially	  increasing	  Greece’s	  public	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio.	  	  Since,	  if	  Greece’s	  nominal	  GDP	  were	  to	  decline	  over	  the	  next	  few	  years	  by	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20	  percent…Greece’s	  public	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  would	  rise	  towards	  175	  percent”	  (Donadio	  and	  Erlanger	  2011).	  	  As	  it	  stands,	  Greece’s	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  has	  been	  steadily	  climbing,	  and	  it	  will	  remain	  high	  for	  years	  to	  come.	  	  Currently	  the	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  has	  reached	  159.1	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2011,	  up	  from	  138.8	  percent	  a	  year	  earlier	  (Kitsantonis	  and	  Jolly	  2012).	  	  	  	   The	  bailout	  packages	  are	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  increase	  in	  Greece’s	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio.	  	  Calling	  such	  funds	  a	  “bailout”	  however	  is	  misleading.	  	  This	  term	  suggests	  that	  the	  EU	  and	  IMF	  are	  altruistically	  saving	  Greece	  through	  permanent	  debt	  relief.	  	  In	  reality,	  a	  “bailout”	  is	  a	  euphemism	  for	  interest-­‐bearing	  loans.	  	  Simply	  stated,	  Greece	  is	  taking	  on	  more	  debt	  while	  failing	  to	  grow	  its	  economy.	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  bailouts	  are	  only	  piling	  up	  more	  debt	  onto	  the	  Greek	  budget,	  and	  the	  decline	  in	  Greek	  GDP	  has	  further	  diminished	  Greece’s	  capacity	  to	  pay	  it	  back.	  	  With	  the	  Greek	  Parliament	  recently	  approving	  of	  a	  second	  bailout	  package	  in	  January	  2012,	  even	  more	  interest-­‐bearing	  loans	  will	  be	  piling	  up	  on	  Greece’s	  balance	  sheet.	  	   The	  biggest	  problem	  associated	  with	  the	  steady	  increase	  in	  Greece’s	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  is	  that	  the	  debt-­‐servicing	  costs	  are	  unsustainable.	  	  Lynn	  (2011)	  worries	  that	  Greece’s	  debt-­‐load	  has	  become	  “a	  kind	  of	  monster,	  growing	  in	  size	  all	  the	  time	  and	  devouring	  more	  and	  more	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  each	  year	  passed”	  (p.	  214).	  	  As	  Greece	  accepts	  new	  interest-­‐bearing	  loans	  through	  the	  bailouts,	  debt-­‐servicing	  costs	  will	  consume	  a	  larger	  amount	  of	  Greece’s	  budget,	  feeding	  Greece’s	  debt	  Minotaur.	  	  Fitch	  estimated	  that	  “gross	  fiscal	  funding	  needs	  will	  jump	  to	  over	  30	  percent	  of	  GDP	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in	  2014-­‐2015”	  (Lynn	  2011:214).	  	  This	  means	  that	  within	  a	  few	  years,	  debt-­‐servicing	  costs	  will	  consume	  one-­‐third	  of	  everything	  the	  Greek	  economy	  produces.	  	   The	  current	  reform	  package	  in	  Greece	  has	  failed	  to	  solve	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  	  The	  view	  of	  the	  mainstream	  narrative,	  insisting	  that	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  a	  “cure”	  for	  “sick”	  economies,	  is	  severely	  flawed.	  	  If	  Greece	  is	  a	  “sick”	  patient,	  than	  the	  current	  treatment,	  consisting	  of	  bailouts	  and	  structural	  adjustment,	  is	  making	  Greece	  worse.	  	  	  	   Structural	  adjustment	  measures	  have	  been	  severely	  taxing	  on	  Greek	  workers	  with	  employment	  contracting	  for	  the	  past	  two	  years.	  	  Some	  68,000	  businesses	  closed	  in	  2010,	  and	  another	  53,000-­‐-­‐out	  of	  300,000	  still	  alive-­‐-­‐are	  said	  to	  be	  close	  to	  bankruptcy	  in	  the	  near	  future	  (Donadio	  and	  Kitsantonis	  2012).	  	  In	  addition,	  unemployment	  stands	  at	  21	  percent	  and	  rising;	  unemployment	  for	  people	  under	  25	  has	  reached	  48	  percent	  leading	  many	  to	  declare	  that	  a	  “lost”	  decade	  of	  youth	  has	  emerged	  ("Greek	  Unemployment	  Passes	  20	  percent,	  48	  for	  Youth"	  2012a).	  	  The	  Greek	  suicide	  rate	  has	  increased	  by	  40	  percent	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2011,	  mostly	  attributed	  to	  the	  persistence	  and	  deepening	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  (Shorto	  2012).	  	  Overall,	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  for	  the	  average	  Greek	  has	  drastically	  deteriorated	  since	  the	  onset	  of	  this	  crisis.	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  negative	  status	  of	  the	  Greek	  economy	  and	  deteriorating	  standard	  of	  living,	  Greece	  continues	  to	  be	  on	  the	  precipice	  of	  default	  time	  and	  time	  again,	  indicated	  by	  the	  unrelenting	  rhetoric	  that	  Greece	  could	  still	  in	  fact	  default	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  Such	  talk	  of	  a	  possible	  Greek	  default	  has	  existed	  in	  political,	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economic,	  and	  media	  circles	  since	  the	  start	  of	  crisis	  in	  early	  2010	  and	  has	  persisted	  until	  the	  present.	  	   To	  keep	  Greece	  solvent	  during	  this	  treatment	  process,	  thereby	  preventing	  a	  default,	  Greece	  has	  been	  injected	  with	  bailout	  funds.	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  bailouts	  are	  keeping	  Greece	  on	  life	  support.	  	  However,	  since	  the	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  have	  failed	  to	  stimulate	  economic	  growth,	  and	  the	  bailouts	  are	  piling	  more	  debt	  onto	  the	  Greek	  balance	  sheets,	  it	  is	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  before	  Greece	  flat	  out	  dies,	  i.e.	  defaults	  on	  its	  debt	  obligations.	  	  According	  to	  Nouriel	  Roubini,	  “The	  110	  billion	  euros	  bail-­‐out	  agreed	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  in	  May	  [2010]	  only	  delays	  the	  inevitable	  default	  and	  risks	  making	  it	  disorderly	  when	  it	  comes”	  (Lynn	  2010:218).	  	  	   Greece	  is	  being	  prescribed	  the	  wrong	  sort	  of	  treatment.	  	  The	  current	  reform	  strategy	  consists	  of	  nationally	  oriented	  reforms	  derived	  from	  a	  faulty	  analysis	  that	  posits	  that	  Greece	  is	  strictly	  the	  cause	  of	  its	  own	  financial	  crisis.	  	  Instead,	  it	  should	  be	  recognized	  by	  EU	  officials	  that	  Greece’s	  economic	  crisis	  is	  a	  global	  issue	  that	  cannot	  be	  solved	  by	  national	  reforms	  alone.	  	  The	  following	  section	  exposes	  how	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  that	  underlies	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  eurozone.	  
The	  Structured	  Power	  Imbalance	  	  	   As	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  sections,	  the	  Greek	  crisis	  is	  not	  solely	  the	  result	  of	  a	  profligate	  and	  fiscally	  mismanaged	  Greek	  state	  that	  borrowed	  and	  spent	  too	  much.	  	  Instead,	  the	  Greek	  crisis	  is	  in	  reality	  crisis	  of	  the	  eurozone,	  and	  the	  by-­‐
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product	  of	  a	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  within	  the	  eurozone	  countries.	  	  Core	  eurozone	  countries,	  such	  as	  France	  and	  Germany	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  Netherlands	  and	  Luxembourg,	  have	  strong	  export	  economies	  while	  the	  peripheral	  countries,	  Portugal,	  Italy,	  Spain,	  and	  Greece	  (PIGS),	  use	  loans	  to	  buy	  the	  commodities	  produced	  in	  the	  core	  counties.	  	  As	  Lynn	  (2011)	  explains,	  “The	  deficit	  [peripheral]	  countries	  paid	  for	  all	  the	  things	  they	  were	  buying	  from	  the	  surplus	  [core]	  countries	  by	  borrowing	  money	  through	  the	  banks”	  (p.	  72).	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  eurozone	  has	  created	  a	  massive	  power	  imbalance	  between	  the	  core	  and	  periphery.	  	  Greece’s	  current	  debt-­‐load	  is	  not	  the	  cause	  and	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  crisis	  but	  a	  victim	  of	  the	  overall	  power	  imbalance	  in	  the	  eurozone.	  	   Greece’s	  debt	  crisis	  is	  a	  symptom	  of	  an	  underlying	  structural	  problem	  that	  enabled	  Greece	  to	  borrow	  so	  much-­‐-­‐mainly	  that	  Greece’s	  exports	  became	  much	  less	  competitive	  when	  Greece	  joined	  the	  euro.	  	  Instead	  of	  restructuring	  the	  persistently	  uncompetitive	  Greek	  economy,	  a	  remnant	  of	  the	  1980’s	  socialist	  era,	  it	  became	  cheaper	  for	  Greece	  to	  import	  its	  commodities	  and	  pay	  for	  it	  with	  loans	  offered	  by	  the	  EU.	  	  Manolopoulos	  (2011)	  supports	  this	  claim	  by	  saying	  that	  when	  a	  country	  like	  Greece	  pegs	  its	  currency	  to	  a	  strong,	  hard	  one,	  such	  as	  the	  euro,	  it	  stimulates	  the	  import	  of	  goods,	  which	  ends	  up	  ruining	  Greece’s	  industrial	  sector.	  	  This	  is	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  that	  generated	  Greece’s	  borrowing	  spree	  during	  the	  2000’s.	  	  After	  joining	  the	  eurozone,	  it	  became	  cheaper	  for	  Greece	  to	  accept	  loans	  from	  the	  EU	  that	  allowed	  Greece	  to	  import	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  commodities	  than	  for	  Greece	  to	  
  106 
produce	  these	  commodities	  themselves.	  	  In	  effect,	  Greece	  continued	  its	  legacy	  of	  de-­‐industrialization	  in	  the	  2000’s.	  	  	  	   When	  Greece	  adopted	  the	  euro	  in	  2001,	  the	  trade	  deficit	  was	  at	  3	  percent	  of	  GDP	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  It	  subsequently	  worsened	  as	  Greece’s	  imports	  grew.	  This	  trade	  balance	  has	  significantly	  deteriorated	  throughout	  the	  2000’s	  to	  its	  peak	  level	  at	  14	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  2009	  (Lynn	  2011).	  	  This	  is	  contrary	  to	  what	  the	  euro-­‐architects	  had	  planned.	  	  They	  had	  hoped	  that	  by	  ruling	  out	  competitive	  devaluation,	  the	  euro	  would	  effectively	  force	  countries	  to	  reform	  their	  labor	  market,	  open	  up	  their	  economy,	  and	  usher	  in	  productivity	  gains	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  euro-­‐architects	  hoped	  and	  planned	  that	  by	  Greece	  adopting	  the	  euro,	  it	  would	  force	  them	  to	  make	  their	  economy	  more	  competitive.	  	  According	  to	  Lynn	  (2011),	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  euro	  “would	  in	  a	  single	  act	  take	  what	  were	  in	  many	  ways	  relatively	  backward,	  agricultural	  economies,	  dominated	  by	  the	  state-­‐and	  family-­‐controlled	  cartels,	  and,	  by	  a	  kind	  of	  alchemy	  that	  was	  never	  fully	  explained,	  transform	  them	  into	  modern,	  dynamic,	  liberal,	  technological	  powerhouses	  with	  the	  flash	  of	  a	  wand”	  (p.	  54).	  	  Tough	  questions	  concerning	  the	  practicality	  of	  whether	  Greek	  industry	  could	  compete	  with	  the	  far	  more	  experienced	  competitors	  of	  northern	  Europe	  were	  conveniently	  swept	  under	  the	  table.	  	  	  	   When	  Greece	  adopted	  the	  euro,	  it	  was	  tied	  to	  a	  hard	  currency	  which	  made	  exports	  less	  competitive	  and	  stimulated	  importing	  goods.	  	  Greece	  could	  have	  attempted	  to	  follow	  the	  prescriptions	  of	  the	  euro-­‐architects	  and	  restructured	  their	  economy	  to	  make	  it	  more	  globally	  competitive,	  however	  that	  would	  be	  difficult	  and	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would	  not	  guarantee	  that	  Greece	  would	  in	  fact	  become	  more	  globally	  competitive.	  	  According	  to	  Manolopoulos	  (2011),	  “The	  core	  problem	  with	  the	  eurozone	  countries	  after	  monetary	  union	  was	  that	  membership	  actually	  reduced	  pressure	  on	  governments	  to	  undertake	  reforms	  necessary	  for	  monetary	  union	  to	  succeed”	  (p.	  145).	  	  It	  became	  more	  economically	  beneficial,	  at	  the	  time,	  for	  Greece	  to	  borrow	  money	  from	  the	  EU	  and	  use	  that	  money	  to	  buy	  commodities	  from	  the	  core	  exporting	  euro	  countries.	  	  	  Analyzing	  the	  dynamics	  of	  Greece’s	  military	  situation	  provides	  the	  most	  concrete	  and	  explicit	  example	  of	  how	  the	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  operates	  within	  the	  eurozone.	  	  As	  political	  tension	  with	  Turkey	  has	  lasted	  for	  centuries,	  both	  countries	  are	  currently	  heavily	  militarized.	  	  Greece’s	  defense	  spending	  is	  the	  highest,	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  GDP,	  of	  any	  country	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  Greece	  spends	  4.6	  percent	  of	  GDP	  on	  defense,	  which	  is	  on	  par	  with	  China	  and	  just	  ahead	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  In	  addition,	  Greece	  has	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  military	  personnel	  per	  capita	  of	  any	  NATO	  country	  (at	  119	  per	  10,000	  which	  is	  more	  than	  twice	  that	  of	  the	  second	  runner-­‐up,	  Bulgaria)	  (Graeber	  2011).	  	  Such	  a	  high	  level	  of	  militarization	  is	  extremely	  expensive	  and	  is	  a	  huge	  drain	  on	  Greek	  finances.	  To	  sustain	  such	  a	  high	  level	  of	  militarization,	  Greece	  used	  funds	  provided	  by	  French	  and	  German	  banks	  to	  buy	  military	  equipment	  from	  French	  and	  German	  manufacturers.	  	  According	  to	  David	  Graeber	  (2011),	  “The	  role	  of	  the	  Greek	  government’s	  interest	  in	  expensive	  German	  and	  French	  military	  equipment	  (jets,	  submarines),	  and	  its	  financing	  through	  money	  borrowed	  from	  German	  and	  French	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banks,	  has	  been	  well-­‐documented”	  (p.	  230).	  	  In	  addition,	  Manolopoulos	  (2011)	  sums	  up	  this	  dynamic	  best	  when	  stating:	  Much	  of	  the	  lending	  to	  Greece	  in	  the	  boom	  years	  was	  by	  large	  northern	  European	  banks.	  	  These	  institutions,	  some	  of	  them	  based	  in	  France	  and	  Germany,	  were	  loaning	  billions	  of	  euros	  to	  the	  Greek	  government,	  much	  of	  which	  was	  being	  spent	  on	  arms	  purchases	  from	  the	  likes	  of	  Dassault	  and	  Krauss	  Maffie	  Wegmann.	  	  The	  role	  of	  French	  and	  German	  banks	  in	  making	  loans	  to	  assist	  the	  Greek	  purchase	  of	  French	  and	  German	  manufactured	  goods,	  for	  both	  civil	  and	  military	  uses,	  is	  a	  major	  element	  in	  the	  entire	  saga	  of	  the	  ballooning	  Greek	  public	  sector	  deficit.	  (P.	  75)	  	  Before	  the	  start	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  there	  were	  multiple	  deals	  between	  Greece	  and	  French	  and	  German	  arms	  manufacturers.	  	  On	  the	  French	  side,	  in	  November	  2007,	  fifteen	  Mirage	  2000-­‐5	  aircraft	  were	  delivered	  to	  Greece	  from	  the	  French	  Rafale	  International	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  Following	  this	  sale,	  in	  March	  2008,	  Rafale	  International	  announced	  the	  opening	  of	  an	  office	  in	  Athens	  to	  establish	  a	  “natural	  continuity	  of	  the	  French	  supply	  source	  to	  answer	  the	  needs	  of	  Hellenic	  Air	  Force”	  ("Rafale	  International	  Moves	  a	  Step	  Forward	  in	  Greece	  by	  Reinforcing	  its	  Presence	  in	  Athens"	  2008).	  	  Additionally,	  Germany	  is	  the	  world’s	  third	  largest	  exporter	  of	  arms	  whose	  top	  two	  customers	  are	  Turkey	  and	  Greece.	  	  In	  2003,	  the	  Greek	  government	  announced	  a	  contract	  of	  160	  Leopard	  tanks	  from	  German	  company	  Krauss	  Maffei	  Wegmann	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  More	  interesting	  are	  the	  deals	  that	  have	  been	  made	  between	  the	  Greek	  government	  and	  French	  and	  German	  arms	  manufacturers	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  Greece’s	  crisis.	  	  In	  the	  discussions	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  first	  bailout	  in	  2010,	  both	  France	  and	  Germany	  have	  been	  accused	  of	  using	  the	  Greek	  crisis	  as	  leverage	  to	  advance	  arms	  contracts.	  	  In	  February	  2010,	  when	  George	  Papandreou	  visited	  with	  French	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President	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy	  to	  discuss	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  first	  bailout	  package,	  Papandreou	  agreed	  to	  order	  six	  frigates	  from	  the	  French	  state-­‐controlled	  company	  DCNS	  valued	  at	  2.5	  billion	  euros.	  	  In	  addition,	  talks	  were	  held	  about	  the	  purchase	  of	  15	  French	  Super	  Puma	  helicopters	  worth	  400	  million	  euros	  and	  40	  multipurpose	  combat	  aircraft	  (Manolopoulos	  2011;	  Stern	  2010;	  Taylor	  and	  Maltezou	  2010).	  	  	  Despite	  German	  Chancellor	  Angela	  Merkel’s	  propaganda	  that	  accused	  the	  Greek	  population	  of	  living	  beyond	  their	  means,	  in	  March	  2010	  Berlin	  completed	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Greek	  government	  on	  the	  purchase	  of	  two	  submarines	  valued	  at	  1.3	  billion	  euros	  (Stern	  2010;	  Taylor	  and	  Maltezou	  2010).	  	  Thus,	  while	  Merkel	  criticized	  Greece	  for	  wasting	  vast	  sums	  of	  money,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  crisis,	  Germany	  has	  approved	  of	  Greece	  spending	  1.3	  billion	  euros	  on	  submarines.	  	  Although	  the	  German	  government	  has	  denied	  that	  this	  deal	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  bailout	  discussions,	  it	  is	  clear	  according	  to	  Johannes	  Stern	  (2010)	  that	  “both	  France	  and	  Germany	  have	  made	  weapons	  exports	  a	  condition	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  Greek	  rescue	  package.”	  	  Regardless	  if	  this	  is	  covert	  corruption	  or	  not,	  funds	  that	  are	  being	  extracted	  from	  Greece	  through	  massive	  cost-­‐cutting	  austerity	  measures	  are	  being	  used	  to	  finance	  military	  rearmament	  sold	  by	  French	  and	  German	  manufacturers.	  	  	  The	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  that	  enabled	  and	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  funds	  from	  peripheral	  countries	  to	  core	  countries	  was	  facilitated	  by	  financial	  liberalization	  during	  the	  planning	  stages	  of	  the	  eurozone	  which	  became	  a	  European-­‐wide	  strategy	  by	  the	  late	  1980’s	  and	  early	  1990’s	  (Perez-­‐Caldentey	  and	  Vernengo	  2012).	  	  According	  to	  Pagoulatos	  (2003):	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  Over	  the	  1980’s,	  one	  EC	  country	  after	  another	  proceeded	  to	  stimulate	  internal	  banking	  competition	  through	  deregulating	  interest	  rates,	  removing	  domestic	  and	  cross-­‐border	  obstacles,	  phasing	  out	  direct	  lending	  controls	  and	  investment	  requirements,	  and	  encouraging	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  financial	  instruments.	  (P.	  105)	  	  	  	  France,	  once	  a	  paragon	  of	  financial	  dirigisme,	  adopted	  bold	  deregulation	  measures	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  Southern	  European	  countries	  of	  Spain,	  Italy,	  and	  Portugal	  all	  dismantled	  state-­‐controlled	  financial	  interventionism	  and	  replaced	  them	  with	  liberalization	  measures	  (Pagoulatos	  2003).	  	  Financialization	  became	  a	  mechanism	  that	  helped	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  a	  peripheralized	  Greece.	  	   Greece	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  embarking	  on	  a	  debt-­‐fueled	  importation	  spree.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  debt-­‐buildup	  was	  an	  issue	  for	  all	  the	  peripheral	  eurozone	  countries,	  not	  just	  Greece.	  	  Portugal,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  and	  Spain	  all	  built	  up	  huge	  deficits.	  	  The	  PIIGS	  used	  loans	  to	  import	  commodities	  because	  it	  was	  cheaper.	  	  The	  private	  sector	  account	  balances	  for	  peripheral	  countries	  show	  a	  rising	  average	  deficit	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  euro.	  	  In	  2002,	  the	  private	  sector	  deficit	  of	  peripheral	  countries	  average	  1.6	  percent	  of	  GDP	  and	  increased	  to	  reach	  6.7	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  2007	  (Perez-­‐Caldentey	  and	  Vernengo	  2012).	  	   Figure	  1	  depicts	  the	  exports	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  of	  some	  of	  the	  main	  countries	  involved	  in	  the	  European	  debt	  crisis.	  	  The	  PIGS	  all	  have	  significantly	  less	  exports	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  than	  the	  core	  countries,	  indicating	  a	  gap	  in	  terms	  of	  strength	  of	  the	  economies	  of	  the	  core	  versus	  the	  periphery.	  	   Similarly,	  looking	  at	  the	  current	  account	  balance	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  also	  indicates	  a	  power	  imbalance	  between	  the	  core	  and	  the	  periphery.	  	  As	  Figure	  2	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illustrates,	  the	  core	  countries	  all	  have	  positive	  current	  account	  balances	  while	  the	  PIGS	  are	  all	  in	  the	  negative.	  	  This	  chart	  depicts	  how	  the	  core	  countries	  are	  exporting	  significantly	  more	  than	  they	  import,	  while	  conversely,	  the	  PIGS	  are	  importing	  more	  than	  they	  export.	  	  In	  both	  charts,	  Greece	  has	  the	  lowest	  exports	  and	  greatest	  current	  account	  deficit	  of	  the	  PIGS.	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Figure	  2:	  Exports	  of	  Goods	  and	  Services	  (%	  of	  GDP)	  Source:	  World	  Bank	  2012	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   Therefore,	  solely	  blaming	  Greece	  for	  causing	  the	  European	  financial	  crisis	  misses	  the	  larger	  picture	  that	  it	  is	  a	  widespread	  structural	  problem.	  	  It	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  case	  that	  the	  Greeks	  borrowed	  too	  much	  creating	  its	  own	  crisis	  and	  putting	  the	  entire	  eurozone	  at	  risk.	  	  It	  is	  more	  the	  case	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  eurozone	  created	  a	  situation	  where	  it	  became	  more	  economically	  beneficial	  for	  PIGS	  to	  take	  the	  loans	  offered	  by	  the	  EU	  to	  import	  commodities	  rather	  than	  to	  reform	  its	  respective	  labor	  markets	  to	  keep	  economic	  competitiveness	  with	  the	  core	  of	  eurozone.	  	  The	  eurozone	  essentially	  created	  a	  periphery	  within	  the	  core	  of	  Western	  Europe.	  	  	  	   Within	  this	  framework	  of	  a	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  within	  the	  eurozone,	  just	  as	  there	  are	  deficit	  peripheral	  countries,	  there	  must	  be	  surplus	  core	  countries.	  	  	  By	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  eurozone,	  core	  countries	  were	  able	  to	  pursue	  export-­‐led	  development	  strategies	  while	  peripheral	  countries	  pursued	  import-­‐led	  development,	  facilitated	  by	  going	  deeper	  and	  deeper	  into	  debt.	  	  According	  to	  Perez-­‐Caldentey	  and	  Vernengo	  (2012),	  “the	  lending	  boom	  in	  the	  periphery	  allowed	  core	  countries	  to	  pursue	  a	  strategy	  of	  export-­‐led	  growth”	  (p.	  25).	  	  Following	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  euro	  in	  2001,	  core	  countries	  registered,	  on	  average,	  a	  surplus	  on	  their	  current	  accounts	  balance	  equivalent	  to	  0.9	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  	  In	  2007,	  the	  surplus	  had	  increased	  to	  3.6	  percent	  of	  GDP	  on	  average	  (Perez-­‐Caldentey	  and	  Vernengo	  2012).	  	   Germany	  is	  the	  clearest	  example	  of	  a	  core	  country	  that	  benefitted	  from	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  eurozone.	  	  Manolopoulos	  (2011)	  writes:	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While	  monetary	  union	  was	  intended	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  currency	  devaluations,	  Germany	  effectively	  ‘devalued’	  through	  control	  of	  wages	  and	  strong	  productivity	  growth,	  suppressing	  consumption	  and	  investment.	  	  This	  improved	  competitiveness	  and	  suppressed	  demand	  for	  imports,	  causing	  the	  country’s	  trade	  and	  current	  account	  surpluses	  to	  increase.	  (P.	  146)	  	  	  	   By	  2007,	  Germany	  was	  generating	  the	  world’s	  largest	  trade	  surplus.	  	  The	  trade	  surplus	  was	  not	  due	  to	  increased	  trade	  with	  non-­‐European	  countries.	  	  Germany’s	  trade	  surplus	  with	  the	  US	  grew	  only	  slightly	  during	  this	  time,	  and	  the	  country	  actually	  ran	  deficits	  with	  key	  Asian	  nations.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Germany’s	  trade	  surplus	  was	  a	  result	  of	  increased	  trading	  with	  eurozone	  countries	  that	  became	  more	  accessible	  once	  financial	  deregulation	  and	  liberalization	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  monetary	  union	  heightened	  intra-­‐eurozone	  trade	  (Manolopoulos	  2011).	  	  	  	   The	  analysis	  of	  the	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  illustrates	  that	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  not	  a	  national	  problem	  that	  can	  be	  solved	  with	  national	  reforms,	  i.e.	  structural	  adjustment.	  	  The	  Greek	  crisis	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  logic	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  eurozone,	  which	  has	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  core	  countries	  to	  have	  budget	  surpluses	  and	  peripheral	  countries	  to	  have	  budget	  deficits.	  	  Conventional	  wisdom	  offered	  by	  the	  European	  leaders	  fails	  to	  grasp	  this	  point.	  	  Any	  viable	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis	  must	  directly	  address	  the	  structured	  power	  imbalance.	  
The	  State	  Crisis	  of	  Legitimacy	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  Authoritarianism	  	  	   The	  foregoing	  analysis	  indicates	  that	  nationally	  oriented	  reforms	  consisting	  in	  structural	  adjustment	  and	  neoliberalization	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  failing	  to	  stabilize	  and	  solve	  Greece’s	  current	  financial	  crisis.	  	  A	  valid	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  the	  reasons	  why	  Greece	  continues	  to	  follow	  a	  failing	  path	  that	  will	  not	  lead	  to	  recovery.	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   The	  main	  reason	  Greece	  continues	  on	  a	  path	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  due	  to	  the	  hegemonic	  status	  of	  neoliberal	  theory	  guiding	  the	  global	  capitalist	  world-­‐system	  (Harvey	  2005).	  	  This	  notion	  holds	  that	  regaining	  economic	  competitiveness	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  grow	  out	  of	  a	  crisis,	  as	  competitive	  economies	  attract	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  presumably	  leading	  to	  growth.	  	  Thus,	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  are	  intended	  to	  reduce	  labor	  costs	  and	  increase	  the	  flexibility	  and	  mobility	  of	  labor.	  	  Liberalization	  and	  deregulation	  measures	  aim	  to	  remove	  bureaucratic	  red-­‐tape	  to	  stimulate	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  entrepreneurship	  in	  Greece.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  privatization	  of	  state-­‐owned	  assets	  is	  meant	  to	  eliminate	  corrupt	  and	  inefficient	  government	  involvement	  in	  the	  economy,	  and	  instead,	  allow	  the	  private	  sphere	  to	  control	  Greek	  economic	  activity.	  	  According	  to	  this	  logic,	  if	  Greece	  can	  implement	  these	  measures,	  then	  the	  Greek	  business	  climate	  and	  economic	  competitiveness	  will	  improve	  leading	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  foreign	  direct	  investment.	  	  It	  is	  thought	  that	  the	  Greek	  government	  will	  be	  able	  to	  accrue	  sufficient	  revenue	  to	  pay	  back	  the	  debt-­‐load.	  	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  although	  theoretically	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  intended	  to	  solve	  the	  crisis,	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  a	  failure.	  	   Greece’s	  entire	  reform	  package	  is	  meant	  to	  demonstrate	  creditworthiness	  and	  investment	  potential.	  	  The	  intent	  is	  to	  attract	  capital	  into	  Greece	  by	  creating	  a	  favorable	  business	  climate,	  thus	  stimulating	  industry	  and	  economic	  activity.	  	  Greece’s	  reform	  strategy	  therefore	  strengthens	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  the	  Greek	  economy.	  	  This	  makes	  sense	  due	  to	  the	  hegemonic	  status	  of	  neoliberal	  economic	  theory	  that	  extols	  the	  private	  sector	  as	  the	  main	  driver	  for	  economic	  growth.	  	  In	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effect,	  private	  interests	  have	  real	  power	  over	  the	  Greek	  state	  and	  continue	  Greece	  along	  a	  path	  of	  “rolling	  back	  the	  state.”	  	  Thus,	  Greece	  is	  preoccupied	  with	  signaling	  creditworthiness	  and	  demonstrating	  investment	  potential	  to	  private	  interests	  to	  keep	  capital	  within	  that	  country.	  	   Greece’s	  structural	  adjustment	  strategy	  forces	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  the	  popular	  classes	  to	  bear	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  reform	  effort.	  	  Reducing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  government	  bureaucracy	  through	  layoffs,	  cutting	  social	  expenditure,	  and	  decreasing	  pensions	  and	  wages	  are	  intended	  to	  increase	  government	  revenues.	  	  However,	  as	  years	  of	  protest	  and	  social	  unrest	  demonstrated,	  such	  policies	  incite	  social	  upheaval.	  	  	  	   Thus,	  the	  Greek	  state	  must	  perform	  the	  contradictory	  role	  of	  having	  to	  control	  the	  social	  unrest	  that	  it	  has	  essentially	  created.	  	  As	  an	  unintended	  consequence,	  the	  Greek	  state	  has	  generated	  mounting	  legitimacy	  problems.	  	  Continuing	  the	  façade	  of	  social	  stability	  is	  increasingly	  achieved	  through	  coercive	  measures.	  	  Beginning	  with	  the	  first	  protests	  against	  austerity	  starting	  in	  February	  2010,	  social	  resistance	  has	  been	  met	  with	  brutal	  crackdowns	  from	  riot	  police.	  	  As	  long	  as	  there	  have	  been	  protests,	  there	  have	  been	  police	  to	  quell	  it.	  	  With	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  coalition	  government	  in	  November	  2011,	  Greece	  has	  intensified	  coercive	  measures	  to	  maintain	  a	  thin	  veil	  of	  social	  stability	  leading	  to	  the	  very	  real	  prospect	  of	  rising	  authoritarianism	  in	  Greece.	  	   As	  discussed	  in	  the	  second	  chapter,	  a	  coalition	  government	  was	  created	  after	  George	  Papandreou	  lost	  support	  from	  the	  PASOK	  party	  and	  resigned	  from	  his	  position	  as	  Prime	  Minster.	  	  Lucas	  Papademos	  was	  appointed	  as	  the	  new	  Prime	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Minister	  due	  to	  his	  technocratic	  background	  and	  staunch	  support	  of	  structural	  adjustment.	  	  Signs	  of	  the	  rise	  in	  authoritarianism	  can	  be	  seen	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  coalition	  government.	  	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  mainstream	  Greek	  political	  parties	  of	  center-­‐left	  PASOK	  and	  center-­‐right	  New	  Democracy,	  the	  coalition	  government	  also	  included	  a	  third	  party,	  the	  Popular	  Orthodox	  Rally	  (LAOS).	  	  LAOS	  is	  an	  ultra	  right-­‐wing	  political	  party	  founded	  in	  2002	  by	  notorious	  anti-­‐Semite	  George	  Karatzeferis.	  	  The	  party’s	  founding	  statement	  calls	  for	  government	  decisions	  to	  be	  made	  by	  a	  council	  including	  military	  officers	  and	  Church	  officials-­‐-­‐a	  thinly	  disguised	  call	  for	  a	  military	  regime	  (Dreir	  2011).	  	  This	  is	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  military	  junta	  in	  1974	  that	  a	  far-­‐right	  party	  has	  held	  governmental	  power.	  	   In	  his	  brief	  tenure	  as	  Prime	  Minister,	  Papademos	  implemented	  authoritarian	  policies	  to	  quell	  social	  resistance	  to	  austerity.	  	  In	  August	  2011,	  the	  PASOK	  government	  abolished	  the	  Academic	  Asylum	  law	  that	  previously	  barred	  police	  from	  entering	  academic	  campuses	  during	  protests.	  	  This	  law	  was	  passed	  in	  the	  early	  1980’s	  and	  guaranteed	  students	  sanctuary	  from	  arrest	  and	  state	  brutality	  during	  protests.	  	  The	  abolition	  of	  the	  Academic	  Asylum	  law	  occurred	  just	  in	  time	  for	  the	  annual	  November	  17	  protests	  that	  commemorate	  the	  student	  protests	  against	  the	  military	  junta	  in	  1974	  which	  ended	  in	  bloodshed.	  	  Once	  this	  law	  was	  no	  longer	  in	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effect,	  police	  quickly	  thwarted	  the	  protests	  on	  November	  17,	  2011	  at	  Athens	  Polytechnic	  with	  tear	  gas	  and	  stun	  grenades3	  (Stevens	  2011).	  	   In	  addition	  to	  suppressing	  the	  annual	  student	  protests,	  Papademos	  showed	  additional	  signs	  of	  authoritarian	  sentiments.	  	  In	  early	  December	  2011,	  police	  clashed	  with	  protestors	  on	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  murder	  of	  Alexis	  Grigoropoulos	  who	  was	  murdered	  by	  a	  police	  officer	  in	  December	  2008.	  	  Since	  the	  murder,	  each	  year	  the	  Greek	  people	  commemorate	  the	  event	  by	  taking	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  social	  demonstrations.	  	  On	  December	  6,	  2011,	  more	  than	  7,000	  police	  officers	  were	  deployed	  to	  combat	  the	  stones	  and	  Molotov	  cocktails	  that	  demonstrators	  were	  throwing	  (Labropoulou	  2011).	  	  	  	  	   The	  Greek	  state	  has	  provoked	  massive	  social	  unrest	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  unpopular	  economic	  reforms.	  	  This	  trend	  began	  with	  implementation	  of	  the	  first	  round	  of	  austerity	  in	  February	  2010	  and	  has	  persisted	  for	  the	  past	  two	  years.	  	  Throughout	  the	  tumultuous	  and	  erratic	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis,	  popular	  protests	  have	  been	  a	  stable	  presence.	  	  The	  Greek	  people	  feel	  that	  corrupt	  political	  administrations,	  not	  themselves,	  are	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  yet	  they	  disproportionately	  bear	  the	  cost	  and	  burden	  of	  the	  reform	  package.	  	  Protesting	  and	  rioting	  is	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  this	  anger.	  	  In	  response,	  the	  Greek	  state	  unleashes	  its	  vast	  police	  force	  to	  suppress	  the	  outbursts.	  
                                                
 3	  An	  interesting	  side	  note	  pertains	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  Academic	  Asylum	  law	  was	  abolished.	  	  A	  Wikileaks	  document	  indicated	  that	  the	  United	  State’s	  Obama	  administration	  also	  encouraged	  abolishing	  this	  law.	  	  According	  to	  this	  document,	  the	  Academic	  Asylum	  law	  was	  “nothing	  more	  than	  a	  legal	  cover	  for	  hoodlums	  to	  wreak	  destruction	  with	  impunity”	  (Stevens	  2011).	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   The	  social	  upheaval	  and	  protests	  by	  the	  Greek	  people	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  established	  by	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  politically	  tumultuous	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  decades	  of	  civil	  war	  and	  dictatorship,	  the	  Greek	  state	  was	  unable	  to	  establish	  a	  social	  contract	  with	  the	  people	  until	  the	  return	  to	  democracy	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970’s	  which	  was	  solidified	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  At	  this	  time,	  Andreas	  Papandreou	  created	  a	  social	  contract	  with	  Greek	  people	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  welfare	  state	  and	  bloated	  government	  bureaucracy	  that	  employed	  the	  majority	  of	  Greeks.	  	  An	  entitlement	  culture	  was	  created	  where	  Greeks	  felt	  that	  the	  state	  owed	  them	  a	  luxurious	  and	  stable	  life.	  	  As	  a	  consequence,	  there	  was	  peace	  between	  the	  Greek	  people	  and	  the	  state	  that	  lasted	  throughout	  the	  1990’s	  and	  much	  of	  the	  2000’s.	  	  	  	   With	  the	  steady	  erosion	  of	  the	  old	  social	  contract	  through	  the	  repeated	  implementation	  of	  austerity,	  Greek	  people	  are	  angry	  that	  their	  entitlement	  culture	  is	  being	  snatched	  from	  under	  their	  feet.	  	  In	  response,	  Greeks	  are	  protesting	  and	  rioting,	  and	  Greek	  society	  is	  fraying.	  	  To	  maintain	  power,	  the	  Greek	  state	  is	  quelling	  social	  resistance	  through	  brutal	  crackdowns	  with	  riot	  police.	  	  The	  contradiction	  of	  the	  Greek	  state	  arises	  where	  it	  implements	  structural	  adjustment	  and	  then	  must	  deal	  with	  the	  social	  upheaval	  that	  ensues	  through	  authoritarian	  means.	  	  Structural	  adjustment	  is	  no	  ally	  of	  democracy,	  and	  a	  new	  social	  contract	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  created	  that	  will	  promote	  peace	  within	  Greek	  society.	  	   Although	  data	  collection	  for	  this	  project	  has	  ended,	  subsequent	  occurrences	  in	  May	  and	  June	  2012	  reinforce	  the	  notion	  that	  authoritarianism	  is	  on	  the	  rise	  in	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Greece.	  	  In	  May	  2012,	  the	  coalition	  government	  headed	  by	  Papademos	  was	  dissolved	  and	  elections	  were	  called.	  	  After	  a	  failed	  attempt	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  government	  in	  May	  2012,	  a	  second	  round	  of	  elections	  were	  called	  in	  June	  2012.	  	  The	  Greek	  people,	  increasingly	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  two	  main	  political	  parties,	  center-­‐right	  New	  Democracy	  and	  center-­‐left	  PASOK,	  are	  looking	  for	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  mainstream	  reform	  strategy	  of	  structural	  adjustment.	  	  The	  main	  political	  parties	  combined	  garnered	  less	  than	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  vote;	  these	  two	  parties	  receiving	  less	  than	  half	  of	  the	  vote	  has	  not	  happened	  in	  decades.	  	  People	  are	  now	  looking	  to	  the	  political	  extremes	  which	  on	  both	  the	  far	  left	  and	  the	  far	  right	  have	  gained	  more	  than	  41	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  June	  2012	  elections	  (Hatzis	  2012;	  Smith	  2012).	  	   The	  far	  left	  has	  gained	  the	  most	  votes	  and	  momentum	  from	  the	  Greek	  elections.	  	  The	  anti-­‐bailout	  and	  anti-­‐austerity	  party	  that	  wants	  to	  keep	  Greece	  within	  the	  eurozone,	  SYRIZA,	  gained	  27	  percent	  of	  the	  vote,	  just	  a	  few	  points	  behind	  the	  leading	  mainstream	  New	  Democracy	  party4	  (Sustar	  2012).	  	  Although	  the	  far-­‐left	  in	  Greece	  gained	  the	  most	  net	  electoral	  votes	  in	  the	  election,	  the	  gains	  of	  the	  far-­‐right	  are	  more	  interesting.	  	  Greece	  has	  always	  had	  a	  strong	  leftist	  political	  culture,	  however,	  the	  far-­‐right	  has	  not	  been	  prominent	  at	  all	  since	  the	  military	  junta	  in	  the	  early	  1970’s.	  	  	  
                                                
 4	  New	  Democracy	  gained	  30	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  June	  2012	  elections,	  down	  from	  its	  34	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  previous	  October	  2009	  elections.	  	  Although	  this	  is	  drop	  is	  not	  very	  significant	  on	  the	  surface,	  the	  main	  point	  is	  that	  the	  Greek	  people	  are	  increasingly	  renouncing	  support	  for	  the	  main	  political	  parties.	  	  PASOK,	  the	  other	  main	  political	  party,	  received	  just	  12	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  June	  2012	  elections,	  down	  from	  44	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  October	  2009	  elections	  (“Greek	  Election	  Results”	  2012).	  	  Thus,	  both	  mainstream	  political	  parties	  have	  lost	  support	  from	  the	  people.	  	  The	  extremes,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  gaining	  popular	  backing	  and	  momentum.	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   Chrysi	  Avgi,	  or	  Golden	  Dawn,	  was	  formed	  in	  1994	  and	  openly	  backed	  the	  military	  dictatorship	  of	  the	  1970’s.	  	  Today,	  the	  far-­‐right	  political	  party	  stands	  on	  an	  explicitly	  anti-­‐immigration	  platform.	  	  The	  leader	  of	  Golden	  Dawn,	  Nikolaos	  Michaloliakos,	  claims	  that	  his	  supporters	  are	  “patriots	  who	  want	  to	  return	  Greece	  to	  the	  Greeks”	  (Smith	  2012).	  	  Alexandros	  Lyris,	  a	  Golden	  Dawn	  member,	  stated	  “The	  situation	  with	  immigrants	  is	  out	  of	  control.	  	  Greeks	  are	  afraid	  to	  walk	  the	  streets	  anymore…well,	  we	  say	  ‘foreigners	  go	  home’	  and	  if	  you	  don’t	  like	  your	  homeland,	  ‘tough	  luck’”	  	  (Smith	  2012).	  	  The	  rise	  of	  xenophobic	  attitudes	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  influx	  of	  immigrants	  in	  recent	  years	  that	  are	  criticized	  for	  taking	  Greek	  jobs.	  	  Golden	  Dawn	  campaigned	  under	  the	  political	  slogan	  “So	  we	  can	  rid	  this	  land	  of	  filth”	  (JTA	  2012).	  	   The	  Greek	  elections	  in	  June	  2012	  led	  to	  Golden	  Dawn	  gaining	  seven	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  which	  allowed	  the	  far-­‐right	  party	  to	  have	  about	  a	  dozen	  seats	  in	  Parliament.	  	  This	  is	  an	  astonishing	  increase	  given	  that	  the	  party	  captured	  a	  mere	  0.23	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  last	  general	  elections	  in	  October	  2009	  (Cooper	  2012;	  Smith	  2012).	  	  The	  impact	  and	  significance	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  this	  right-­‐wing	  extremist	  group	  will	  be	  revealed	  in	  the	  coming	  months.	  	  	  	   Overall,	  the	  Greek	  state	  continues	  on	  a	  path	  that	  protects	  the	  private	  sector	  yet	  brutalizes	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  the	  Greek	  people.	  	  Angry	  at	  this	  reality	  and	  finding	  no	  recompense	  from	  the	  Greek	  government,	  the	  people	  are	  moving	  to	  the	  political	  extremes	  for	  relief.	  	  Signs	  of	  authoritarianism,	  once	  lurking	  in	  the	  shadows,	  are	  becoming	  more	  apparent.	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CHAPTER	  VII	  
CONCLUSION	  	  	   In	  today’s	  globalized	  world-­‐system,	  financial	  crises	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  aberration	  to	  the	  otherwise	  smooth	  functioning	  of	  the	  world	  economy.	  	  Unfortunately,	  as	  recent	  events	  have	  shown,	  financial	  crises	  have	  become	  the	  norm.	  	  The	  persistence	  of	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  that	  has	  evaded	  any	  signs	  of	  recovery	  speaks	  to	  this	  point.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  those	  in	  power	  have	  not	  learned	  from	  previous	  examples	  of	  financial	  crisis,	  specifically	  the	  Latin	  American	  financial	  crisis,	  and	  instead	  continue	  to	  recommend	  and	  implement	  strategies	  that	  fail	  in	  their	  explicitly	  intended	  goals-­‐-­‐to	  end	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis.	  	   We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  Greek	  crisis	  is	  not	  a	  unique	  case.	  	  Not	  only	  are	  other	  indebted,	  peripheral	  eurozone	  countries	  experiencing	  their	  own	  respective	  crises	  for	  much	  the	  same	  reasons,	  but	  also	  Latin	  America	  was	  in	  a	  very	  similar	  predicament	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  	  Different	  actors	  and	  mechanisms	  were	  at	  play,	  however,	  the	  central	  fact	  of	  a	  debt	  crisis	  remains	  largely	  the	  same.	  	  In	  Latin	  America,	  profligate	  states	  allegedly	  squandered	  borrowed	  money	  leading	  to	  their	  debt	  crisis.	  	  In	  Greece,	  a	  corrupt	  and	  inefficient	  government	  bureaucracy	  is	  being	  criticized	  for	  amassing	  an	  unsustainable	  amount	  of	  debt,	  also	  leading	  to	  a	  debt	  crisis.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  structural	  adjustment	  became	  the	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	  “cure”	  for	  indebted	  countries,	  and	  in	  both	  cases,	  structural	  adjustment	  failed	  to	  achieve	  stability	  for	  crisis-­‐ridden	  states.	  	  	  	   The	  Latin	  American	  debt	  crisis	  led	  to	  the	  “Lost	  Decade”	  of	  the	  1980’s.	  	  In	  Greece,	  researchers	  talk	  about	  a	  “lost	  generation”	  of	  young	  people	  who	  cannot	  find	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jobs,	  as	  the	  youth	  unemployment	  rate	  reaches	  48	  percent	  and	  rising,	  and	  overall	  unemployment	  stands	  at	  21	  percent	  ("Greek	  Unemployment	  Passes	  20	  percent,	  48	  for	  Youth"	  2012a).	  	  Such	  an	  exorbitant	  amount	  of	  unemployed	  Greeks	  has	  intensified	  the	  protest	  movement,	  as	  angry	  Greeks	  have	  no	  constructive	  outlet	  to	  vent	  their	  frustration.	  	  The	  police	  are	  frequently	  called	  to	  brutally	  suppress	  these	  social	  outbursts.	  	   Those	  in	  charge	  of	  resolving	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  have	  failed	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  lessons	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  financial	  crisis.	  	  National	  reforms	  failed	  to	  stabilize	  what	  was	  a	  global	  problem	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  National	  reforms	  in	  Greece	  are	  similarly	  failing	  to	  stabilize	  what	  is	  a	  global	  problem	  within	  the	  eurozone.	  	  Simply	  stated,	  global	  structural	  problems	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  with	  national	  policies.	  	  	   In	  an	  effort	  to	  build	  a	  monetary	  union	  in	  Europe,	  power	  differences	  among	  member	  countries	  were	  reinforced.	  	  Core	  eurozone	  countries	  pursued	  export-­‐led	  development	  strategies	  in	  the	  post-­‐euro	  period	  that	  led	  to	  budget	  surpluses	  and	  strong,	  industrialized	  economies.	  	  In	  the	  eurozone	  periphery,	  Greece	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  PIGS’s	  exports	  became	  less	  competitive,	  stimulating	  an	  import	  frenzy	  from	  the	  core	  countries.	  	  Readily	  available	  loans	  provided	  by	  the	  EU	  accumulated	  onto	  Greece’s	  budget	  deficit	  creating	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  debt	  crisis.	  	  Any	  viable	  solution	  must	  take	  this	  dynamic	  into	  consideration.	  	  The	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  within	  the	  eurozone	  must	  be	  dismantled	  if	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  has	  any	  hope	  of	  resolution.	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   What	  is	  needed	  is	  a	  new	  framework	  to	  analyze	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  that	  directly	  confronts	  the	  structured	  power	  imbalance	  within	  the	  eurozone.	  	  Otherwise,	  no	  amount	  of	  belt-­‐tightening	  and	  economic	  restructuring	  in	  Greece	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  permanent	  resolution	  to	  the	  crisis.	  	  For	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  eurozone	  to	  stabilize,	  a	  global	  strategy	  must	  be	  adopted.	  	  	  	   A	  valid	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  actually	  meant	  to	  be	  permanently	  resolved.	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  more	  than	  two	  years	  that	  Greece	  has	  been	  mired	  in	  crisis,	  and	  the	  same	  failing	  reform	  strategies	  have	  continuously	  been	  advocated	  and	  implemented,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  conceive	  that	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  actually	  resolved,	  but	  simply	  managed.	  	  Actually	  resolving	  the	  crisis	  would	  be	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  European	  and	  Greek	  elites	  who	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  handling	  the	  crisis.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  different	  strategy	  than	  structural	  adjustment	  was	  implemented	  to	  resolve	  the	  crisis,	  foreign	  banks	  and	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  (ECB)	  who	  own	  Greek	  debt	  may	  have	  to	  take	  a	  complete	  loss	  on	  its	  investments	  which	  is	  detrimental	  to	  the	  elites.	  	  Structural	  adjustment,	  instead,	  protects	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  the	  Greek	  economy	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  elites	  and	  continues	  to	  hold	  the	  Greek	  state	  accountable	  on	  its	  debt	  obligations.	  	   Assuming	  that	  European	  elites	  truly	  intend	  to	  resolve	  the	  crisis,	  as	  one	  would	  hope,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  those	  in	  power	  lack	  an	  accurate	  conception	  of	  how	  structural	  adjustment	  actually	  operates,	  rather	  than	  how	  it	  is	  theorized	  to	  operate.	  	  Recently	  in	  April	  2012,	  Olli	  Rehn,	  Commissioner	  for	  the	  Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Affairs,	  and	  the	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ECB	  emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  Greece	  to	  implement	  further	  structural	  adjustment	  measures,	  yet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  criticized	  Greece	  for	  not	  implementing	  such	  measures	  effectively.	  	  Rehn	  identified	  two	  weaknesses	  with	  the	  Greek	  state	  that	  hinder	  proper	  implementation	  of	  the	  reform	  strategy:	  “weak	  administrative	  capacity”	  and	  “lack	  of	  necessary	  political	  unity”	  ("Troika	  Targets	  More	  Political	  Ownership"	  2012).	  This	  is	  a	  contradictory	  situation	  where	  elites	  are	  calling	  for	  more	  structural	  adjustment,	  yet	  criticizing	  Greece	  for	  its	  ineffective	  implementation	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  due	  to	  government	  mismanagement.	  	  This	  is	  a	  conflation	  of	  cause	  and	  effect.	  	   Structural	  adjustment	  leads	  to	  the	  weak	  administrative	  capacity	  and	  lack	  of	  political	  unity,	  and	  thus	  ineffective	  implementation,	  due	  to	  the	  inherent	  fragmentary	  nature	  of	  such	  policies;	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around	  where	  weak	  administrative	  capacity	  and	  lack	  of	  political	  unity	  is	  causing	  structural	  adjustment	  to	  be	  ineffectively	  implemented.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  an	  unsuccessful	  structural	  adjustment	  reform	  strategy	  is	  due	  to	  the	  faulty	  logic	  inherit	  in	  such	  policies,	  rather	  than	  being	  simply	  an	  external	  factor	  of	  mismanaged	  governments.	  	  	  	   As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  both	  Latin	  America	  and	  in	  Greece	  (as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  other	  indebted	  peripheral	  eurozone	  countries),	  structural	  adjustment	  measures	  cause	  massive	  social	  upheaval	  that	  tears	  apart	  the	  fabric	  of	  society.	  	  It	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  a	  failed	  reform	  strategy	  if	  the	  intent	  is	  to	  stabilize	  the	  macroeconomic	  finances	  of	  indebted	  countries	  and	  lead	  to	  economic	  and	  social	  stability.	  	  If	  the	  intent	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  is	  to	  solely	  manage	  the	  crisis,	  and	  not	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actually	  resolve	  it,	  then	  structural	  adjustment	  may	  be	  effective.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  the	  European	  officials	  have	  rescinded	  modernity’s	  promise	  of	  “social	  justice”	  and	  have	  embarked	  on	  a	  path	  that	  benefits	  themselves	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  people.	  	  	   Regardless	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  crisis	  is	  actually	  intended	  to	  be	  resolved,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  financial	  crisis	  continues	  to	  plague	  Greece	  has	  real	  and	  tangible	  effects	  for	  the	  Greek	  people.	  	  As	  the	  social	  contract	  has	  been	  continuously	  eroded	  for	  the	  past	  two	  years	  and	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  has	  dramatically	  fallen,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  this	  trend	  will	  continue	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  and	  structural	  adjustment	  will	  retain	  its	  primacy	  as	  a	  reform	  strategy.	  	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  mainstream	  political	  system	  and	  its	  continuous	  support	  for	  growth-­‐stifling,	  cost-­‐cutting	  austerity	  measures	  have	  lead	  to	  the	  Greek	  people	  searching	  for	  an	  alternative	  at	  the	  political	  extremes.	  	  	  	  	   The	  direction	  that	  the	  Greek	  financial	  crisis	  is	  headed	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  is	  unclear.	  	  Will	  European	  officials	  and	  the	  Greek	  government	  continue	  to	  advocate	  for	  failing	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  interests?	  	  Will	  the	  far-­‐left	  in	  Greece	  continue	  to	  strengthen	  and	  reverse	  the	  austerity	  treatment?	  	  Will	  the	  far-­‐right	  gain	  momentum	  and	  steer	  Greece	  in	  an	  authoritarian	  direction?	  	  Only	  time	  will	  tell.	  	  For	  now,	  the	  future	  of	  Greece	  is	  shrouded	  with	  uncertainty.	  	  The	  Greek	  night	  will	  grow	  darker	  before	  the	  dawn.	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